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Preface
My research on networks in the Russian economy and society started in 
the early 1990s as part of a larger European research project on personal 
networks coordinated by Professor Maurizio Gribaudi at the École des 
Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. The Finnish part of the project was 
led by Professor Risto Alapuro at the University of Helsinki. The interest 
Risto and I had in Russian society led us first to add the case of Russia 
to the network data corpus on other European societies and later on to 
conduct several other research projects on the Russian economy and 
society. Without Risto’s continuous support and encouragement, intel-
lectual interaction and stimulation, this book would not exist.
Anna-Maija Castrén and Anna-Maria Salmi joined our Finnish 
research group and worked intensively on the network data collected 
within the frame of our common project. I have always been able to 
count on Anna-Maija’s and Anna-Maria’s help, and their serious and 
uncompromising attitude to the researcher’s profession remains exem-
plary for me.
Russia turned out to be a tenacious research topic. After 1992 all the 
research projects in which I have participated or which I have led have, 
in one way or another, had to do with Russia. Within these projects 
I have, with Risto Alapuro and other colleagues, collected and analyzed 
data on the personal networks of Russian secondary school teachers, 
factory workers, young mobile phone users, and IT professionals, often 
in a comparative perspective.
I am grateful to the many people who assisted in the realization of 
this book. Aleksi Aaltonen, Svetlana Kirichenko, Eeva Nironen, Sylvi 
Nikitenkov, and Olga Tarasenko helped in preparing the online survey 
on the personal networks of IT professionals. Tatyana Kozlova collected 
the Russian interview data, which was coded by Sylvi Nikitenkov at 
the Department of Sociology, University of Helsinki. As native Russian 
speakers, Sylvi Nikitenkov and Viktor Sinelnikov have been constant 
sources of help at the Department of Sociology, both in practical terms 
and in helping to make sense of the linguistic details and cultural specif-
icities of the Russian interview data. In addition, Sylvi has diligently and 
competently worked as my assistant during all phases of the research, 
gathering and analyzing data from various sources.
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My gratitude also extends to the people who helped either in the 
fieldwork, the data analysis, or the writing period through discussions 
concerning Russian business practices, the features of Russian culture, 
or network methods: Zhanna Tsinman, Alexander Etkind, Kapitolina 
Fedorova, Timo Harmo, Natalya Ganina, Boris Gladarev, Jukka Gronow, 
Melanie Feakins, Arkady Khotin, Meri Kulmala, Nikolay Likhodedov, 
Elizabeth Moore, Sanna Määttänen, Tiina Saajasto, Pekka Sutela, Terttu 
Turunen, and Alexey Yurchak.
Risto Alapuro, Alena Ledeneva, Anna-Maria Salmi, Philipp Torchinsky, 
Larisa Shpakovskaya, and anonymous reviewers at Palgrave Macmillan 
have read the earlier versions of the manuscript and made many invalu-
able comments. In addition, Philipp deserves special thanks for his per-
manent and valuable help in all phases of the study. Taiba Batool and 
Gemma Papageorgiou at Palgrave Macmillan were indispensable aids in 
converting the manuscript into the final book.
The Academy of Finland, the Aleksanteri Institute, Collegium for 
Advanced Studies and Department of Sociology at the University of 
Helsinki have supported the research financially and offered peaceful 
but stimulating research environments. I owe special thanks to Risto 
Alapuro and Markku Kivinen for arranging for the financing of the 
study in the interstices of two research projects.
During recent years the research seminar led by Risto Alapuro at the 
Department of Sociology has been a permanent source of collegial sup-
port and constructive criticism. Wise advice from and discussions with 
Eeva Luhtakallio and Tuomas Ylä-Anttila from the seminar have been 
especially significant. I have also been fortunate to be able to lean on 
the substantial knowledge and expertise of the Russian society provided 
by the staff and the researchers of the Aleksanteri Institute, the effec-
tive and quick library and information services of the Institute, and the 
library of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Helsinki.
The most important of my international connections have been 
with France and Russia. The French connection has been effectuated 
through yearly research exchange visits to the École des Hautes Études 
en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) within the exchange program between 
EHESS and the University of Helsinki. The advice of Alain Blum, Pascal 
Cristofoli, Myriam Désert, Gilles Favarel-Garrigues, Maurizio Gribaudi, 
Anne Le Huérou, Anna Lebedev, Anna Zaytseva, Kathy Rousselet, and 
Laurent Thévenot has been particularly beneficial. In addition, the 
conferences of the International Network for Social Network Analysis 
(INSNA) and the collegial help and discussions effectuated through the 
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INSNA international e-mail distribution list SOCNET have been irre-
placeable resources.
In Russia my main contact has been with the European University 
at St. Petersburg, the home base of my research visits in Russia. I thank 
Vladimir Gelman, Oleg Kharkhordin, Anna Temkina, Vadim Volkov, 
and Elena Zdravomyslova for their intellectual stimulation and practi-
cal assistance. 
In addition to the European University, another important node in 
my St. Petersburg network is the Center for Independent Social Research 
led by Viktor Voronkov. The Center and its researchers, particularly Boris 
Gladarev, have been invaluable resources for this study. In Moscow the 
expertise, support, research, and contacts provided by Vadim Radaev at 
the Higher School of Economics are gratefully acknowledged.
My greatest thanks go to the Russian IT professionals who took time 
out of their busy schedules in order to be interviewed or to participate 
in our web survey. Those who were particularly helpful, and with 
whom I still continue to exchange opinions after the completion of the 
research project, cannot be singled out here in order to protect their 
anonymity, but I would like to warmly acknowledge the gift of their 
time and thoughtful interaction. The responsibility for the conclusions, 
interpretations, and outright errors in the text is, naturally, mine only.
Ursa Dykstra revised the language of the book with great care and 
expertise, and also translated parts of the manuscript from Finnish to 
English. Irina Vesikko assisted in the final phases of the book editing 
and checked the English transliterations of Russian words.
I am also obliged to the writer Antti Hyry, a legend of Finnish litera-
ture, who believes that finishing a book manuscript is, after all, a mat-
ter of sheer will and resolution. In an interview after having received a 
major Finnish literary prize Hyry said: ‘If you intend to write a book, 
you just have to write it’. These words pushed me during moments of 
doubt to finish this book.
Finally, I want to thank my wife Anu-Katriina Pesonen, my daughter 
Ruut, and my son Elja for their patience and endurance.
Preface xi
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The software industry as an exemplary case of the 
functioning of the Russian market economy
If Russia has indeed ‘become a market economy’ as Anders Åslund 
claimed already in 1995, what are the roles of the social,  cultural and 
moral aspects of this economy and how does it function at the level of 
individual actors and their personal relations? In more concrete terms: 
what kinds of resources are transmitted through the personal networks 
of Russian business managers and directors, and which mechanisms 
govern this transmission?
This book searches for answers to these questions by contesting the 
separation of the economy from the social world and by setting the 
interactions of real people in their everyday economic activities at 
the center of inquiry (Swedberg and Granovetter 2001). The investiga-
tion will be accomplished through the analysis of interviews and an 
online survey conducted among specialists, managers, directors and 
company owners of St. Petersburg software development companies 
between 2003 and 2006.
The software industry is a particularly indicative test case through 
which to investigate the Russian market economy and its network-
ing practices.1 A study of one of the most sophisticated and modern 
(though still relatively modest in terms of turnover and profit) parts 
of the Russian economy should better reveal the actual functioning of 
the markets than, say, a study of the state-controlled energy sector. The 
Russian software industry is also relatively less influenced by the ‘Soviet 
heritage’ than many other branches of the Russian economy: though its 
roots are in the scientific and technical knowledge already accumulated 
in the Soviet era and imperial Russia, the first companies emerged only 
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during perestroika and as a rule did not inherit outdated Soviet produc-
tion facilities or management structures.
This book contributes to the literature on post-Soviet transition, 
affording a rarely available micro-level view on the new Russian knowl-
edge-based economy. In addition, it has both economic and political 
importance. From the viewpoint of the development of the Russian 
economy, this book’s significance lies in pointing out perspectives on 
economic diversification in terms of mathematical-technical expertise 
instead of on energy production and export. A developed software sector 
is not only essential for the modernization of all fields of the economy; 
the examples of Ireland and India suggest that it may also function 
as a major source of revenue in a national economy (Terekhov 2003). 
Increasing global connections in the field of information technology 
may also encourage the adoption of international business practices, for 
example through ISO and CMM quality certification (Feakins 2007).
Finding the Russian economy a way out of the ‘resource curse’ is all 
the more necessary since the economic policy based on energy produc-
tion has had its time in the sun and the growth in output of basic energy 
commodities is likely to remain low (Sutela 2008a, b). This necessity has 
not gone unnoticed by the Russian leadership: both Vladimir Putin and 
Dmitry Medvedev have on several occasions emphasized the need to 
diversify the Russian economy.2 The latter, for example, has criticized 
harshly the backwardness of the Russian economy and its anchorage 
in the Soviet past, naming information technology as one of the five 
new priority areas of the economy. When announcing the creation of 
a presidential commission for the modernization and technological 
development of Russia’s economy in May 2009, Medvedev openly 
admitted that none of the precedent measures taken to boost innova-
tion-based high-tech economy in the 2000s, such as industrial parks, 
technology transfer centers, special economic zones or Russian venture 
companies, had yielded serious results but rather existed ‘only on paper’ 
(Butrin and Granik 2009). He returned to the economic moderniza-
tion theme in his opening address for the commission in June, in his 
widely debated article ‘Go, Russia!’ in September, and in his address to 
the Federal Assembly in December of the same year (Medvedev 2009a, 
b, c).3
From the viewpoint of politics, the investments by and collaboration 
with foreign IT firms in Russia as well as the Russian IT entrepreneurs’ 
activities may open up the Russian economy and create preconditions 
for a new kind of state–business relationship, currently characterized by 
the dominance of the state over the economy (Yakovlev 2006). More 
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importantly, modern information and communications technology 
plays an increasingly important role for the horizontal communication 
among civil society actors, substituting for the biased coverage of the 
Russian mainstream media (Lonkila 2008).
The role of social networks in the Soviet and Russian 
economy and society
Thanks primarily to Alena Ledeneva’s (1998) work on blat – a Soviet sys-
tem of using connections to obtain private gain from state resources – 
there is agreement among researchers on the central role social net-
works played in Soviet society.4 In order to get by in daily life, most 
Soviet citizens had to pull strings, for example, to get decent meat, a car, 
an apartment or exemption from army service. 
However, the use of social networks for purposes other than blat 
in the Soviet Union is a clearly under-researched topic. Blat practices 
certainly did not cover all the instances of mutual favors or helping 
others out in Soviet daily life. Moreover, even the actual prevalence of 
blat in the Soviet Union is difficult to estimate in retrospect. As noted 
by Anna-Maria Salmi, it is not known how many Soviet citizens actu-
ally obtained, say, their apartment or car by using blat (Salmi 2006, 
2009).5
The critical notes by Salmi also warn against hasty answers to the 
question ‘What happened to the use of connections when the Soviet 
Union collapsed?’ If we lack reliable empirical data on the prevalence of 
these connections in the Soviet Union, the estimates of the changes in 
post-Soviet Russia in these ties will be educated guesses at best.
Despite the problems, a natural expectation would seem to be that 
the privatizing of the economy and the spread of market relations 
would have torn apart old Soviet era practices such as blat: most goods 
which were in short supply in the Soviet Union are now freely available 
on the market, there are less state property, goods or services to use in 
private exchanges, and the market costs of these exchanges are clearly 
visible to all participants (Ledeneva 1998; for a closer look at blat and 
its transformation in post-Soviet Russia see Chapter 4).
However, a growing body of research on the use of social networks 
in the post-Soviet era suggests that connections still play an important 
role in Russian society, for example, in health care (Salmi 2003; Rivkin-
Fish 1997, 2005), education (Lonkila 1998), civil society and collective 
action (Alapuro 2001; Alapuro and Lonkila 2000; Gibson 2001) and 
many other fields of life (Salmi 2006; Ledeneva 2009).6 Though, because 
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of the fading of the Soviet shortage economy, there is less need to pull 
strings to get access to goods and services, connections are still needed – 
often in conjunction with money – to ensure their quality.
The results of these studies are lent further support by an all-Russian 
survey on the non-market forms of exchanges of help in Russian fami-
lies’ daily life conducted by the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2000 
and 2006. The study revealed that the number of Russian families get-
ting various types of help from their personal networks had increased in 
regard to almost all types of help. The study also found that the types 
of help obtained from one’s social networks varied according both to 
the local context (help being more prevalent in growth regions such 
as Moscow and St. Petersburg) and to the socioeconomic level of the 
families. The poor families used their social ties mainly to survive in 
daily life, whereas the ‘multifunctional’ networks of the more well-to-do 
families also helped them in improving their situation. The results of 
the study suggest that social networks are not only the result of social 
stratification but also reproduce this stratification.7
Similarly, a face-to-face survey conducted in 313 Moscow families in 
2005–6 about their engagement in non-market work found that the 
vast majority of the households studied participated in non-market 
economic practices, including the subsistence economy, non-monetized 
exchange with friends, neighbors and kin and informal monetary 
exchange (Williams and Round 2007).8
Networks are not only used, however, for Russian households’ subsist-
ence, but to solve a wide variety of daily life problems in various arenas 
and fields of life. Expanding the area surveyed outside the household 
income formation allows us to conclude that the connections still have 
an important role in post-Soviet Russian society.
In line with the findings regarding the role of networks in Russian 
society, the studies of networks in the Russian economy have confirmed 
their role across a variety of economic contexts such as labor markets 
(Clarke and Kabalina 2000; Yakubovich and Kozina 2000; Yakubovich 
2005), banking (Guseva and Rona-Tass 2001) and entrepreneurship and 
firm performance (Aidis et al. 2008; Shmulyar Gréen 2009; Batjargal 
2003, 2005a, b, 2007; Rogers 2006).9
Because of the wide range of study areas, different theoretical back-
grounds, a range of methods mostly not designed for network research 
and often-metaphorical notions of networks, this literature does not 
produce coherent or accumulating results. These difficulties notwith-
standing, the main conclusion points to the continuing and central 
importance of social networks in Russian economic life.10
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The significance of networks in the Russian economy is often 
related to lacking or incomplete market institutions such as the bank-
ing system, the distrust of most societal institutions penetrating 
Russian society11 and the patterns of behavior inherited from the Soviet 
era. In Russian daily life several aspects that are taken for granted in 
‘Western countries’12 may turn out to become problematic; and in 
solving these problems, one is inclined to turn to his/her social ties for 
help.13
Despite the wealth of research on social networks in the Russian 
economy, there is still a remarkable lack of empirical studies describing 
in detail how these networks function in practice at the grassroots level. 
How do the network ties emerge and form? What kinds of resources 
flow through these ties? Which mechanisms govern the transmission of 
resources? These are the questions this book seeks to answer by paying 
attention not only to social, but also cultural and moral aspects of the 
Russian economy.
Incorporating cultural and moral aspects into studies of 
networks in the Russian economy
Studies of social networks in the Russian economy seem to suffer 
from a double bias: it is as if any use of social networks in Russia has 
a somewhat dubious or instrumental character, and the networks of 
economic life are even more contaminated by pervasive instrumental-
ism and illegal or immoral behavior. Consequently, other aspects of the 
social networks, such as friendship or non-instrumental mutual help, 
have received much less attention (but see Kharkhordin 2005: 132–54, 
2009).
At least two reasons for this state of affairs can be distinguished. 
First, due to the vagueness or complete lack of definition of the notion 
of ‘network’, the term may be used to refer to anything from formal 
interorganizational ties to social interaction in general (Salmi 2006). 
Second, social networks are often confused with blat and post-Soviet 
informal practices despite the fact that not all informal practices are 
effectuated through social networks, and networks also have other, non-
instrumental functions such as sociability.
This book seeks to overcome these problems by taking the notion 
of personal network both as the theoretical point of departure and 
methodological tool of the study, enabling an analysis of networks 
as an alternative means to markets for coordinating economic 
activities. This analysis will reveal the tensions resulting from the 
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sometimes-contradictory requirements of personal ties and markets and 
illustrate the intertwining of social, cultural and moral aspects in the 
Russian economy.
This book focuses, instead of on illegal or immoral practices, on more 
supportive and mundane aspects of favors, ranging from a hint about a 
good job from a friend to the help of a lawyer acquaintance in writing 
a contract or the advice of an old schoolmate to locate a key person in 
a client organization. Without these kinds of favors – mostly invisible 
in any statistics – neither the Russian nor any other economy would 
work properly. It is essential to note that these favors are often quicker, 
cheaper and more effective than alternative, formal ways of action, 
and they do not necessarily have to have either an illegal or immoral 
character. At the same time, they may have important consequences 
for the economy and society as a whole, as is the case in job searches, 
for example.14
Thus this study complements previous research on economic net-
works and informal practices, particularly Alena Ledeneva’s important 
work on the economy and society of the Soviet Union and post-Soviet 
Russia, including such works as Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, 
Networking and Informal Exchange (Ledeneva 1998) and How Russia 
Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and 
Business (Ledeneva 2006), but differs from Ledeneva’s research in several 
respects.
First, Ledeneva’s (1998) examples concern the daily life problems of 
ordinary people and various fields of business in both the Soviet Union 
and post-Soviet Russia, whereas this book deals solely with the most 
modern part of the post-Soviet Russian economy. Second, this study 
focuses on personal networks instead of informal practices. Third, 
the material of Ledeneva’s latest book (2006) describes the situation 
mainly in the 1990s, ending with her study of informal practices up 
to the year 2003. The online survey data of this book were collected 
in 2004 (describing the situation in 2003), but the interviews cover 
the years 2003–6, with updates to the present. Fourth, this study deals 
with ‘the economy of favors’ in post-Soviet Russia, which differs from 
blat exchanges in two important ways: the mutual favors analyzed 
in this book do not have to have the dubious character that marked 
blat exchanges, nor is state property or access to it as a rule used as a 
medium of exchange. Finally, this book shows that the Russian market 
economy is not only embedded in social networks but also that the 
actors in the networks justify their economically relevant transactions 
by referring to moral principles.
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Structure of the book
The next chapter describes the theoretical idea, methods and data of 
the study. It introduces the notion of personal network to the reader 
and analyzes the advantages of the notion in the studies of the Russian 
economy and society. The chapter also describes in detail the use of the 
researchers’ own personal ties when trying to get interviews from the 
busy Russian IT professionals. This description is not only of a method-
ological nature, however, since it simultaneously illustrates the central 
theme of this book: the importance of personal network ties in solving 
problems in post-Soviet Russia.
Chapter 3 contextualizes the network data on Russian managers’ 
and directors’ networks analyzed in this book. The chapter begins with 
a case description of the birth and development of the St. Petersburg 
software company ‘Arcadia’. This case is then placed in a larger context 
by a portrayal of the evolution of the IT field in the Soviet Union and 
post-Soviet Russia.
Though the IT sector has been less affected by the Soviet past than 
many other fields of Russian industry, this past is still in many ways 
present in today’s IT sector. Chapter 4 discusses both the constraining 
and enabling aspects of this ‘Soviet legacy’. It offers examples of the 
gradual transformation of informal Soviet practices, such as blat (pull-
ing strings), to the transition-era barter and present-day otkat, a new and 
widespread form of corruption.
Social networks do not grow haphazardly; rather, new acquaint-
ances are usually made in social contexts and milieus where people 
are brought together by some common purpose and are likely to have 
regular or prolonged interaction. Chapter 5 studies the social milieus 
and ‘interaction foci’ important to personal network growth among 
St. Petersburg IT professionals. They include schools with a spe-
cial emphasis on mathematics, the several technical universities of 
St. Petersburg, virtual milieus such as Russian weblogs and social net-
working web sites, the association of Russian software developers and 
the special importance and social functions of birthdays in the Russian 
economy and society.
Chapter 6 describes in detail the contents of the network exchanges, 
illustrated by quotes from our respondents’ interviews. These exchanges 
transmit various kinds of information and other important economic 
resources, such as jobs, advice and concrete help.
While the previous chapter dealt with the contents of the Russian 
managers’ informal transactions, Chapter 7 analyzes the social 
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mechanisms governing these exchanges. The chapter focuses on three 
such mechanisms: reciprocal obligations, the use of brokers in resource 
transmission and evaluation and the mixing of professional and personal 
spheres of life. In discussing reciprocal obligations, the chapter shows – 
drawing from the justification theory developed by Luc Boltanski and 
Laurent Thévenot ([1991] 2006) − how the economically relevant 
exchanges between Russian IT professionals are related to and sup-
ported by the moral resources used to justify these exchanges.
Chapter 8 connects the micro-level analysis of preceding chapters to 
an assessment of the nature of the emerging new Russian capitalism, 
building on the results of an online network survey conducted among 
St. Petersburg IT professionals in 2004. Having established the impor-
tance of personal network ties in the Russian economy and society, this 
chapter examines the extent to which this significance is indicative of 
the emergence of the ‘new spirit of capitalism’, which values constant 
networking, projects and mobility (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005).
The study’s conclusions are offered in Chapter 9.
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2
Using Networks to Find 
Out about Networks
The significance of personal networks in studies of the 
Russian economy
The notion of network refers to a system consisting of nodes and the 
links between them. A social network may be distinguished from, say, 
computer networks by the fact that the nodes of the network are social 
actors. Often the nodes are individual persons, but in principle they 
could also be groups of people, cities, states, social organizations, and 
so on.1
In this book, however, a notion of personal network consisting of an 
individual person (ego) and the people (network members or alters) with 
whom s/he has relations is used.2 What constitutes a ‘relation’ depends 
on the study question. Typically, though not necessarily, a personal 
network may contain colleagues, family and kin, friends and acquaint-
ances, neighbors, and so forth.3
The central idea of this book is that in the Russian context the notion 
of personal network is, in addition to being a researcher’s tool for col-
lecting and analyzing empirical data, also recognized by the actors them-
selves as a conventional means of coordinating economically relevant 
transactions. In more concrete terms: turning to one’s personal network 
instead of formal economic institutions is a common way of conducting 
various transactions and solving problems in the Russian economy.
As will become evident later in this book, this convention of turning 
to one’s personal network has its roots not only in the Soviet period – 
and probably in Imperial Russia – but also in perestroika and the transi-
tion era. On the one hand, and somewhat paradoxically, the introduc-
tion of the principle of market competition to the economy forced the 
new Russian entrepreneurs to turn to their existing networks, but on the 
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other hand, it led to conflicts and tensions between the ‘network’ and 
‘market’ modes of coordinating transactions.
In studying the Russian economy, the notion of personal network 
has several advantages. First, in Russia the ties connecting organizations 
generally and firms in particular are often highly personal in nature. 
In other words, the interrelations between organizations are based, 
instead of on formal organizational roles, on the personal relations 
between particular individuals (Salmi and Bäckman 1999; Brygalina and 
Temkina 2004; Salmenniemi 2008). 
Second, the notion of personal network allows for relating the life 
history of an individual to the interaction with his personal network 
members. This makes it possible to combine aspects of both agency 
and structure in the analysis, but more importantly, to investigate the 
formation of social ties, often neglected in social network research.
Third, and closely related to the previous point,  the notion of per-
sonal network enables one to illustrate the mixing of ‘personal’ and 
‘professional’ spheres of life in Russia.4 A network study focusing only 
on the ties between colleagues within one organization cannot grasp 
the overlap and intertwining of social ties at and outside work (Lonkila 
1998, 2010).
Fourth, the notion of personal network corresponds closely with the 
way Russians speak about their social relations. The Russian language 
contains several expressions referring to personal networks, such as 
moi krug (my circle), okruzhenie (surrounding), blizkii krug (close circle), 
krug obshcheniia (circle of socializing) and krug znakomykh (circle of 
acquaintances).5 It is central for the purposes of this book that these 
expressions depict precisely personal networks anchored around focal 
individuals and containing different types of social relations such as 
family, kin, friends, and colleagues. The mixing of these relations in the 
personal networks of Russian IT business is one of the main findings of 
this study, but seems also to be a more general feature of the Russian 
society.6 
Finally, the great amount of time and effort placed on specific social 
rituals related to personal networks, such as birthday parties and cel-
ebrations, is indicative of their significance. In Russia, birthdays of the 
members of the extended family, friends, acquaintances, and colleagues 
are remembered and celebrated – often on several occasions – both at 
home and at work to a much greater extent than, say, in the US (Visson 
2003, for a closer account on birthdays see Chapter 5).
Our use of personal networks in social research owes much to the 
works of the Manchester school anthropologists (see, for example, 
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Mitchell 1969). For them the use of the notion was a conscious theo-
retical and methodological choice which allowed, for example, the 
investigation of the multiplexity of social ties (Gribaudi 1998).7 This 
book follows that lead by paying particular attention to the overlapping 
spheres of life as detected through personal network data.
The micro-level perspective implied in the use of the notion of 
personal network is similarly indebted to the recent anthropological 
research on Russia. This research, which emphasizes the importance of 
studying Russian society on a grassroots level, has produced some of 
the most interesting views on the Russian economy and society (e.g. 
Burawoy and Verdery 1999a; Ashwin 1999; Humphrey 2002; Yurchak 
2006).8
In all, turning to one’s personal network is a conventional way to 
effectuate transactions and solve various problems in the Russian 
economy. Understanding the nature of the present-day Russian market 
economy requires a detailed examination of the functioning of these 
networks, which is the aim of the empirical analysis of this book.
The qualitative approach in social network analysis
Many of the contributions and achievements of social network analysis 
have come from the ‘structural school’ (e.g. Wellman and Berkowitz 
1988), which is based on modeling and analyzing the patterns of ties 
between the members of networks. The critics of the structural school 
have claimed since the 1990s that this modeling has been carried out 
at the expense of reflection on the nature and content of the ties (e.g. 
Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Smith-Doerr and Powell 2005).
Stressing network structure at the expense of the nature of social ties 
runs the risk of universalizing the results mainly based on data collected 
in Western countries and consequently downplaying cross-country dif-
ferences. The comparative research on friendship networks suggests, 
for example, that there is variation in the rights and duties related to 
friendship (Fischer 1982; Castrén and Lonkila 2004). From this view-
point, the questions on friendship used in international comparative 
surveys take as a fixed point of departure a category which itself should 
be questioned and studied. 
This study belongs to the strand of qualitative and mixed-methods 
approaches to network analysis (Lonkila 1999a; Castrén 2000; Salmi 
2006; Fuhse 2009) in which, instead of network structure, the meaning 
and formation of personal network ties are at the center of attention.9 
It responds to the call by Smith-Doerr and Powell (2005: 394) for ‘more 
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process-oriented, case-based approaches’ which should offer accounts 
of ‘why ties are created, how they are maintained, what resources flow 
across these linkages, and with what consequences’.10
Because an important part of the respondents were shareholders or 
owners of St. Petersburg IT firms, this study also contributes to the 
research literature on entrepreneurship. Following Hoang and Antoncic 
(2003), this research addresses three essential components of social 
networks: the content, governance, and structure of the relationships. 
As for the content of the networks, network ties are considered to be 
the media through which actors gain access to resources held by other 
actors. The governance refers to mechanisms that coordinate network 
exchanges, and the structure denotes the pattern of relationships 
between actors (Hoang and Antoncic 2003: 166).
In this book, emphasis is laid on the role of personal networks in the 
transmission of resources. In the classification by Hoang and Antoncic, 
the focus is thus on the content of the ties (dealt with in Chapter 6), as 
well as on the mechanisms governing the functioning of the network 
(dealt with in Chapter 7). The modeling of network structure, which 
is primary in the structural network analysis tradition, will receive less 
attention and is included in the analysis mainly while discussing the 
role of brokerage (Chapter 7).
From the viewpoint of resource transmission, this study thus started 
as a ‘connectionist’ variant of social network analysis (Borgatti and 
Foster 2003: 1002) focusing on the resources that flow through social 
ties:
Ties are seen, often quite explicitly, as conduits through which 
information and aid flow (…) In this conception, an actor is suc-
cessful because she can draw on the resources controlled by her 
alters, including information, money, power, and material aid. This 
perspective is also implicit in the social support literature (…) and in 
most network research on entrepreneurs.
(Borgatti and Foster 2003: 1002)
However, during the study it became evident that the transmission 
of economically relevant resources in the networks could not be 
separated from social, cultural, and moral issues. Both the qualitative 
and quantitative data suggest that the mechanisms governing the 
network exchanges were not only based on atomistic individuals’ 
rational calculations, but were also deeply affected by social and moral 
considerations.
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Network data and how to get them
This book is based on the analysis of semi-structured interviews and 
personal network data collected among St. Petersburg IT professionals 
during 2003–6 (interviews) and in 2004 (network data).
The qualitative interview data
The interview data consist of semi-structured interviews conducted in 
St. Petersburg from 2003 to 2006 with 50 top- and mid-level IT directors 
and managers.11 Of the 50 respondents, 38 were under 40 years of age 
and eight were women.12 Except for two respondents, all had a univer-
sity degree, and several had either a licentiate13 or doctoral degree. The 
majority of the companies where respondents worked were owned by 
Russians, but the data also include foreign-owned companies and joint 
ventures. The bulk of the firms were established in the 1990s.14
Independently of this study, Melanie Feakins (2007) conducted 
interviews among St. Petersburg software companies involved in off-
shore programming. Feakins’ vivid characterization of her respondents 
applies mutatis mutandis to ours – more so since some of our interview-
ees were probably overlapping:
A large proportion of the firms interviewed were established by entre-
preneurs with PhDs who had left teaching, research, and academic 
life to establish firms with colleagues, friends, spouses, and as indi-
viduals. (…) Many were hesitant, amused, pleased, and sometimes 
still shocked that they have become entrepreneurs in the post-Soviet 
world, particularly because it had not been imaginable in the Soviet 
Union. (…) As a category of people, their deliberate distance from 
state administration and enterprise life of the Soviet period separates 
them distinctly from apparatchiks and new elites whose positions 
and wealth in post-Soviet society are derived largely from conver-
sions of their political status to material wealth and/or participation 
in privatization schemes of enterprises and natural resources.
(Feakins 2007: 1892)
In line with Feakins’ account, one of our respondents, a middle-aged 
Russian firm owner, described his situation upon the demise of the 
Soviet system as an unemployed engineer ‘who was of no use to any-
one’. Starting from nothing, he had built a flourishing software com-
pany that employed a considerable number of people and was growing 
yearly. Despite this success, he lived, behaved, and dressed modestly 
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and, instead of using the profits to improve his lifestyle, he invested 
most of his money in the development of the firm.15
Finding respondents was tricky. As IT professionals are generally busy 
people, finding time for one to two hour interviews from the daily 
chores of Russian business required a remarkable amount of work and 
preparation from our native Russian research assistant. Luckily, the 
process of locating and persuading potential candidates to be inter-
viewed turned out to be part of the phenomenon we studied in several 
ways. 
First, the respondents were often found through the interviewer’s 
personal networks, and sometimes through the network of the author 
of this book. This process illustrated the importance of personal ties and 
brokerage in making things happen in Russia, as becomes evident from 
the field notes of the research assistant:
Respondent [project leader, p23] was found thanks to Vadim 
Grigor’evich [a friend of the author] (…) Generally, the interview 
went very sympathetically but this was basically due to Vadim 
Grigor’evich’s mediation. After the interview the respondent con-
fessed that without this mediation he would not have agreed to be 
interviewed.
Another reluctant respondent (system administrator, p32) finally agreed 
to be interviewed, probably influenced by the fact that he had been the 
classmate of the son of our interviewer’s acquaintance, who, in his turn, 
was acquainted with the interviewer’s mother.
Second, the respondents often seemed to agree to be interviewed 
thanks to the particular role of the ‘ethics of helping out’ in Russian 
culture which will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 7 of this book. 
Third, our research assistant’s field notes about the atmosphere and 
communication prior to, during, and after the interview illuminated 
the mixing of professional and personal spheres of life, one of the main 
themes of this book, in the interaction between the Russian interviewer 
and the Russian respondents. On several occasions the interview started 
out in a professional tone and floated to the areas of common interests 
and personal life of both parties.
All these aspects will be discussed in detail in later chapters. Here it 
suffices to say that the very process of data collection already illustrated 
the main substantial results and theoretical ideas of this book, justify-
ing its detailed examination here as much as a result of the study as a 
description of its methods.
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As a rule, interviews were conducted in a relaxed atmosphere either at 
the office, café, car, or even home, often accompanied by a cup of coffee 
or tea. The main disrupting factors were work-related time pressures and 
occasional interruptions by workmates. Out of 50 interviews, only one 
turned out to be a truly unpleasant experience:
I would not want to meet this person another time. He demonstrated 
benevolence, willingness to help. But his whole tone of speaking, 
expressions and questions could be experienced as an attempt to 
show who is who here. I felt like I was interrogated. The only reason 
I let the respondent treat me this way was that this was for him the 
most natural way of interacting with people whom he considered 
inferior to him. Prior to the interview the respondent asked questions 
about my university and faculty and my understanding of sociology. 
Then he said that I have exactly one hour for the interview, and put 
the clock on the table in front of him. When he saw my list of ques-
tions, he grabbed it and started reading and answering the questions 
himself. In the course of the interview I asked complementary ques-
tions. When the interview had ended, the respondent boasted about 
that we managed to finish in one hour.
(interviewer’s field notes)
During his reading and answering the questions, the respondent men-
tioned that his firm was working for ‘state structures’ (gosstruktury) and 
replied ‘confidential’, for example, for questions about the number of 
employees and the location of offices.
Fortunately, this kind of reception was an exception. Generally, our 
respondents related to the study positively and seriously, trying to expli-
cate the details of their business practices and use of social ties to the 
best of their understanding.16 
Though interviews were conducted by a native Russian and the 
respondents were guaranteed anonymity, it would be naïve to assume 
that the respondents would have openly shared all aspects of their busi-
ness activities. Some refused to answer certain questions referring to 
business secrecy while others expressed right away that they wouldn’t 
reveal all they knew about the topic at hand:
I won’t tell everything about this case. There are simply things 
I won’t tell even if protected by anonymity. Believe me, there are 
situations where not even close to everything can be written into a 
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contract. And in this case the guarantee for everything being done 
right and on time is the word of the person you are dealing with.
(general director, p4)
Therefore, one most likely ‘underrepresented’ theme of the study is 
the corrupt and informal practices of Russian business (cf. Chapter 4 of 
this book). Because of the wealth of studies on this topic and the focus 
of this study on the ‘routinized’ and legal ways of acting through net-
works, this is not a serious shortcoming.
Personal network data
Data on personal networks were collected in spring 2004 through a 
web-based network questionnaire.17 Respondents were selected from 
the catalogue ‘The whole computer world, St. Petersburg 2003’ (Ves’ 
kompyuterny mir, St. Petersburg 2003), which contained data on 1048 
firms in the field, and through the research group’s own connections. 
Though the catalogue hardly included all firms active in St. Petersburg 
at the time, it contained a wide variety of entrepreneurs dealing with 
software development, hardware, system integration, consulting, serv-
ice providing, and so forth. (The firms dealing only with computer 
hardware trade were not included in the survey.)
Selected firms were first approached by phone to find the e-mail 
address of a person who could and would answer our questionnaire. 
This person was then sent the weblink of our survey by e-mail. In the 
survey the respondents were asked to describe a successful project or 
work task which they had completed in 2003, and to name the three 
most important people (that is, their personal network members or 
‘alters’) involved in the implementation of the project. 
In addition, they were asked to name two more people who had been 
important for their whole career in ICT. Lastly, the respondents were 
asked to name one person who lived abroad and had had the most 
important effect on their whole activity in ICT (for more details, see 
Lonkila 2006). After having generated the list of names of their network 
members, the respondents indicated in a network matrix if, to their 
knowledge, their network members knew each other – that is, had been 
in mutual contact. In addition, the questionnaire contained free-form 
fields where the respondents could characterize their network members 
in their own words. This qualitative data turned out to be very interest-
ing for the purposes of this book.18
The complete web survey network data corpus contains information 
on 72 respondents and 343 network members. The respondents were 
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67 young or middle-aged male and five female ICT professionals from 
St. Petersburg, almost half of them younger than 36 years. Seventy 
percent of them had an MA degree, 22 percent were licentiates or 
doctors, and they were working in mostly small- or medium-sized ICT 
companies. The respondents were well placed in their own organiza-
tions: 28 percent were CEOs, 39 percent top directors, and 29 percent 
managers. In addition, 43 percent were shareowners in their companies. 
The 343 network members were also mostly young and middle-aged men, 
the majority of them working either as CEOs (18 percent), directors (20 
percent), or managers (20 percent).
The web survey data cannot be considered representative. Neither 
can we calculate the response rate since the information of our study 
was also diffused through our own connections who informed their 
acquaintances and friends of our survey. Nevertheless, combined with 
the interview data, it gives a vivid picture of the meaning and func-
tions of personal networks in the most modern part of the Russian 
economy.
Limitations of the study
This book focuses primarily on factors facilitating the transmission of 
resources and connecting actors. Network ties can, however, also be used 
strategically to exclude others, and their use may also have negative 
consequences both on micro and macro levels (e.g. Ledeneva 2004: 
8–9). Ronald Burt’s influential theory of structural holes, for example, is 
based on the tertius gaudens (the third who gains) idea borrowed from 
Georg Simmel. In this perspective, network member A takes advantage 
of the fact that he is connected to both B and C, who do not know 
each other. This intermediary position allows A the possibility to use 
it to his own advantage. However, this study follows David Obstfeld’s 
(2005) lead instead. Obstfeld has in his study of brokerage employed the 
tertius iungens (the third who joins) perspective, that is, the active role of 
network members in creating the connections between other network 
members (see Chapter 7).
Second, this book does not use the concept of social capital. Without 
denying the achievements of the large research literature on social 
capital, the notion is problematic for the tasks of this study. In her 
review on the problems of the notion, Salmi (2006: 51) notes how the 
leading theorists (Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman, and Robert Putnam) 
all stress different aspects of the concept. More importantly, the very 
essence of the notion remains vague. In the well-known formulation of 
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Robert Putnam (1993: 167), for example, social capital consists of trust, 
norms, and networks, each of which remains vaguely defined. 
One problem pointed out by critics is that social capital is often 
used in a very unfocused manner. Social capital means different 
things depending on the tradition one draws from and, in the worst 
case, can mean just about everything, as has been argued by Portes. 
He claims that Coleman started the proliferation of the concept by 
including ‘a number of different and even contradictory processes’ 
in the term, some of which are the mechanisms that generate social 
capital and some the consequences of its possession (Portes 1998, 5).
(Salmi 2006: 51)
Third, this book focuses on the role of social ties between human beings 
involved in economically relevant transactions. Formalized solutions 
such as standards and certifications are certainly of importance, but 
the emphasis of this study is rather on the ways of circumventing these 
standardized solutions with the use of social ties. 
Problems of generalization
The structure, composition, and functioning of the personal networks 
is influenced by several factors which have to do with the properties 
of the respondents (age, sex, place of birth, life course), their position 
in the organization (programmer vs. manager), and the characteristics 
of the company (field of industry, size, age, and so forth). For example, 
the role and meaning of networks is likely to change during the life 
cycle of a company. When acquiring customers, a small, start-up firm 
may be more inclined to use personal relations than a bigger company 
that has already established a stable client base.19 On the other hand, as 
will become evident later, even big companies are sometimes forced to 
turn to their networks, in order to win tenders, for example.
Many respondents also noted that networks function differently in 
offshore IT companies oriented toward foreign customers and adapted 
to Western standards of conducting business on the one hand, and in 
companies operating in domestic markets alongside big state-owned 
companies on the other hand. Because of the qualitative nature of this 
study, all of these ‘background variables’ cannot, however, be systemati-
cally investigated. 
Finally, the gender aspect merits both methodological and substantial 
comment. From the methodological viewpoint one has to note that 
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the interview situation consisted of a young Russian female student 
conducting interviews mostly with middle-aged Russian men. Because 
of the Russian gender system, this age and gender difference probably 
helped in obtaining interviews from the busy IT directors and manag-
ers. Moreover, in the interview situation some of the interviewees took 
a ‘teaching position’, which was often helpful in terms of creating an 
overall picture of the field. Most important, however, is to acknowledge 
that the gender difference most likely emphasized some aspects of the 
phenomenon studied and concealed others.
Substantially, both Russian business and the IT field are male-
dominated areas of life. This provoked a lively discussion between one 
of our female respondents (team leader, p37) and the female interviewer 
about the role of women in the IT business. The respondent noted that 
women are treated differently, and those starting from the bottom in 
the IT business have a harder time than men. This difference is, how-
ever, of complex character and contains several contradictory elements. 
According to her, being a woman has negative consequences until one 
has gathered enough experience, when the gender factor ‘starts to func-
tion strongly in your favor.’ Moreover, there are both places ‘where they 
don’t take you because you are a woman’ and places ‘where they will 
take you exactly because you are a woman.’ The respondent also related 
the gender aspect to the nature of the male Russian ‘work collective’ in 
IT business:
Firstly, many [Russian IT professionals] think that women cannot work 
as programmers. Secondly, many think that it is a crazy idea to take a 
woman into a company consisting of 20 men, because this spoils the 
collective and the mood of the men. And then one has to remember that 
women have a tendency of taking maternity leave. In the firm I worked 
at earlier, practically all of the women took maternity leave. Well, not 
all, but those with whom I myself had come to the company.
(team leader, p37)
Another female respondent belonging to top management stated that 
programming and engineering professions ‘are not women’s affairs’ (ne 
zhenskoe eto delo) – unlike marketing, where women can use ‘fine tools’ 
(tonkimi instrumentami mozhno vladet’) (director, p41). Still another 
female respondent (PR manager, p2) considered how ‘for women the 
family will always be first’.
These replies illustrate aspects of the Russian gender system that 
cannot be dealt with in detail here (for an account of entrepreneurship 
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in gender terms, see Shmulyar Gréen 2009: 93–8). However, consider-
ing the examples given above, it is likely that a systematic analysis of 
the women managers’ networks would confirm rather than refute the 
tendency toward mixing of personal and professional spheres of life 
observed in this study.
In sum, this book describes mostly owners’, directors’, and managers’ 
use of networks in small- and medium-sized Russian software compa-
nies, though it also includes interviews with employees from some of 
the biggest software companies in St. Petersburg. For the purposes of 
this book this bias toward SMEs (small- and medium-sized enterprises) 
firms is not fatal. First, the flourishing SMEs are considered important 
to the dynamics of the market economy, and even the biggest com-
panies have started small. Second, the larger and more important the 
company is, the more it runs the risk of getting involved in deals with 
state-owned companies or involved in the top-level politico-economic 
struggles. Thus, for a study of the emerging Russian market economy, 
SME companies are a good starting point.
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The Evolution of Russia’s IT Sector
This chapter describes the formation of the ICT field in post-Soviet 
Russia. The first section introduces the reader to the realities of a start-up 
Russian software firm and the role of personal networks in the company 
growth through a detailed description of the birth and development 
of Arcadia, one of the central software companies in St. Petersburg. 
The second section places this case in a larger historical context by 
depicting in a necessarily limited form the evolution of computing in 
the Soviet Union. The third section describes the role of information 
technology in the collapse of the Soviet Union, drawing on the work of 
Manuel Castells. The last section focuses on ICT in post-Soviet Russia 
by describing its role in the Russian national economy, the use of ICT 
by the Russians, the state’s supportive measures in the IT field, and the 
position of Russian IT in the global economy.
Arcadia: The birth of a St. Petersburg software company
Arcadia’s story is told here to illustrate the role of personal networks in 
the early phase of the emerging Russian software industry. The story 
relies on the account of Arcadia’s founder and CEO Arkady Khotin, and 
will be reproduced here on the basis of a series of meetings and e-mail 
exchanges between the author and Khotin, and the article by Cook 
(2009).1
Khotin was one of the thousands of Soviet engineers, computer scien-
tists, and mathematicians whom the collapse of both the economy and 
governmental support for scientific research forced to find new jobs. 
Many emigrated, but those who did not had to make a living at a time 
when the economy and society were floating from one crisis to another, 
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when the institutions of the market economy had not yet been created 
but the Soviet ones had started to fall apart.
Khotin’s recollections describe vividly the background of the first 
Russian IT entrepreneurs coming from the ranks of research institutes, 
the difficulties they faced in the early years of the formation of the 
software industry, and the central role of social relations in overcom-
ing these problems. The story will be presented in chronological order, 
depicting the most important steps taken and the resources accumu-
lated during Khotin’s professional career.
Potatoes and punchcards at a scientific research institute (1972–8)
After graduating from the Leningrad Institute of Aviation Engineering 
as a radio engineer, Khotin served two years in the Red Army base near 
Tallinn, the capital of Estonia. After serving in the army Khotin, now 
a reserve lieutenant, landed a job in 1972 as a hardware developer in a 
research institute, conducting studies in the field of hydrological tech-
nology in his native Leningrad. Khotin’s institute was secret, as were 
many Soviet research institutes – even the researchers in the different 
departments were not supposed to know what was being studied next 
door. As Khotin’s work was not in any way related to computers and his 
laboratory did not have one, he was introduced to the world of comput-
ing by a lucky coincidence. 
In the Soviet era, the employees of the institute were sent once a year 
to help nearby state farms to harvest potatoes. During these trips, which 
were called kartoshka (potato) by the staff, there was not much to do 
in the evenings but drink vodka and get to know the researchers from 
the other laboratories. Bumping into one of these acquaintances at the 
institute later on proved crucially important for Khotin’s future:
I ran into this guy in the corridor of our institute. He was carrying 
a huge pile of Hollerith cards [punch cards used for programming]. 
I did not know what they were because our laboratory did not have 
any computers and I jokingly swiped the whole pile to the floor. 
He got very angry and shouted that he’d been working on them for 
months and I had ruined everything. I apologized, helped him to 
pick the cards up and sat with him several evenings helping to re-
sort them. While doing this I grew interested in programming and 
computers. ‘What is this computer? What do you do with it?’
Khotin started to study programming voluntarily in evening courses. 
One of his young teachers – today a professor of computer science at a 
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prestigious St. Petersburg university – told the course participants that 
they needed to start learning programming or they would find them-
selves on the street in a few years’ time.
Computerizing Soviet factories at the state computing firm 
‘LSMNU’ (1979–89)
Khotin took this advice seriously and left the research institute in 1979 
for the state firm LSMNU,2 which specialized in the computerization 
of Soviet factories under the ministry of industrial instrumentation 
and engineering (Minpribor). The Ministry had given orders to allocate 
computers to individual factories, many of which did not understand or 
know how to operate them. It was Khotin and his work brigade who were 
responsible for helping the factories under the command of the ministry 
nation-wide to install copies of Western minicomputers. M40, which 
Khotin was installing and programming, had only one kilobyte of RAM 
(random access memory) and 16 kilobytes of ROM (read only memory).
Instead of waiting to be ordered to visit the clients, Khotin travelled 
to the Moscow factory producing M40s. He managed to get the names 
and phone numbers of the client factories where the computers were to 
be distributed. His initiative, which earlier could have been subject to 
disapproval as divergence from the behavior of an average Soviet engi-
neer, was backed up by the introduction of the khozraschet ideology in 
the Soviet Union, which emphasized independent economic account-
ing for the individual production units. 
According to khozraschet, each Soviet enterprise should make ends 
meet on its own, requiring initiative and sales and marketing skills 
that had not been top priorities for Soviet factory managers. With the 
allocation list of M40 minicomputers in hand, brigade leader Khotin – 
worried about the future of his job – started phoning factories, intro-
ducing himself, and offering help in M40 installations. This market-
ing campaign resulted in a long chain of work trips throughout the 
vast Soviet state. Khotin visited factories that produced anything from 
shoelaces to gunpowder and rockets, helping their staff unpack, install, 
connect, and program the new machines. However, with the years he 
grew tired of continuous traveling. Also, the state of affairs in the Soviet 
periphery differed drastically from the official rosy picture:
In the mid 1980s our brigade visited a factory in a Siberian town that 
was producing shells for Katyusha rockets. When we had finished 
our job in the evening and were about to return to the hotel, the fac-
tory engineer asked us to wait for a moment. He left the room and 
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returned after a while with a one meter long sharpened metal stick. 
He insisted on walking us to the hotel, protecting our safety with 
this metal stick.
For Khotin’s future career the time at LMNSU was important, not only 
in terms of gaining concrete though necessarily limited work experience 
but also in making new connections with the management of the Soviet 
factories. It was one of these managers who invited him to take a job 
as software director in a Russian–American joint venture in Leningrad 
in 1989, the next important step in Khotin’s path toward founding his 
own software company. 
Gaining contacts and competences in the Russian–American joint 
venture Dialogue (1989–92)
Dialogue was one of the very first Russian–American joint ventures – 
Russians supplying the programmers and Americans the funding – 
established in the Soviet Union. It had an office in both Moscow and 
Leningrad, and it worked as a Russian dealer for several Western IT 
companies, mostly selling computers and, among other things, conduct-
ing localization of MS Word and other Microsoft products.3 Khotin’s 
role in the Leningrad office was to develop software projects inside and 
outside Russia. Getting projects outside of Russia was hard, so he focused 
on getting factory computerization projects in the Leningrad area.
The job at Dialogue was an eye-opening experience, exposing Khotin 
to a world totally different from his experience in the Soviet economy. 
It allowed him to, among other things, travel to New York and Boston 
as early as 1990, when visiting abroad was still impossible for all but a 
few people in the Soviet Union. 
During his time with Dialogue, Khotin established a network of 
important connections, gained competences vital for conducting 
business, and got connected to the world outside the Soviet Union. 
The joint venture functioned as a nexus of contacts and a springboard 
for many future Russian businessmen such as Khotin’s boss, Vitaly 
Savelev, who is currently the CEO of the Russian airline company 
Aeroflot. Khotin, who himself was asked to join Dialogue by his former 
client at LMNSU, continued the chain by inviting another former 
client of LMNSU to join Dialogue and, years later, to join Khotin’s 
own software company.
The connections made during my years at Dialogue were very 
important and they still are. If you look at my LinkedIn network 
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[a business-oriented social network site], you will see that many peo-
ple in my network have had some relationship with this company.
Most importantly, Dialogue allowed Khotin to meet with and learn 
from many US businessmen. In the early 1990s there was a keen inter-
est in Russian transition, and Dialogue had several high-caliber visi-
tors. Among them was Bill Gates, with whom Khotin shook hands and 
talked during Gates’ Russian trip where he was spreading his vision of 
getting computers ‘on every desk’. Khotin learned both business skills 
and terms from these encounters and gained experience in speaking 
English. Every one of these encounters taught a former Soviet radio 
engineer something important, from the English language to Western 
business practices, and one of them also forced him to face an existen-
tial question: 
I met a 17-year-old American student whose father had sent him to 
Russia to gain experience. He asked me what I am going to do in five 
years. That was first time anyone had asked me such a question and 
the first time I had ever thought about it. The Party was supposed to 
take care of us, so there had been nothing to think about. I realized 
that I had been living like a vegetable!
When conducting computerization in a factory located in Vyborg, 
a small town near the Finnish border, Khotin actively used the program-
ming language Clipper, which was mainly used for database program-
ming. Having gained considerable expertise in this language and being 
surrounded by Americans ‘who believed that users had some rights’, 
he founded the first Russian Clipper users group, which was joined by 
some two hundred Russian IT specialists. Having close contacts with 
this professional community later encouraged him in his decision to 
establish his own business:
One of the most important factors behind my decision to leave 
Dialogue and start up my own business was the idea that there were 
two hundred developers whom I knew and with whom I could work 
on projects. If I had been a single guy with no support, I probably 
would not have dared to do it.
Among the important lessons Khotin learned at Dialogue was how to 
communicate abroad through computers. The company built one of 
the first Bulletin Board System nodes in Russia and joined FidoNet – a 
network connecting Russian and foreign personal computers through 
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modem and phone line – in the early 1990s when the Internet was 
not yet available in Russia.4 The first connection between the Russian 
nodes of the network to the West was established through the personal 
computer of a Finnish user who every night received data in a trunk 
call from his Russian counterpart for whom it was possible to phone 
abroad for free. 
However, the commercial success of the joint venture did not come 
about as wished. The enthusiasm of the employees could not replace 
the lacking business skills and control of funds, only a part of which 
was used for business development. When Dialogue widened its sphere 
of activities and started trading ‘all kinds of goods’, Khotin began to 
look for other options, already having decided to start up his own 
company.
Founding and early years of the software company Arcadia 
(1992–present)
Khotin was invited to a teaching job at an educational institute in 
St. Petersburg in 1992, again by an acquaintance, also a former employee 
of Dialogue. The meager salary was compensated by the free use of a 
computer and free access to the Internet – both rare opportunities in 
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. At Dialogue Khotin had already 
understood the importance of foreign contacts and learned to use the 
Internet, which knowledge he now put to use: 
At that time one of my friends gave me a small laptop computer. 
Consequently, in the daytime I was teaching, while in the evening 
I was using computers and Internet at my office and at night browsed 
BBS world from that tiny laptop with just small floppy instead of HD.
(Cook 2009: 4–5)
Though the idea of his own software company had emerged for the 
first time already during his second or third year at Dialogue, the final 
decision was made in March 1993 in Khotin’s kitchen, together with 
his wife, a professional programmer, and their daughter – all former 
graduates of the same technical university. The firm was named Arcadia, 
mimicking Khotin’s first name, ‘after 30 seconds of reflection’ and the 
accountant, a key person in a Russian firm, was recruited from among 
the former students who had gone through summer training by his wife 
at her office at the university. 
Khotin’s experiences of Western connections from the Dialogue years 
and the lack of demand for software development services in domestic 
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markets encouraged him to look for customers outside of Russia. He 
tried every possible channel to raise the interest of potential foreign 
clients through active e-mailing to various bulletin boards. Following 
up on an idea from a friend, he even sent an email in 1993 to the NBC 
nightly news, which was inviting viewers to send in e-mail messages 
from all over the world. This mail was read on air by the NBC news 
anchor, because it differed from the other 3000 messages sent in (Cook 
2009): 
Subject: From Russia with Love
Dear Americans,
My warmest seasons greetings from St. Petersburg Russia. Please keep 
up your great work in helping us to dig ourselves out from the deep 
hole that we got into about 70 years ago. I am sure it will be reward-
able for both nations!
Cheers, Arcady Khotin
In addition to e-mails, Khotin started writing articles in Boardwatch 
magazine, one issue of which was read by the Florida-based US citizen 
Philip Schwartz, who asked Khotin to transmit a message from Schwartz’ 
Russian friend to St. Petersburg. This contact started an intensive com-
munication between the two men, which continues until today, and 
provided Khotin with an important mentor who advised him how to 
conduct business:
It turned out that we were same age and had similar interests in 
many areas. Philip and I began a very heavy e-mail communication 
over a period of weeks and then months and now even years. I was 
asking him tons of questions about how to do business. We called 
that e-mail stream Schwartz University. This was possible for me to 
accomplish in part because of the time shift. I would take care of my 
daily affairs and then send him e-mail. He would be up and running 
in Florida by late afternoon my time and we would exchange three or 
five or even 10 e-mails in a 24-hours period. He was extremely help-
ful. He sent me the modem, then a laptop, and then invited me over. 
He gave me invaluable help in developing my early business.
(Cook 2009: 9)
Finally one of Khotin’s e-mails on a bulletin board was read by a US citi-
zen from Long Island, who became his first customer. This first contract 
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helped him to rent a two-room office on the outskirts of St. Petersburg, 
buy three computers, and hire three programmers from among his old 
contacts in the Russian Clipper user group. 
The first contract, which was based on the fact that a good program-
mer’s pay was at the time USD 150 a month in Russia, kept Khotin 
afloat but was not enough. Khotin continued his search for clients 
by following the Internet, reading articles in Computerworld or on BBS 
message boards and sending innumerable e-mails offering IT services. 
To overcome the trust gap, he volunteered to do some work for free, 
hoping that a happy customer would continue to work with him for 
pay. This was not, however, an easy effort, since he still lacked expertise 
in basic business practices such as how much to charge the customers, 
as the following recollection from 1994 shows:
I had no idea about how to speak at the terms of payment. I had 
no idea of the concept of things like retainers. My Soviet mentality 
did not allow me to ask. (…) when someone asked me how much 
I wanted to be paid for this activity, I had no idea how to arrive at an 
appropriate figure. I began to ask Philip for help and advice which he 
began to generously offer me. In trying to price a small project I had 
no idea how to say it would be about $500 or it would be in the lower 
hundreds of dollars. Philip had software development experience 
and he was very good in helping me formulate proper estimates.
(Cook 2009: 9)
In addition to the problems with foreign business practices and cus-
toms, the domestic ones proved to be even more difficult. Starting as 
an entrepreneur in Russia was not easy in the early 1990s, when many 
basics for the normal running of a company such as computers, print-
ing paper, or properly working phone lines were hard to get, unreliable, 
or expensive, regulations concerning business were constantly chang-
ing, and banks were unreliable and often bankrupting. 
The domestic markets were riddled with corruption and violence and 
the cat-and-mouse game with tax inspectors was one of the many prob-
lems which had to be solved with the help of trusted social ties:
[personal contacts were used] to find out how to write a report to tax 
inspection. This was very important because our state agencies did 
not know what we were doing, they did not understand it. (…) For us 
it was enough to send the software to the client through the Internet. 
But the tax inspector did not understand what the Internet was. They 
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suggested that we save the software on a diskette and send it by mail 
so that there would be a tangible product crossing the border. We 
started sending diskettes like fools but then someone realized that we 
could send state secrets on them – their contents should be checked 
at the corresponding state agency which could then authorize the 
sending. What idiotism! Well, we of course asked each other how you 
solve this problem, what do you write in the contract?
By 1996 Khotin had grown tired of flying three times a month to meet 
the US clients and started looking for customers closer to home. A natu-
ral choice was neighboring Finland, whose capital Helsinki was located 
only 300 kilometers west of St. Petersburg. Khotin decided to pay a visit 
to Finland in order to attend an IT seminar with his best programmer 
in 1996:
I had no money to pay for his seminar but I said look if I can make 
a presentation, will you let me in? He [the Finnish seminar organ-
izer] said sure. (…) We went to the seminar and spent six hours lis-
tening to presentations in the Finnish language and then we made 
our own presentation in English. People were complimentary and 
I thought ‘wow, we will get some projects’ but we returned back to St 
Petersburg and nothing happened. I definitely had raised some inter-
est but I had a zero marketing skills including a lack of understanding 
of how to follow-up. I even went without business cards. They said 
we will send you something but they did not even know my e-mail 
address. I was still a very inexperienced person.
(Cook 2009: 10)
Despite Khotin’s inexperience in selling services, this conference led 
later on to an important contract with the owners of the Finnish anti-
virus company Data Fellows (currently F-Secure) which remains his 
customer to this day. Observing and learning from the Finns doing 
business has been a practical business school whose example Khotin is 
still in the process of applying to his own firm. 
The fall of the Russian ruble in 1998 was a catastrophe for many 
Russians, but for Khotin and other software exporters whose custom-
ers paid in dollars, it meant a sudden and large rise in income. For the 
first time in his career, Khotin was able to hire staff – in addition to 
himself, an accountant, and a system administrator – whose hours were 
not directly billable from customers. The company joined the RUSSOFT 
association in 1999, and the 2000s have been marked by the growth of 
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the company from the original four-man office to one of the major St. 
Petersburg software houses. Arcadia has, among other things, started 
its own recruiting agency, opened a Finnish office, and completed ISO 
certification. The growth also translates to the continuous need for 
keeping the hired programmers employed. Here, again, personal rela-
tions come in handy:
I am pulling all my strings. I have almost 600 connections on 
LinkedIn. To e-mail my contacts about the availability of these people 
I would search within LinkedIn for data security and throw in a few 
other appropriate terms to find a subset of my contacts in Scandinavia 
or in Russia to whom I would send e-mail. If the guys are in my net-
work, I can send e-mail directly to them. If they are in the network of 
an acquaintance and look especially good, I can ask the acquaintance 
to help out. I knock on the door and say ‘hey I have spare resources. 
Can you help me to find someone who can put them to work?’
(Cook 2009: 24)
In hindsight, all the phases in Khotin’s professional career now seem to 
have been in some way beneficial for his future entrepreneurship. Work 
at the research institute introduced him to computers and program-
ming, and the job at the state computing firm gave him practical expe-
rience in collaborating with enterprises. Particularly significant was the 
period at the joint venture Dialogue which connected him to the world 
outside the Soviet Union and taught him communication and linguistic 
and business skills. Most importantly during his time at Dialogue, he 
established a great number of both domestic and foreign contacts, such 
as the Russian Clipper user group and his US mentor Schwartz. 
In all, Khotin’s career testifies not only to his personal abilities but 
also to the power and reach of his personal network ties and the over-
lapping of the personal and professional spheres of life. Khotin was 
invited first to work at Dialogue by his former customer at the state 
computing firm and then to a teaching job by his former colleague 
at Dialogue. While at Dialogue, he himself recruited his former client 
from the state computing company to work with him, and founded a 
professional Clipper community, from which he later recruited his first 
programmers. Finally, the founders and key persons of Arcadia were 
selected in and through the trusted ties of family – a natural choice 
under the conditions in Russia in the early 1990s.
These ties and networks formed the social basis for Arcadia’s birth and 
growth. But the story of Arcadia also illustrates how, in addition to the 
social aspects, the emergence and success of a post-Soviet Russian firm 
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has to be placed and understood in historical perspective. This is what 
the next two sections try to do for the Russian IT sector.
Computing in the Soviet Union
The basis for Soviet computing and later post-Soviet Russian IT was 
already laid by the development of higher education and scientific 
research in imperial Russia. Though the turmoil of the 1910s and 1920s 
hampered progress, both mathematics and electronic engineering 
developed intensively in the 1920s and 1930s, stimulated by Lenin’s 
famous GOELRO program (Gosudarstvennaia komissiia po elektrifikatsii 
Rossii) for building a nation-wide electricity distribution network in 
the Soviet Union. The strong growth of power engineering had great 
impacts on the early period of Soviet computing, whereas later on the 
computing needs of the Soviet military sector came to be of primary 
importance (Fitzpatrick et al. 2006).
The construction of the first Soviet digital computer MESM (Malaia 
Elektronnaia Schetnaia Mashina, ‘small electronic calculation device’) 
during the years 1947–51 under the leadership of S. A. Lebedev, one of 
the founding fathers of Soviet computing, illustrates well the material, 
organizational, and ideological constraints under which the pioneers of 
Soviet computing operated.5 Researchers of the history of computing 
even claim that ‘no all-electronic computer was ever built under more 
difficult conditions’ (Goodman 2003: 21).
Crowe and Goodman (1994) offer a vivid account of the struggles of 
Lebedev, who was appointed the director of the Institute of Energy of 
the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, located in a former monastery in a 
suburb of Kiev, in 1946.6 Lebedev had already started working on elec-
tronic triggers and arithmetical research related to computing systems 
in 1939, but the Second World War interrupted his work. The work by 
his institute was slowed down by the shortage of materials in the war-
torn country, as it was unable to deliver the needed quantity and quality 
of components. Lebedev also had to fight the administrative, ideologi-
cal, and science policy barriers, the protagonists of analog computing, 
and, in the 1950s, with a competing Soviet computer design project, 
‘Arrow’ (Strela).7 When building MESM, Lebedev had to convince the 
Soviet leadership and scientific community of the importance and 
future of digital computing, which at the time was evident in neither 
the Soviet Union nor the US.
Despite the obstacles, MESM solved its first simple problem on 
November 6, 1950, was exhibited to a commission of scholars from the 
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Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in January 1951, and was accepted into 
full operation in January 1952 (Crowe and Goodman 1994).
In the 1950s Lebedev moved to Moscow and continued his work, 
first with a new high-speed computer, BESM (Bystrodeistvuiushchaia 
Elektronnaia Schetnaia Mashina, ‘high-speed electronic calculating 
machine’), and then from 1954 onwards with M-20, a computer based 
on germanium diodes, which would replace the unreliable vacuum tubes 
of the earlier models.8 M-20 was completed in 1958, about the same time 
as a project named BESM-2, and its serial production started in Moscow 
in early 1959 (Crowe and Goodman 1994). The beginning of the produc-
tion of M-20 computers marked the starting point for the development 
of the Soviet computer industry, and stimulated the production of a 
series of M-20 compatible computers. In 1961 the M-20 computers’ users 
association, the first professional association of computer specialists in 
the Soviet Union, was established (Prokhorov 1999: 5–7).9 
During the Cold War, military reasoning gained a primary position in 
the development of Soviet computing. Military computing had special 
requirements for the components, which also had to be domestically 
produced. The beginning of commercial production of Soviet transistors 
in 1956–8 started the production of special computers adapted to mili-
tary purposes (Khetagurov 2001: 192). The large share of these special-
ized military computers was a particular feature of Soviet computing, 
and, according to Susiluoto (2006: 147–8), even the universal computers 
were mainly used for military purposes.
Three military programs (nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and anti-
missile defense) dominated not only post-war Soviet computing, but 
also Soviet science and technology more generally. Their importance is 
illustrated by a quote from the Soviet cosmonaut Grechko recalling his 
experiences of working in the mid 1950s at the Academy Computation 
Centre on the BESM:
Kurchatov’s people [nuclear weapons researchers] used it in the day-
time and during the night Korolev’s people [designers of ballistics 
missiles and spacecraft]. And for all the rest of Soviet science: maybe 
five minutes for the Institute of Theoretical Astronomy, maybe half 
an hour for the chemical industry.
(Harford 1997: note 54, 220, cited in Gerovitch 2001: 269)
The tremendous investment of resources in the military sector in the 
Soviet Union produced well-known achievements in the areas of space 
flight and military technology, among others, at the expense of the 
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consumption and daily life needs of the general population. According 
to Manuel Castells, between 1940 and 1960 Soviet mainframe comput-
ers were not very far behind the achievements of the West,10 but in 
1965 the country’s leadership decided to shift from developing its own 
production to imitating Western computer technology – in the late 
1960s and 1970s copying the architecture of the IBM 360 (Crowe and 
Goodman 1994: 11).11 As a result of this decision the USSR’s informa-
tion technology sector became dependent on copying chiefly American 
technology and began to lag more and more behind the development 
of the West. 
Castells’ assessment, based on his research both in Soviet and post-
Soviet Russia, is in line with that of the US experts from 1988 (Global 
Trends in Computer Technology, 1988). According to this report, in the 
late 1980s the Soviet Union was lagging years behind the West in most 
areas of computing, with possible exceptions in the theory of program-
ming languages and information retrieval systems.12 
Many of the reasons for the backwardness of the Soviet computing 
industry were the same as for that of the Soviet economy in general. 
Not only did the individual Soviet factories not necessarily know what 
to do with computers but they also had little incentive to be more effi-
cient than what was required to fulfill the plan. There was a shortage 
of high-quality components needed for reliable hardware production, 
service for hardware and software was poor or lacking, and the ideologi-
cal control of information did not fit the needs of the new economy, 
increasingly based on the processing of information (Global Trends in 
Computer Technology, 1988). 
The excessive demand and lack of competition allowed the produc-
tion units to continue their Soviet-era habits of production, and the 
complex and overlapping organization of the industry led to cata-
strophic shortages:
The production of floppy disks has been a disaster. Production was 
assigned to four different ministries with the brunt of the task fall-
ing on Minpribor. However, at the lower levels in Minpribor, there 
was a scramble to find productions space, and the full capacity of 
50 million diskettes per year will not be reached before 1989. (…) The 
end result is a great shortage of diskettes.
(Global Trends in Computer Technology, 1988: 159)
In addition to problems of organizing production, Soviet computing also 
had to balance between ideological and pragmatic aspects of the field, 
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which was to have lasting consequences for its development. According 
to Gerovitch (2001), computing scientists and professionals in the 
Soviet Union were torn by the contradictory requirements of emulating 
and surpassing American computing on the one hand and keeping at 
a distance from cybernetics, which was ideologically discredited in the 
Soviet Union as reactionary pseudo-science, on the other. This tension 
was solved through a discursive strategy of distancing computing from 
cybernetics. This had, however, long-term impacts on Soviet science by 
limiting computer uses to mathematical physics: 
Soviet specialists in ‘machine mathematics’ had to walk a fine line 
between two mortal dangers – falling behind the West in comput-
ing, and following Western trends too closely. To avoid unwanted 
associations with controversial American cybernetics, they chose to 
‘de-ideologize’ Soviet computing and place emphasis on the narrow 
technical functions of computing and information theory, ignoring 
any potential conceptual innovations. This strategy severely limited 
the field of prospective computer applications. The computer was 
legitimized in this Soviet context as a giant calculator; its capacities 
as a data processor for economic and sociological analysis, and as a 
tool for biological research, were downplayed, to avoid ideological 
complications.
(Gerovitch 2001: 279)
In order to meet the ideological requirements, the Russian translations 
of Western computer literature were furnished with introductions con-
demning the ideological errors of these publications and the most dubi-
ous parts were just left out. Domestic publication of computer-related 
works was prevented both by a fear of revealing state secrets as well as 
helping out rival Soviet computing programs. Only after Khrushchev’s 
rise to power was cybernetics rehabilitated and legitimized (Gerovitch 
2001: 270–5). 
As a combined result of the problems and weaknesses described above, 
the Soviet Union missed the explosive growth of personal computing 
taking place in the West during the 1980s. While in the US interactive 
and user-friendly personal computers were revolutionizing office work, 
home entertainment, and computer-mediated communication, this 
development was absent in the Soviet Union. According to the estimate 
of a firm negotiating an agreement to sell computers to the USSR, and 
the information published by the New York Times, the USSR had 50,000 
personal computers in 1988 – one for every 5600 people – while the US 
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had roughly 30 million PCs – one for every 8 people (Global Trends in 
Computer Technology, 1988).13 The assessment of the missed chances in 
the Soviet Union by US experts in 1988 is devastating: 
[T]he phenomenal growth of the PC in the United States depended 
on the characteristics and availability of the PC and its software, the 
demand environment, and marketing effectiveness. The PC offers 
such dramatic gains in simple areas such as maintaining a mailing 
list, generating form letters, doing word processing, and tracking 
budgets, to name but a few central applications, that it has become 
as indispensable to the office as the telephone and the copying 
machine. None of these conditions has been present in the Soviet 
Union. The Soviets have been unable to mass produce a reliable 
personal computer on the order of the IBM-PC, and support service 
is questionable at best. (…) The software distribution system is con-
voluted, and good software often never receives distribution because 
of the lack of copyright protection. Lower-level managers have far 
less autonomy, have not received any training in computing, and 
have little desire to start using computers. Generally speaking they 
are not in a data-rich environment where they could connect PCs 
to mainframes or networks. The individualistic and entrepreneurial 
strains are generally missing from the Soviet culture, and the absence 
of any home computers, for all practical purposes, has precluded the 
possibility of the emergence of the home computer phenomenon so 
familiar in the West.
(Global Trends in Computer Technology, 1988: 160)
In the spirit of perestroika, many problems of the computing industry 
could be discussed publicly, and attempts at reorganizing the field 
of the Soviet computing industry were made by creating two new 
organizations in 1986: the State Committee for Computing and 
Informatics was to coordinate and develop Soviet computing and 
promote the use of computers in the economy; and the Interbranch 
Scientific Technical Complex for Personal Computers was established 
to address the problem of continuity in the research and development 
cycle and the problem of ministerial departmentalism. Both institu-
tions had to struggle with the already existing Soviet organizations 
and their results were meager (Global Trends in Computer Technology, 
1988).
The collapse of the Soviet Union finally brought to end these 
and other experiments to revive the Soviet system from the inside. 
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According to Manuel Castells (2000), information technology played 
a notable role in this collapse, and this role will be the subject of the 
next section.
Information technology and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union
Castells bases his interpretation both on his own fieldwork in the Soviet 
Union during the years 1989–96 and on the studies conducted by his 
wife, Emma Kiselyova (Castells 2000: 5).14 After Castells and Kiselyova 
the development of post-Soviet Russia’s IT sector has, with a few rare 
exceptions, been studied chiefly by private companies and market 
research departments. Exceptions in the area of information technology 
are, for example, Castells 2000; Gaslikova and Gokhberg 2001; Averin 
and Dudarev 2003; Hawk and McHenry 2005; Lonkila 2006; Rantanen 
2001; and Susiluoto 2006.
In Castell’s interpretation a central reason for the Soviet Union’s 
bankruptcy was the inability of the Soviet economy, or, in Castell’s 
terminology, the centrally planned ‘industrial statism’, to mold itself to 
the demands of a new economy based on information processing.15 
Purely from the viewpoint of extensive economic growth, the growth 
of the Soviet Union’s economy after the Second World War was a suc-
cess story – although it was bought at the expense of human suffering 
and overuse of natural resources. According to Castells, for the greater 
part of its history the Soviet Union’s economic growth was in fact larger 
than in Western countries and the speed of the country’s industrializa-
tion is unequalled in world history. 
Comparative growth abated only in 1975 and came to a standstill in 
1980. Because of the absence of the price mechanism, the economy’s 
resources were not allocated efficiently, and Soviet citizens became 
accustomed to life in a shortage economy. Nor was the economy able 
to develop internationally competitive, non-military products: the role 
of the Soviet Union in the international market became the massive 
export of raw materials, especially oil and gas which, coming into the 
1980s, comprised 90 percent of the USSR’s exports to capitalist countries 
(Castells 2000: 10–24). 
Most catastrophic, however, was the drop-off in the speed of techno-
scientific development. The primary reason for this was the hegemony 
of the military-economic complex as well as an untenably large defense 
budget, which in the 1980s was about 15 percent of the gross national 
product – proportionally about twice as much as Reagan’s government 
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comparatively spent. The complex siphoned off both the best material 
and human resources from productive use, but it did not produce a 
spin-off effect on the side of the civil economy. The Soviet economy’s 
priorities were always the security needs of the Soviet state as defined 
by the military-economic complex, and the fundamental conservatism 
of the security ideology would not tolerate the risk-taking necessary for 
an innovation-based new economy.
In addition to the central role of the military-technological complex, 
another important reason for the failure of the Soviet economy was the 
lack of an innovation system. The rigid centrally managed planning 
system, international differentiation, and lack of competition did not 
compel innovation and risk-taking, but rather led to the organization of 
production in the accustomed way. The Soviet Union’s science academy 
was disconnected from the production plants, the research and develop-
ment of which were based on each ministry’s own research institutes. 
These in turn were not in contact with each other with the exception 
of an unsuccessful experiment in the Khrushchev era at the end of the 
1960s.
Finally, the information-technological revolution did not fit together 
with the Soviet system’s bureaucracy and ideological repression. Only a 
few Soviet scientists got to participate in international congresses, and 
the free circulation of information important for innovation was far 
from the Soviet system, where the use of typewriters and copy machines 
was tightly supervised. The new networked style of production could 
not be conciliated with the concentrated, hierarchical command 
economy (Castells 2000: 5–37).
If information technology had an impact on the demise of the Soviet 
Union, it also helped to save the fragile Russian democracy during the 
August putsch in 1991. Based on his interviews with key players, Rafael 
Rohozinski (1999: 1–2) describes in detail how the programmers of 
Relcom/Demos, one of Russia’s private Internet providers, were among 
the first to testify to the coup from their offices near the Kremlin, and 
started transmitting the information to network nodes across the Soviet 
Union:
Within hours, they had established a temporary network node at the 
White House and were e-mailing Yeltsin’s defiant declaration, reject-
ing the legitimacy of the coup committee to Russia’s regions and 
abroad (…) By evening, the Relcom network was acting as a major 
channel of information between Moscow and the regions, linking 
the multitude of major and minor actors opposed to the coup. (…) As 
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local and republican press organs increasingly drew upon Relcom for 
information about the unfolding drama in Moscow, the information 
vacuum, a key factor in the coup plotters’ game plan, was filled.
(Rohozinski 1999: 1–2)
The whole story of the collapse of the Soviet empire with its ensuing 
transformation of economic, political, and geographical orders in the 
1990s will not be reproduced here. Suffice it to say that the collapse 
of the economy destroyed the state budget which in its turn shattered 
the financial base of Russian scientific and research institutions. Some 
of them, however, managed to find a niche in the post-Soviet Russian 
ICT field, the description of which is the focus of the final section of 
this chapter. 
The ICT sector in the Post-Soviet Russian economy
The role of the ICT sector in Russia’s national economy
When assessing the role of the Russian ICT industry in the economy 
one has to bear in mind that it has, similar to other private enterprise in 
Russia, functioned for only under 20 years, and was born in the 1990s 
under particularly difficult conditions.16 The emergence of the Russian 
ICT field coincided with the global shift from mainframe to personal 
computing. This shift created a need for private companies provid-
ing system integration and software development services for the new 
platforms and contributed to the formation of the industry (Terekhov 
2003: 22). 
Despite the recent tendency of Russian software companies toward 
regionalization, the Russian ICT industry is geographically concen-
trated in relatively few centers, of which St. Petersburg, the location of 
our data collection, is the most important after Moscow. Though the 
St. Petersburg ICT market and companies are clearly smaller than in the 
capital, the city has been at the forefront of information technology, 
telecommunications and electronic engineering since imperial Russia 
through the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia: Russia’s first phone 
line was erected between St. Petersburg and Gatchina in 1882 (Sokolov 
1992: 66) and Alexander Popov presented his radio receiver to the 
Russian Physical and Chemical Society in St. Petersburg in 1895.
In the Soviet Union, within the frame of the planned economy, 
a considerable amount of radio engineering, telecommunications, and 
electronics industry and research was located in northwestern Russia, 
and at the end of the 1980s more than 50 industrial enterprises and 
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scientific research organizations operated in Leningrad (Averin and 
Dudarev 2003: 37–8).
The St. Petersburg/Leningrad region also played an important role 
in the recovery of the post-Soviet Russian economy after the collapse 
of Soviet industrial enterprises and research organizations. Due to its 
geographical proximity to Western Europe, availability of educated 
workforce, and long traditions in the field, northwestern Russia was a 
central player in the development of the Russian IT industry and mobile 
telecommunications. The first cellphone call in post-Soviet Russia, 
for example, was made by the St. Petersburg mayor Anatoly Sobchak 
through the operator Delta Telecom in 1991, and the main optical fiber 
connecting the Russian Federation to Europe and the rest of the world 
goes through St. Petersburg and Finland. Several large international 
companies in the ICT related fields, such as HP, Siemens, LG, Microsoft, 
Google, Sun, and Intel, operate in the St. Petersburg area (Kärkkäinen 
2008: 70–81).
Today the Russian ICT industry is a small but rapidly developing 
sector of the economy, which until recently has stayed in the shadow 
of the energy sector. The ICT sector’s relatively small proportion of 
the economy (5 percent of the gross national product in 2005, accord-
ing to the minister of communications Leonid Reiman)17 has been 
compensated by its extremely rapid growth during the 2000s.18 One of 
the main engines of this growth – together with the general boost to 
the Russian economy fueled by rising oil prices – has been the develop-
ment of the telecommunications field, particularly cellphone use, in 
Russia.
In the 1990s cellphones were still out of reach of the general popu-
lation because of both the high prices of phones and the high tariffs, 
and they were chiefly considered symbols of the nouveaux riches and 
organized crime. After the economic crisis of 1998 and especially in the 
2000s, prices fell as competition was freed, cellphones lost their elite 
character, and their use exploded (Gladarev and Lonkila 2008). As a 
result, telecommunications accounted for 70 percent of the ICT sector 
in 2007 (see Table 3.1). 
Within the IT sector, the table shows how hardware’s proportion of 
the total IT markets diminished from 66 percent in 2003 to 56 percent 
in 2007, while during the same time the proportion of software devel-
opment grew from 13 percent to 18 percent, and that of services from 
21 percent to 26 percent. 
As the example of Ireland shows, software exports may function as an 
important source of foreign currency revenue in a national economy. 
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Though the value of Russian software exports has been modest, their 
proportion of the whole IT sector grew steadily during the first decade 
of the 2000s (see Table 3.2).
The clear majority of the Russian software export income in 2007 
came from software development services (58 percent), followed by 
sales of products and solutions (25 percent) and from international 
companies’ development centers in Russia (18 percent) (RUSSOFT 
Annual Survey, 2007: 12). The export of ready-made products was very 
concentrated: four companies accounted for over half of Russian soft-
ware exports including, in addition to ABBYY products, Kaspersky Lab 
(antivirus programs), CBOSS (billing systems) and Transas (navigation 
systems, vessel traffic management systems, marine and aviation simu-
lation systems) (RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008).
On average the Russian IT companies are small in comparison with 
international firms both in terms of sales and number of employees 
(see Table 3.3). Notable exceptions are such Moscow-based firms as 
Luxsoft, EPAM, and Exigen which employ 2000–5000 people each. The 
software companies based in St. Petersburg were clearly smaller than 
Table 3.1 The development of Russian ICT markets 2003–7, bn USD












Hardware  4.6  66  5.4  61  6.6  61  8.1  59  9.9  56
Software  0.9  13  1.1  12  1.5  14  2.2  16  3.1  18
Services  1.5  21  2.4  27  2.8  26  3.5  25  4.6  26
IT total  7.0 100  8.9 100 10.9 100 13.7 100 17.6 100
Telecommunications 12.9  18.8  23.3  31.7  40.5  
ICT total 19.9  27.7 34.2  45.4  58.1  
% telecomm of ICT  65  68  68  70  70
Source: Minkomsviaz’ (2009)
Table 3.2  Software exports’ proportion of the Russian IT sector 2003–7, bn 
USD
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Russian IT sector * 7.0 8.9 10.9 13.7 17.6
Software export ** 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.5 2.2
Software export % of IT sector 7.8 8.5 8.9 10.6 12.5
Sources:* Minkomsviaz’ (2009); ** RUSSOFT Annual survey, 2007
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their Moscow counterparts; none of them ranked among the 10 biggest 
Russian IT companies. The largest of the St. Petersburg companies 
employ only some hundred people and include companies such as 
Reksoft, DataArt, Digital Design, Arcadia, and Lanit-Tercom.19 Of the 
30 leading IT companies in northwestern Russia, the sales of the big-
gest one, BCC, amounted to 3,685,500 thousand roubles (roughly 142 
million USD) in 2006 and it employed 720 people (CNews Analytics 
2007).
These impressions of the comparatively small size of Russian IT com-
panies are supported by a 2008 survey directed at companies who were to 
some extent involved in exports of software products and services from 
Russia. Of the 96 companies who responded to the survey, 47 percent 
employed up to 30 people, 43 percent from 30 to 500, 5 percent from 
500 to 1000 and 5 percent more than 1000 people. In terms of turnover, 
43 percent of these firms had up to 0.5 million USD, 47 percent from 0.5 
to 10 million and only 10 percent over 10 million USD. 
ICT use in Russia
Though the figures on ICT use in Russia vary depending on the source 
and methodology, the general trend has been that of extremely quick 
growth. Chachin (2008), for example, estimates the growth rate of 
Internet users in 2006–7, based on the data from Russia’s ministry of 
communications, at 50 percent, the number of PCs at 36 percent, and 
number of households’ broadband access at more than 50 percent. 
Figure 3.1 shows the development in the use of Internet, personal 
computers, and mobile phones in Russia during the 2000s based on data 
from the Levada Center surveys.20
Despite the rapid growth, the general level of ICT use in Russia is still 
weak according to the international ‘network readiness index’. This 
index – which combines evaluation of the regulatory macroeconomic 
environment with the readiness and usage of ICT by individuals, busi-
ness, and government – positioned Russia in 2007–8 at 72, between 
Vietnam (73) and Kazakhstan (71). In the same list Denmark was 
Table 3.3 Median number of employees in the 100 biggest Russian IT 
companies 2003–7
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Median no of employees 204 209 300 368 403
Source: CNews Analytics (2010)
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first, the US fourth, Finland sixth, and the UK twelfth (Dutta and Mia 
2009).
This impression is further reinforced by the results of the latest round 
of the European Social Survey offering comparative data on Internet use 
in Europe (Table 3.4).
The question was ‘how often do you use the Internet, the World Wide 
Web or e-mail – whether at home or at work – for your personal use?’
The table shows clearly that Internet use in Russia is lagging far 
behind the level of Western European countries. Internet use is also 
unequally divided in terms of geography, education, and income, and 
Table 3.4 The use of Internet in selected European countries in 2008, %
Germany Finland France UK Russia 
No access at home or work 22  12 22.5 21.1 62.4
Never use 8.8  13.7 10.6 7.5 7.6
Less than once a month 1.6  1.5 1.3 2.6 2.5
Once a month 1.1  1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3
Several times a month 6.1  2.6 2.4 4.2 3.1
Once a week 4.8  6 3.2 4.2 2.3
Several times a week 17.2  16.5 12.8 15.9 8
Every day 38.3  46.3 45.7 43.3 12.7
Total 100  100 100 100 100










2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Internet personal computer mobile phone
Figure 3.1 The use of Internet, personal computers and mobile phones in Russia, 
% of population
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Internet access is still hampered by the deficiencies of the old telecom-
munications infrastructure. 
Moreover, the Russian Internet is at least potentially subject to 
state control: while the original SORM legislation (Sistema Operativno-
Rozysknykh Meropriiatii, ‘System for Operational-Investigative Activities’) 
allowed officials to record all phone discussions, its updated version 
SORM-2 authorizes FSB to access all Internet Service Providers’ comput-
ers or other devices in order to monitor Internet traffic (cf. Alexander 
2004: 616). In practice the amount of Internet traffic limits the realiza-
tion of state control (see Alexander 2004 for a closer account of SORM 
and Russian Internet policy).21
State support for the Russian ICT industry
The state can have different kinds of roles in the development of ICT 
industry. At the center of Finland’s information society model, for 
example, has been a state-mediated relationship between the public and 
private sectors, in which the state has purposefully supported a politics 
of innovation both directly and through the universities and research 
institutes (Castells and Himanen 2001; see also Fligstein 2001).22
Throughout the 2000s Russia’s government as well has, at least in pub-
lic speeches, recognized the economic, strategic, and political aspects 
of the ICT sector, which has manifested in, for example, the Federal 
Program Electronic Russia covering the years 2002–10. The program 
was approved by the Russian government in 2002 with a total budget of 
2.6 billion USD. It aimed at increasing the effectiveness of government 
operation, developing the information transparency of the authori-
ties, improving industry legislation and stimulating higher ICT related 
education. The first results did not, however, meet expectations. The 
program budget was cut twice in 2003 and its actual outcomes remain 
unclear (Averin and Dudarev 2003: 109; Susiluoto 2006: 305–6).
During the 2000s there have been further state initiatives to boost 
non-energy-related areas of the Russian economy, such as the creation 
of ‘special economic zones’, ‘technology parks’, and venture investment 
funds and plans of reduced tax burdens on export-oriented Russian 
IT companies (Wilson 2007; Stewart 2008).23 Assessing these efforts, 
Gianella and Thompson (2007: 25–6) estimate, however, that without 
coordination between various state bodies, close monitoring of the 
budgetary funds, and evaluation of the effectiveness of the projects, 
there is a risk of duplication of effort, waste, and rent-seeking. 
This assessment is in line with the opinion of the authors of the 
Russian Software Developers Association’s report from 2008, based 
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on the annual survey of 96 Russian software-exporting companies. 
The general views of the companies on the business environment are 
devastating: a high number of companies gave ‘poor’ marks for most 
of the aspects inquired about, such as human resources availability and 
education system (52 percent), taxation system (45 percent), impact 
of bureaucratic and administrative barriers on business (63 percent), 
availability of up-to-date infrastructure (52 percent), financial support 
to start-ups (67 percent), and state support of international marketing 
activity (75 percent). These numbers clearly reveal the failure of the 
Russian state to markedly support working conditions for the software 
industry. Even in the cases where measures have been taken, as the 
examples of the e-Russia program and technology parks above show, 
they have failed to produce substantial results:
Still there is no significant progress in implementation of projects 
on technology parks construction specifically for IT companies 
(including software developers) with state financial support. Design 
and construction of technology parks in some cities is already in 
progress. But it goes slowly and the terms for property construction 
are constantly shifted. Besides, initiators of these projects have little 
understanding of the final results. There are reasons to assume that 
within the framework of technology parks ordinary business would 
be constructed (not only for IT companies).
(RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008: 22)
This is also the case with taxation, where the law on reduction of the 
Unified Social Tax for software exporters from 26 percent to 16 percent 
turned out to be inconsistent with Russian pension legislation. Neither 
has an amendment in the Russian Federation Tax Code exempt-
ing value-added tax on sales of licensed software worked in practice 
(RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008: 20).
The authors of the report estimated the situation of the creation 
of special economic zones, where residents and high-tech companies 
are granted special privileges, in somewhat brighter terms, but saw 
no significant progress in the development of ‘science cities’ in which 
research centers were supposed to receive additional funding from local 
and federal budgets (RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008: 22).
According to the survey, Russian ICT firms consider bureaucratic 
and administrative barriers to be one of the most important business 
problems. As noted, 63 percent of firms in the survey described the 
level of solving bureaucratic and administrative barriers as ‘poor’, and 
particularly the St. Petersburg-based firms were among those affected by 
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the Russian bureaucracy. One example, given by the survey authors, was 
the difficulty in recruiting foreigners: 
The existence of barriers for recruitment of foreign staff in Russian 
companies looks absolutely illogical. Sometimes the inviting Russian 
party has to spend up to six months to formalize all required docu-
ments to make it possible for such specialist to work for one year in 
Russia. Some companies are ready to attract experienced foreigner 
or former Russian citizens to use their expertise and knowledge to 
arrange sales of ready-made solutions and products on the world 
markets. But they do not dare to undertake these steps precisely due 
to complicated bureaucratic formalities.
(RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008: 21–2)
Though a third of the firms in the RUSSOFT 2008 survey did note an 
improvement in state support of IT in the last two years,24 the authors 
of the report consider this number to be based on hopes of the industry 
being finally taken seriously and supported by the state. According to 
the authors, however, no substantial results have been reached:
The situation was seriously aggravated by the fact that the new 
Government did not include a ministry responsible for information 
technologies. The former Ministry of Information Technologies, 
and Communications was transformed into the ministry of Mass 
Communications losing IT in its official name.
(RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008: 25)
In addition to the bleak estimates of the situation in 2008, most param-
eters of the business environment for software development companies 
had slightly worsened or remained the same in comparison with 2007 – 
with the lone exception of property rights. However, the report also 
concludes that the difficulties hit the medium-sized companies hardest 
whereas a group of large companies – also facing a lot of problems – had 
‘more opportunities to overcome them’, as the authors ambiguously 
remark (RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008).
To summarize, and in line with the crushing statement of President 
Medvedev cited in the introduction of this book, the available evidence 
suggests that the Russian state has so far failed to notably support the 
development of the IT field.
Russia’s position in the global ICT market
The Russian share in the global IT market is estimated at between 
1 percent and 3 percent (Russian ICT market overview, 2007). Russia does 
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not have significant, globally competitive hardware production nor – 
with some exceptions, such as the document conversion, data capture, 
and linguistic software produced by the company ABBYY – break-
through software applications competitive in the global mass market. 
Instead it is likely that many software products marketed as Western 
contain the work of Russian offshore programmers.
Michael A. Cusumano (2006) considers Russia’s position in the distri-
bution of labor in the global software industry in comparison with the 
situations of Europe, India, and Ireland:
Where does Russia fit into the global software business? Will compa-
nies there go the way of many other European firms and emphasize 
the science more than the business, and on expertly meeting the 
needs of local industry, but encounter limited success in global prod-
uct markets? Will Russia go the way of India and emphasize service 
companies that will do anything the client wants at highly com-
petitive prices but fail to build a products-based business? Will Russia 
become a lower-cost Ireland, with many small companies and lots of 
technical expertise, but too much emphasis on leisurely lifestyles and 
independence from venture capital and the stock markets?
(Cusumano 2006: 33)
He concludes that Russia’s competitive advantage lies in the ability to 
perform very sophisticated technical work at relatively low cost. 
In line with Cusumano’s conclusion, the high quality of Russian infor-
mation technology professionals’ mathematical competence is com-
monly recognized. One indication of this competence is the position of 
Russian students in the International Collegiate Programming Contest. 
The contest was won in 2009, 2008, and 2004 by the St. Petersburg State 
University of Information Technology, Mechanics and Optics, in 2006 
by Saratov State University, and in 2001 and 2000 by St. Petersburg State 
University, with other Russian universities commonly occupying other 
top positions in the contest.25 Considering the results of the contest, it 
is evident that top-level programmers are trained in Russia in Saratov, 
Perm, Izhevsk, Stavropol, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, Ufa, Barnaul, Orel 
and Petrozavodsk, and about ten other Russian cities as well as Moscow 
and St. Petersburg (RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008: 33–4). 
The competitive advantage created by a high quality workforce 
is reduced by deficiencies in the project management and English 
language skills of university graduates. On the macro level the obsta-
cles to the development of Russia’s ICT sector are, among others, the 
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prevalence of pirating,26 poor infrastructure, underdeveloped legisla-
tion, the corruption of the public sector, and the bad image of the 
Russian state abroad along with its intrusion into the economy.27 
Moreover, the quick growth of the ICT sector, the concentration 
of activity in a few centers, particularly Moscow, St. Petersburg, and 
Novosibirsk, and the arrival and establishment of foreign companies 
(such as Sun, Microsoft, Alcatel, Motorola, Intel, and HP) in Russia have 
led to intensifying competition for skilled programmers. The rapid 
growth of demand together with a limited supply pool has led to a 
quick rise in salary levels in the early 2000s.28 Competition for compe-
tent workers also forces employers to organize their business activities 
better. For example, in order to get a bank loan, an employee needs a 
steady job and an officially paid ‘white’ salary. In addition to the salary, 
workers have begun to value social security and health care benefits 
paid by their employers.
The rise in wages has led to a reduction in the relative cost advantage 
of offshore programming done in Russia. This has forced companies, 
especially those concentrating on cheap outsourcing of programming, 
to develop new business models, such as orientation to the domestic 
market, establishment of branches outside of the Russian metropolises 
in places with cheaper labor (other Russian cities and former USSR coun-
tries, but also in Scandinavia and Western Europe), attempts to develop 
their own products and applications, and attempts to reach closer part-
nerships with customer companies. However, closer cooperation with 
customers also demands substantial domain knowledge from different 
fields. The ability of Russian offshore firms to acquire such knowledge 
and integrate themselves deeper into the business processes of the end 
customers may turn out to be decisive for the industry’s future. 
In all, the Russian ICT industry is, despite its small size, a strong and 
fast-growing field of the economy, with the telecommunications sector 
having a leading role. In terms of human resources, it also seems to 
have the potential to capitalize on Russian scientific and mathematical 
competences for the uses of economic diversification. But as the short 
review of the history of the field showed, the roots of the industry in 
many ways date back to the Soviet era. This rooting has commonly been 
referred to as the Soviet legacy or heritage. The next chapter turns to 
the analysis of the nature of this legacy, drawing both on the existing 
research and our own empirical data.
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4
The Soviet Legacy and its 
Transformation in the 
Russian IT Field
Unlike many other fields of contemporary Russian industry, the IT sec-
tor was not built on the relics of Soviet enterprises but on the significant 
scientific, human, and social resources of the new Russian entrepre-
neurs. Despite this relative independence of the IT field from the tradi-
tional Soviet economy, our respondents live and work in a society that 
is still influenced by the socialist past in several ways.
In this chapter, this influence is considered in terms of the ‘Soviet 
legacy’ and the transformation of this legacy in post-Soviet Russia is dis-
cussed. The beginning of the chapter reflects upon both the constrain-
ing and the enabling aspects of the Soviet heritage, and searches for the 
roots of Russian entrepreneurship in the Soviet era. The remaining parts 
of the chapter describe the transformation of informal practices ranging 
from the Soviet way of using connections to the barter exchanges of the 
transition era and the role of ‘kickbacks’ in the present-day Russian IT 
sector.
Constraining and enabling aspects of the Soviet legacy
At first glance, our respondents seemed to have little to do with the 
Soviet legacy. With only a few exceptions, they had clear identities as 
capitalist entrepreneurs, directors, and managers. Many had indeed 
started their businesses practically from scratch and built modern IT 
enterprises through persistence and hard work. Upon detailed inspec-
tion, however, the continuing presence of the Soviet heritage in the 
present could be detected in relation to social structures, individual 
actors, and their personal networks.1
This presence of the Soviet past has often been called the ‘Soviet 
legacy’, and it is still used in various contexts to explain post-Soviet 
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Russian life, most often as a shorthand way of referring to mainly nega-
tive phenomena.2 Under closer scrutiny, this legacy turns out to be a 
complex phenomenon. 
Alexei Yurchak’s view on Soviet legacy in his study Everything 
Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (2006) 
helps both to make sense of this complex legacy and to solve the enigma 
of how the seemingly eternal Soviet system could actually fall apart so 
easily and quickly. According to Yurchak this was possible because 
the Soviet system – despite its undeniable flaws and atrocities – also 
contained spaces for creativity and positive experience. Following 
John Austin’s language theory, he differentiates between the ‘conno-
tative’ and ‘performative’ functions of the language used in the ‘late 
socialism’ of Brezhnev’s years. While the connotative function describes 
reality (an enouncement can be true or false), its performative function 
achieves actions in the world through use of language (e.g. taking an 
oath).
According to Yurchak, in late socialism there was a ‘performative 
shift’ in language use from connotative to perfomative dimensions. In 
other words, people participating in May demonstrations, voting or 
giving speeches in Komsomol meetings did not pay attention to the 
connotative dimensions since at issue was not the truthfulness of their 
speech but rather a performing of a ritual. This kind of participation 
in the common rituals of ‘hypernormalized’ language use at public 
meetings enabled citizens to continue functioning within the Soviet 
system, to which, in actuality, they had attitudes varying from hostility 
and indifference to full support of communist ideals. In other words, 
the performative use of language in official contexts allowed them to 
create alternative spaces for action and interests and to develop their 
own cultural activities (including Western rock music) in and outside 
the Soviet system.
On a general level Yurchak’s approach adds an enabling dimension to 
the depictions of the Soviet system and deconstructs the binary views 
consisting of, for example, true believers in communist ideals and pre-
tenders, official and unofficial, or public and private. Seeing the Soviet 
Union through these binarities prevents us from understanding the 
complexity of daily life in late socialism, and, by extension, paradoxes 
such as the communist system as a platform for the emerging new 
Russian entrepreneurs.
In the following sections the Soviet legacy will be discussed in terms 
of structures, actors, and networks, keeping in mind both the constrain-
ing and enabling aspects of this legacy.
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Soviet organizations as platforms for the 
emerging economy
Komsomol
The constraining structural aspects of the Soviet system on the economy 
have already been addressed in the previous chapter. In line with 
Yurchak’s general idea, however, the Soviet era could also be consid-
ered to have contributed to the emergence of the IT field in several 
important ways. These enabling structural aspects of the Soviet legacy 
include the high level of mathematic-technical education, mass educa-
tion of engineers, and the strong tradition in computer-related sciences 
which provided highly trained employees for the emerging IT sector. 
In addition, Soviet era organizational structures, such as Komsomol 
and particularly the high-level research institutions and universities in 
St. Petersburg, formed important contexts for the emerging Russian 
entrepreneurship.
According to Yurchak, the new Russian entrepreneurs had come from 
backgrounds in industry, science, the black market and Komsomol. In 
his view, many new Russian entrepreneurs had already acquired skills, 
knowledge, and competence under the structures of the late social-
ist Soviet system where no official private entrepreneurship existed 
(Yurchak 2002, 2006: 296–8).3 He notes how the success of many of 
the richest Russian businessmen could be traced back to their high-
ranking Komsomol positions and describes how the Youth Centers of 
Komsomol allowed the emerging businessmen an aegis under which to 
put up the starting capital, find contacts, and transform non-cash funds 
into cash:
In the late 1980s, when the reforms of perestroika reached the 
sphere of economics and the Komsomol was allowed to experi-
ment with private business activity, the knowledge, skills, and 
forms of rationality that consituted the late socialist entrepre-
neurial governmentality proved to be of crucial importance in this 
experimentation. At that time many active Komsomol secretaries 
started thinking of themselves as private entrepreneurs and busi-
nessmen, originally without necessarily giving up their identities 
as Komsomol secretaries. Eventually their work in ‘youth centers’ 
and ‘cooperatives’ under the auspices of the Komsomol organiza-
tion turned many Komsomol committees into private firms and 
banks.
(Yurchak 2006: 297–8)
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Yurchak’s account is lent credence by the descriptions of some of our 
respondents who told of having trained in entrepreneurial activities in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s at the ‘Youth Center for Scientific and 
Technical Creativity’ (Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoe Tvorchestvo Molodezhi, 
NTTM) functioning under the auspices of Komsomol: 
At that time the business life started to develop. I organized on the 
basis of my dissertation topic a brigade which at the time was called 
temporary working brigade (vremennaia trudovaia brigada) (…) it was 
organized through NTTM. It was possible to work behind the back 
of the institute [where the respondent was officially employed] and 
arrange the payment through NTTM.
(technical director, p38)
Another of our respondents (director, p39) had similarly already organ-
ized his first, ‘quite complex’ commercial programming project at the 
end of the 1980s, through a Komsomol organization headed by his 
close relative. For the respondent it was evident that at that time this 
organization did not conduct youth-related activities anymore but 
closed different kinds of commercial deals.
Universities and research institutes
Because of the nature of the IT field and the concentration of several 
technical universities and research institutes in Leningrad, for many of 
our respondents their scientific and academic backgrounds and organi-
zations were more important than their Komsomol connections. 
Many respondents also noted their inclination toward and success in 
mathematics and/or computer science in school. All but two had gradu-
ated from university, and several had a licentiate or doctorate degree in 
computing-related sciences. For many, post-graduate studies in univer-
sity or a job at a scientific research institute facilitated the acquisition of 
the human and social capital needed to start a private business.
Company director Egor (p42), for example, started his program-
ming career in a British–Russian joint venture established at a sci-
entific research institute in the early 1990s. Similarly, a well-known 
St. Petersburg software development company was founded in the early 
1990s by young graduates from the university who wanted to earn a 
living with their skills in software design. In less than 20 years the firm 
has grown into an important player in the St. Petersburg IT field.
Another director (p22), with a background in the academic world, 
describes in a vivid manner his scientific activities at the research 
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institute where he was writing his dissertation, and his gradual orient-
ing toward entrepreneurship: 
We made some new discoveries at the institute and everything was 
very interesting and fun. We sat there all night, worked around the 
clock. But then the excitement started to wear off. There were no 
more new discoveries. We ran out of adrenaline and started thinking 
how to live further. At the same time the first personal computers 
appeared and we started to do programming. (…) I already had a 
family and kids whom I should provide for somehow. (…) How could 
a graduate from matmekh [mathematical-technical faculty] make a 
living, one who has studied mathematics, programming and other 
subjects related to exact sciences? (…) Automatically one starts think-
ing of information technology.
(director, p22)
Though at face value this account resembles the starting phases of US 
firms established by study mates from major universities, the analogy 
is only superficial. For a US graduate careers in both the academy or 
in business were normal and customary options – though in both one 
had to face fierce competition. This was not the case in the Russia 
of the 1990s where academic careers seemed to have no future: one 
could not get by, let alone raise a family, based on the meager salaries 
in the academy. For one wishing to start a business, there were no 
models, business schools, institutions, or markets. One had to sink 
or swim.
A well-known example of the symbiosis between academic and busi-
ness life in Russia is Lanit-Terkom,4 one of the biggest software firms 
in St. Petersburg, which was established and is functioning in close 
connection with the St. Petersburg state university. Averin and Dudarev 
(2003: 55) describe the nature of this symbiosis:
The company grew out of the System Programming Department 
(Mathematics and Mechanics Faculty) of the St. Petersburg State 
University, headed by the chief of department, Professor Andrey 
Terekhov. The utilization of the resources of the Mathematics and 
Mechanical Department gave the company an opportunity to 
use the knowledge and scientific background accumulated in the 
department during the decades of the Faculty’s history. Moreover, 
the company has acquired a virtual monopoly over the highly 
qualified and talented staff – the teaching and research staff, as 
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well as the best graduates of the department. At the moment, 
there is no clear boundary between the educational organization 
and the private company. Almost all teaching staff of the System 
Programming Department work for the company. The most tal-
ented students of the department are engaged in the company’s 
projects within the framework of practical research (included in 
the curriculum) starting from 2nd–3rd years of education. Such a 
symbiosis is gainful both for the company and the department. The 
latter receives financial support and the opportunity to place its 
students in a job. Lanit Tercom is able, in turn, to prepare qualified 
personnel and to use the renowned name of the department in its 
marketing policy. 
This is just one example of the survival strategies based on a symbio-
sis between the academic and business worlds in the early years of 
Russian transformation. However, as will become evident in Chapter 6, 
in addition to academic or Komsomol background rooted in the 
Soviet era structures, a wide variety of other development paths for 
new software companies came to light in our data. One of them was 
illustrated by the 37-year-old CEO of a software company employing 
80 people:
There was a factory which had problems and invited me to consult 
them. I looked around and saw that they had both problems and 
money. We suggested that they would give up their old software and 
we would write them a new one. They agreed. We gathered a group 
of people and started a project. In the course of this project we under-
stood that the project would grow bigger than our temporary group 
of people and we founded a company.
(general director, p3)
Entrepreneurship and Soviet legacy
As for the actors, the term Soviet legacy is often evoked in connec-
tion with the continuing role of the ‘Soviet mentality’ in present-day 
Russia. The connotations of the Soviet legacy are mainly negative, 
such as lack of enterprise, sticking to old routines, strict hierarchies, 
and so forth. 
Although in general the IT sector in post-Soviet Russia is thought 
to be the least affected by the Soviet legacy, one respondent remarked 
that the legacy indeed still had an impact on domestic markets because 
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of the ‘red directors’ working with the Soviet mindset and methods of 
management in customer companies:
When placing an order or making a deal there comes the moment 
of decision: to buy or not. Who buys, how and what. And then you 
will run straight into all these red directors.
(general director, p3)
According to another respondent, the question of the Soviet mentality 
was connected to generations and was only relevant to those educated 
in the Soviet era, whereas the new post-socialist generation had new 
values and new problems: 
P4: Today there has grown a completely new generation which is 
already in business life. Currently I deal with people who are not 
solely working in IT firms. They have managers of my age, that is, 
around thirty. We all went to school in the Soviet era.
Q: Do you have different values or do you work differently?
P4: I don’t know, it is difficult to talk about the others. I can only 
say that in my mind those around thirty–thirty-five still remember 
school well. Those who finished school in the beginning of the 1990s 
already have completely new values and they look at life in a com-
pletely different way. In my head, the Soviet legacy still remains.
(general director, p4)
An example of the problems of transformation for the Soviet generation 
was learning how to behave in business. This knowledge consists of, 
for example, working routines and habits and is accumulated over time 
in organizations but is rarely put into writing (cf. Podolny and Baron 
1997). These habitual ways of acting are thus usually not learned from 
books but typically by imitating or interacting with colleagues or a men-
tor, or simply by doing. 
One of our respondents, who had worked for most of his career in 
the Soviet Union, emphasized – in addition to learning new habits – the 
unlearning of the Soviet routines and ways of acting when comparing 
himself with the 20-year-old CEO of a well-known software company:
Q: There are things which are difficult to learn from books, which 
you can only learn through your own experience or by observing the 
experience of your older colleagues. For example, how to think in a 
new, innovative way, how to relate to people, how to conduct busi-
ness. Have you had these kinds of cases?
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P1: Continuously.
Q: Can you tell examples?
P1: You have to understand that I was born in 1951 [year of birth 
has been changed]. At that time you had not even been planned yet, 
probably not even your parents, but I was already crawling, and then 
grew up in the Soviet Union. My whole mentality is Soviet. Imagine 
how hard it was for me to change, how hard it was to transform 
whereas my colleagues, e.g. my colleague in the company NewComp 
[name of firm changed] is now around 30. Have you yet been to 
NewComp?
Q: No.
P1: Well, look. This guy is older than you, about thirty. He started 
his business right after having finished at the institute. For him this 
is completely different. Of course I keep an eye on him and my 
other competitors. They are my teachers. I watch how they conduct 
business, how they regard their colleagues, how they organize every-
thing. And I try to apply this (…) For them it all came naturally, but 
I had to get rid of the birthmarks of socialism.
(general director, p1)
The same respondent illustrated the moral tension between socialist 
and capitalist mindsets with the dilemma caused by the installation of 
a new computerized system in his company to monitor workers:
For me it was very difficult to start [in the company] a computerized 
access control system, which records the time of arriving and leaving 
the workplace. Now I know who came later, who has not worked 40 
hours a week. It was incredible, how difficult the implementation 
was for me. I felt as if I was being torn into pieces. What would the 
people think?
(general director, p1)
Various techniques of controlling and monitoring workers were cer-
tainly also used both in the Soviet Union and other industrialized 
countries. The quote above thus rather illustrates the difficulties in the 
transition from the position of ‘scientific rank-and-file worker’ to that 
of a capitalist company owner and CEO, and the problems and ten-
sions in balancing between the moral requirements of two conflicting 
sociopolitical orders. 
There is, however, also another way of looking at the Soviet mental-
ity. The studies of daily life survival strategies (e.g. Lonkila 1997), blat 
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networks (Ledeneva 1998), and the abovementioned research by Yurchak 
(2002, 2006) suggest that the allegedly passive homo sovieticus could in 
the interstices of the system find spaces and possibilities for complex and 
innovative maneuvers. In fact, navigating in the opportunity structures 
of the late socialist and perestroika era allows us ‘to speak about entre-
preneurship in a context in which there was no market based private 
business per se’ (Yurchak 2002; see also Shmulyar Gréen 2009). 
In a similar vein Alf Rehn and Saara Taalas (2004) claim that the stu-
dents of entrepreneurship have a lesson to learn about Soviet society, 
where, due to an ideological bias in research, entrepreneurship was not 
considered to exist at all. The authors even go as far as to claim that 
‘The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics might be seen as the most 
entrepreneurial society ever’ and maintain that the Soviet system basi-
cally forced all citizens to become ‘micro-entrepreneurs’ in everyday 
life. They detect entrepreneurship and risk taking in unexpected set-
tings also outside the business and market contexts and consider the 
blat networks to have been the main arena for entrepreneurial activity 
in the Soviet Union (Rehn and Taalas 2004).5 Blat networks in the Soviet 
Union and their transformation in post-Soviet Russia will be the focus 
of the next two sections.
Blat: Transformation of the Soviet-era networking practice
Blat denotes the Soviet habit of using personal relations to direct public 
resources to private uses.6 There are no exact English translations, but 
expressions such as ‘using connections’, ‘pulling strings’, and so forth 
give a rough understanding of the contents of the term. In this sec-
tion the blat system and its transformation in post-Soviet Russia are 
described both according to Ilja Srubar’s comparative investigation as 
well as Alena Ledeneva’s studies of blat (1998, 2008, 2009).
In his article on the actual nature of the socialist system, War der 
reale Sozialismus moderne? (Was the Real Socialism Modern?), Ilja Srubar 
(1991) presents an accurate theoretical description of the role of social 
networks in a socialist system. Though Srubar’s analysis is based on 
comparison of studies of countries which made up the former Soviet 
bloc (not including the Soviet Union itself), the comparative aspect of 
the study strengthens the power of his argument. Srubar manages to 
show a similar kind of relationship between the socialist system and 
social networks in historically and culturally varied national contexts.
According to Srubar, the power monopoly of the Communist Party 
combined with the socialist shortage economy created a mechanism 
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of social integration which was based on social networks and was 
specific to real socialist countries. In the shortage economy in addition 
to money the citizens also needed information about how and where to 
find goods in short supply. These goods and information were obtained 
through networks which developed into an alternative distribution sys-
tem. Within the networks, an atmosphere of mutual solidarity emerged 
out of the reciprocal exchange relations, but it was limited to those who 
had something to barter, such as access to socialist property. These net-
works functioned parallel to the official system and were tolerated by 
the party since they compensated for the flaws of the shortage economy 
by diverting people’s interests from politics to consumption. In addi-
tion, they functioned as a means of control since the party’s tolerance 
for them could always be withdrawn.
While the shortage economy forced citizens to turn to their personal 
relations in order to get by, the party power monopoly produced a 
non-transparent state bureaucracy, the decisions of which could not be 
predicted by citizens. A position in this bureaucracy represented capital 
which could be traded through personal networks. This mechanism of 
social integration had a profound influence on the individual’s social 
identity. Citizens in real socialism divided the world into the trustworthy 
‘us’ – that is, one’s personal network – and potentially hostile ‘others.’ 
Instead of general social solidarity, this integration mechanism produced 
fragmented solidarity within ‘an archipelago of networks’ and a world-
view where moral norms applied to one’s own circle were different from 
those applied to outsiders, for whom there was no moral way to success. 
A neighbor’s wealth, for example, was attributed either to his political 
privileges or illegal activities in redistribution networks (Srubar 1991).
Parallel to Srubar, but independently of his research, Alena Ledeneva 
(1998, 2008, 2009, see also Lomnitz 1988) has studied blat in detail in 
the Soviet Union. Ledeneva bases her work on extensive field research 
and interviews filled with rich descriptions of the content, functioning, 
and practices of the blat ties.
Importantly for the themes of this book, Ledeneva defines blat pre-
cisely with the help of the notion of personal networks, as ‘the use of 
personal networks for obtaining goods and services in short supply 
and for circumventing formal procedures. Blat networks channeled an 
alternative currency – an informal exchange of favors – that introduced 
elements of the market into the planned economy and loosened up the 
rigid constraints of the political regime’ (Ledeneva 2009, 257–8). 
However, though blat practices were conducted through personal net-
works, they were not identical, since the latter also had other functions, 
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such as sociability. These functions were difficult to separate because 
‘blat merged with patterns of sociability to such an extent that people 
were unable to distinguish between friendship and the use of friend-
ship. The boundaries became particularly blurred as the exchanged 
favors were favors of a particular kind – “favors of access”’ (Ledeneva 
2009: 258).
Blat had an ambivalent character since on the one hand it was 
necessary for the functioning of the system, but on the other hand it 
undermined the system and corrupted common morals through its 
very existence. Though blat practices made use of state resources, the 
state was dependent on the informal ways of distributing the scarce 
resources. The informal ways could not be discussed publicly, which 
created a double morality in Soviet society:
Thus blat became an open secret of Soviet socialism, well known 
but banned from political or academic discourse. The blat system 
of exchange was founded in the possibility of extending favors at 
the expense of state property. The dubious nature of state property 
and the repressive nature of the Soviet state contributed to pervasive 
practices of cheating and outwitting the state: blat and other forms 
of diverting state property, smuggling out (vynos), false reporting 
(pripiski), stealing, or absenteeism. These practices indicate not only 
the popular view of the Soviet state as parasitic, due to its highly 
exploitative nature, but also the mutual tolerance between the state 
and the citizens, especially in the Brezhnev era.
(Ledeneva 2008: 123–4)
Ledeneva shows how the inability of the Soviet economy to produce 
enough goods and services of decent quality, such as food products, 
medicine, cars, apartments, and so forth, led to resorting to obtaining 
them ‘by blat’ (po blatu). The examples of blat practices abound: an 
acquaintance working at a warehouse could arrange access to goods 
in short supply ‘under the counter’, a contact in the army ranks could 
arrange for avoiding the two to three years of military service, a doctor 
acquaintance in the hospital could arrange jumping the queue for better 
treatment or an operation, and so on. 
Blat contacts penetrated the whole Soviet society: their amount was 
large and scale wide, but the common denominator was the use of 
social ties in order to gain access to state property or services and to 
use them for the private purposes of one’s own circle. Ledeneva (1998: 
39–58) distinguished blat from its ‘extended family’, including bribery, 
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corruption, second economy, and patronage. For example, the differ-
ence between blat and bribery or corruption was that the latter were 
based on straightforward deals involving buying services with money. 
Characteristic of the blat services, on the other hand, were the long-term 
cultivation of relationships, a special vocabulary, and a refined etiquette 
of behavior where the straightforward offering of money could be con-
sidered insulting. This meant, among other things, that blat practices 
could penetrate areas where use of money could not.
Ledeneva also discusses the differences between blat and the various 
notions of ‘informal’ (unofficial, second, hidden, parallel, shadow, etc.) 
economy. She concludes that blat cannot be adequately analyzed in 
terms of informal economic practices since it implies relations of reci-
procity within personal networks, rather than market-type exchanges 
and activities oriented toward profit, on which informal economic 
practices are often based. In her mind, the study of blat requires a socio-
cultural analysis of personal ties and their impact on blat exchanges.
Blat exchanges were based on reciprocal obligations. Ledeneva employs 
an idea borrowed from Pierre Bourdieu, according to whom the partners 
in a gift exchange take part in a collective ‘misrecognition game.’ In this 
game, the exchange of gifts can be perceived as altruistic only because of 
the time gap between the original gift and the countergift (see Chapter 7 
for a closer account of reciprocal obligations). 
Though Ledeneva’s observations are in many ways extremely relevant 
to this study, the differences between blat exchanges and the exchanges 
dealt with in this book should be made clear. First, despite the misrec-
ognition game, the blat system had in general a negative reputation: 
no Soviet citizen could have publicly admitted to having engaged in 
it. Partly because of this nature, asking a blat favor was often psycho-
logically difficult (Ledeneva 1998: 156). This was not the case for our 
respondents with everyday exchanges of small favors, advice, helping 
out and so forth, most of which did not include a morally doubtful 
aspect. Second, and related to the previous point, blat transactions were 
about granting favor of access to state services or property, which were 
redirected to private use, whereas the majority of the favors and services 
dealt with in this book do not have that character. 
Blat in post-Soviet Russia
In her later work, Ledeneva (2008) notes three major changes in blat 
practices. The first change concerns the expansion of the money econ-
omy, which has diminished the need for blat in personal consumption. 
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Second, the privatization of the economy has changed the nature of 
‘favors of access’ granted by officials. Instead of exchanging favors of 
access to socialist property for access to another distribution system, in 
the 1990s these favors came to be about privatizing state resources and 
converting them into private capital through various licenses and per-
missions. These exchanges between the state and business sector often 
turned into outright corruption. Third, the scale of blat exchanges has 
started to predominantly serve business instead of personal consump-
tion (Ledeneva 2008: 132–3).
However, Ledeneva admits that informal contacts still remained a 
priority where money was not accepted as a means of exchange (1998: 
180), and notes that blat was still used in state education and employ-
ment (1998: 206). Anna-Maria Salmi (2006: 38–9) adds to this list health 
services and job searches, which still offer much space for blat-type 
activities.
Ledeneva’s (2009) recent assessment of the role of blat in post-Soviet 
Russia in 2009 is in line with these results. With the progress of mon-
etary relations, blat has lost its relevance in everyday consumption 
but is still significant in, for example, the labor market, health care, 
and education. In her national representative survey conducted by the 
Levada Center in 2007, she asked respondents to define blat by choos-
ing as many prompts as necessary: 
18 percent of respondents indicated that the term is out of use and 
five percent noted that the word blatnoi means criminal – that is, 
has returned to its original pre-revolutionary meaning. At least a 
quarter of respondents associated blat with an exchange of favors 
(22 percent) or best described by a proverb ‘I scratch your back, you 
scratch mine’ (ty-mne, ia-tebe) (15 percent). With regard to formal 
constraints, the responses were: ‘circumvention of formal rules and 
procedures’ (17 percent), ‘problem solving’ (12 percent), ‘blat is the 
necessity in order to give a bribe’ (six percent) or gain access to 
administrative resources (four percent). Tellingly, only seven percent 
of respondents found it difficult to answer this question and there 
were respondents who offered their own definitions (including 
‘blat is higher than under Stalin’ and ‘blat is a leftover of socialism’ 
(izderzhki sotsializma) as well as ‘blat is the corrupt system, the whole 
industry’ and ‘blat is life’.
(Ledeneva 2009: 262)
Whatever the exact definition, blat still seems to have a central place 
in post-Soviet society since 66 percent of Ledeneva’s respondents 
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considered it either widespread (28 percent) or rather widespread (38 
percent) in their own city or region.
In the following text the post-Soviet blat is illustrated by our inter-
views. Due to the nature of our data and methods, these illustrations 
are not claimed to be generalizable. At the end of this chapter their 
relevance will be evaluated through comparison with other studies of 
the topic. 
The description by a St. Petersburg IT manager of the vanishing of blat 
practices seems to lend support to Ledeneva’s conclusions. According to 
the respondent, the pressure of efficiency in capitalist enterprise does 
not leave room for blat in present-day Russia:
P1: In socialism, a person working as a butcher can get a carcass of 
an animal. Another person drives a taxi. A third one is a doctor and 
can obtain medical services. The butcher cuts the best pieces off the 
carcass and sells them at a normal state regulated price to the taxi 
driver or doctor. (…) And the bones he brings to the shop and sells 
to us engineers (…) Now, if the butcher needs to go someplace by car, 
he phones the taxi driver who drives him from one place to another. 
And the doctor will take care of him.
Q: And how does this work today?
P1: Today you go to the shop and buy. Anything is for sale.
Q: So where is there blat today?
P1: I told you an example of Soviet blat. Today it works on the level 
of old relations. But I believe it will soon disappear. Slowly blat will 
disappear. 
Q: For example, in IT, in outsourcing there is almost no blat?
P1: In practice not. IT functions as other sectors. I can for example, 
appoint my brother as a manager in my firm. And he will turn out to 
be a good for nothing, he can do nothing. What will my colleagues 
say? We are trying to make money, what will they say?
(general director, p1)
Parts of this quote were questioned by other respondents, however. 
Though IT companies working with foreign customers were generally 
considered blat free, they too had to deal with blat-type phenomena if 
also operating on domestic markets. Moreover, in certain cases blat-type 
arrangements may be used either as an alternative to or in combination 
with bribing. 
The interpretation of the term blat seemed to be connected to the 
age of the respondents. While elderly respondents, such as the one 
describing the blat relations among the butcher, taxi driver and doctor, 
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considered blat in line with Ledeneva’s account, marketing manager 
Valentina (p15), who was under 30 years of age, regarded blat as a syno-
nym for the informal use of social relations in general. According to 
development manager Viktor (p17, 33 years) ‘blat is not so relevant for 
young people. Many of them do not know, cannot imagine what blat 
means.’ The hesitation of still another of our respondents, a director 
under 30 years of age, lends support to this:
Blat – it is a tough word. If you define it formally … how would you 
define it formally?
(director, p10)
Varied opinions were expressed about the existence, nature, and specificity 
of post-Soviet blat. A director-owner of his own company, aged 50 (CEO, 
p16) – who thus had his own experiences of Soviet blat – compared blat 
to ‘protection.’ A technical director under 30 (p11) saw blat as a Russian 
version of a universal way of acting that is not inherently immoral. 
Despite these variations, a common view was that blat still exists in 
the public sector and big state-owned companies. In particular tenders 
organized by the state-related actors were considered to be impossible 
to win without blat, bribes, or both. The founder of a young and small 
company expressed this explicitly: 
We [respondent’s firm] probably have not yet reached the level where 
you participate in tenders, but I know that they are indeed won by 
those who have acquaintances. If, for example, the five leading firms 
of my field try as hard as they can, the tender will be won by those 
with connections anyway.
(technical director, p20)
Another respondent doing business with state structures refused to 
answer this question (‘confidential’), but the third respondent, working 
in system integration, confirms the quote above:
In fact, in some market segments it [blat] definitely exists. This was 
particularly visible in system integration which is closely related to 
the state purchases. It is practically impossible to win a tender with-
out corresponding connections, friends, acquaintances, kinfolk. But 
this is actually no secret. I am not revealing any secret.
(marketing manager, p18)
When asked about concrete examples of present-day blat, in addition 
to state structures, employment by blat was mentioned. Marketing 
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director Svetlana (p6) also referred to the arranging of study places 
by blat – a phenomenon about which there are a lot of rumors and 
anecdotal evidence from both the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia: 
Q: In the Soviet era blat relations were still used. Do they still func-
tion, does blat exist nowadays? 
P4: In state structures it stays as it was. In my opinion there is no 
doubt about this. But in business – this is a complex question. It 
is clear that parents try to push their children forward through all 
means. This is a normal parental instinct, and here blat functions. 
Another matter is that it functions precisely as an exchange of favors. 
I have an example in mind, where a big boss arranged for his chil-
dren to work in different companies. With this it happens often that 
the child does not correspond to the requirements presented by the 
companies. But the child was employed precisely because dad had 
given in one way or another a favor to this company. And so this 
happened in full scale. As for business, I think that in big companies 
this also functions, but not in small ones. Here I doubt it.
Q: Why?
P4: In small companies people are visible (na vidu), everything is 
counted and the budget is small. If a small company has to employ 
someone to win a state organized tender, this causes a financial 
calculation: How much do we lose by employing this kid and how 
much do we win by getting this order.
(general director, p4)
In all, despite the significant changes compared to Soviet-era blat, the 
present-day Russian society and economy still seem to leave room for 
informal practices more or less reminiscent of blat. Even though these 
practices may be neither as pervasive nor culturally specific as in the 
Soviet Union, they still continue to exist, particularly in the public sec-
tor and state-controlled parts of the economy. 
Barter: A transitory phenomenon of exchange
Where blat was mainly a phenomenon of the Soviet system, barter 
(non-monetary exchange between companies) peaked in the late 1990s 
(see Figure 4.1).7 Barter will be briefly described here as an example 
of informal socioeconomic practices of the transition era based on 
personal connections. According to Caroline Humphrey (2000a), post-
Soviet barter was a unique phenomenon on the global scale, since never 
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before had an economy as big as Russia’s operated to a large extent 
through barter.
Though barter exchanges took place in the Soviet Union as well, 
according to David Woodruff (1999), the ‘barter of the bankrupt’ of 
the transition era was a qualitatively different phenomenon with new 
causes and new consequences. In his mind the new barter was not only 
an anomaly threatening the implementation of the market reforms, 
but also a sign of how the reformers had neglected the central role of 
monetary consolidation in state building.
According to Ivanenko and Mikheyev (2002; see also Clarke 2000: 
178–9), in the background of barter there were the structural weaknesses 
and bottlenecks of the socialist system. The Soviet economy had built 
a massive industrial production system which was connected to an 
inflexible and one-sided distribution, trade, and banking network. Big 
production plants, for example, were planned to serve certain custom-
ers and get raw material from certain producers. When one part of the 
logistic chain saw trouble, this was reflected in the whole chain:
For example, as steel producers in the Ural region found the demand 
for their products falling, they became unable to pay suppliers in 
cash and offered metal products for coal. The coal mines, being 
unable to find alternative customers along the existing transport 
lines, had to agree.









Figure 4.1 The share of barter in Russian industrial sales, 1992–2007, %
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In addition to leading to barter between companies, the demonetiza-
tion of the post-Soviet Russian economy in the 1990s also affected 
households, since some salaries were paid in non-monetary forms (see 
Clarke 2000: 189–94). Because the retail trade and provision of con-
sumer services were, however, mainly monetary, individual households 
had to react to the new situations either by lowering their standard of 
living (Clarke 2000) or by selling the goods received at the workplace 
on streets and highways or in marketplaces.
It is not our intention to review the large research literature on bar-
ter here (see for example Seabright 2000a; Ivanenko and Mikheyev 
2002; Woodruff 2000). It suffices to say that barter was not only an 
economic but also a social phenomenon operating through social rela-
tions (Seabright 2000b: 8). Consequently, the studies most relevant for 
this book are those analyzing the dynamics of barter on the micro level 
(Humphrey 2000a, b; Ledeneva 2000, 2006; Clarke 2000). 
Though barter took place between companies and organizations, the 
practical deals were handled by individuals, and the barter arrange-
ments and exchange chains were often built upon complex chains of 
exchanging parties (Ledeneva 2000: 298–317, 2006: 115–41). These 
arrangements were partly founded upon already existing networks, 
and partly they created new relationships balancing between trust and 
coercion (Humphrey 2000a, b). Most importantly, the majority of the 
barter deals were not conducted directly between the exchanging firms 
but through middlemen (Ledeneva 2006: 125). 
In actual fact this means that the Russian economy in the 1990s 
formed an immense network consisting of the companies (and their 
workers who were paid in kind) and the middlemen mediating the 
exchanges. These networks, on the base of which Russia’s current form 
of capitalism was partly built, relied on personal contacts:
[G]ood personal contacts are vital for making the offsets agreed upon 
between the parties, for designing schemes, and for making these 
schemes work. Negotiation skills may help to acquire weak links 
for the schemes – partners engaged on a rather short-term basis – but 
it is personal contacts that provide strong links in these schemes, 
those characterized by absolute trust or long-term technological 
partnership.
(Ledeneva 2006: 138–9)
In their criticism of the presuppositions of the transition debate, Michael 
Burawoy and Katherine Verdery (1999b) have stated that in spite of a 
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linear transition from socialism to a market economy, development in 
Russia will most probably be an uneven development of different sec-
tors of society with occasional ‘backlashes’. Though barter will hardly 
reach the prevalence of the 1990s again, there have been some signs of 
the return of barter practices on a smaller scale after the beginning of 
the economic crisis in 2008. Belchenko (2008), for example, describes 
how certain companies in the Krasnoyarsk region in the beginning of 
December 2008 paid their workers’ salaries in the company’s products 
instead of money.8
Otkat: The role of ‘kickbacks’ in the Russian economy
While blat was mainly a Soviet era phenomenon, barter peaked at the 
end of the 1990s, after which it slowly disappeared. Instead of blat and 
barter, many of our respondents mentioned the rise of otkat, an expres-
sion for a post-Soviet form of corruption. It roughly corresponds to 
the English word ‘kickback’ and, as the Russian discussants are eager 
to note, is not a particularity of the Russian economy: the first ‘Anti-
Kickback Act’ was passed in the US already in 1946 and was amended 
in 1960, 1986, and 1994 (Denisov 2005).9
Otkat is a noun from the verb otkatit’ (roll away, roll back). In actual 
terms it means that a company participating in a public tender promises 
to ‘roll back’ a certain amount of the contract sum to the organizers of 
the tender. Otkat is therefore a form of corruption that is not specific 
only to Russia, and there is no reason to believe that foreign firms 
operating in Russia would not use otkat. What seems to be particular 
however – concluding from our interviews, the views of Russian observ-
ers (e.g. Denisov 2005; Gorbachev 2007) and other information about 
corrupted practices in Russia – is the prevalence of otkat in Russian 
business. 
This prevalence is in line with the general information on corrupted 
practices in the Russian economy and society, and its actual practices 
are spiritedly debated both in Russian journals and on Internet forums. 
Giving otkat is often euphemized as ‘personal bonus’ or ‘discount’, and 
the negotiations concerning the deal may be conducted using language 
which at every point in time could be interpreted as referring either to 
a completely transparent and legal deal or a kickback agreement:
In the beginning of the discussion it is very good to test the waters 
with the potential recipient of otkat with the phrases with double 
meaning: ‘For you it will be very profitable (vygodno) to deal with 
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our company’, ‘we are ready to make concessions (poiti navstrechu) so 
that you would choose our company’, ‘a reduction may be arranged 
in any form convenient (udobno) for you’.
(Gorbachev 2007)
During such conversation the rich Russian language gives plenty of 
opportunities to interpret the word ‘you’ as ‘you personally’ instead of 
‘your company’, and the well-reflected pauses of speech, change of into-
nation or tone give an impression of the hidden message behind what 
is meant to be a transparent deal between the representatives of the two 
parties, and give the opponent chances to express understanding of this 
message (Gorbachev 2007).
Though otkat is not a big problem in the IT companies operating 
mainly in foreign markets, many respondents mentioned it in discus-
sions about the transformation of blat in post-Soviet Russia and Russian 
domestic markets:
Q: Sometimes in the Soviet era blat relations were used. Does this 
still function?
P9: It only turned into corruption. Of course it functions.
Q: Have you run into some examples?
P9: Not personally, because I work with foreign business and there 
this does not exist in general. But in Russia – of course. I don’t think 
you will find a line of business which functions without otkat and 
all this.
(director, p9)
Otkat was taken up by several respondents in connection with tenders 
which, according to the respondents, were won either through relations 
or otkat, or both. According to another respondent (director, p29) who 
had worked with Russian companies on domestic markets for a long 
time, tenders are rarely won based on ‘objective’ criteria, but with con-
nections and, lacking connections, by otkat. At the moment his firm did 
not participate in tender, considering it a waste of time and resources 
because the result was predestined:
The firm will do a huge amount of preparation, but the tender will 
be won by a crazy proposal only because of connections.
(director, p29)
Another respondent, a technical director working with big companies, 
told openly of the various forms of otkat, claiming that in practice all 
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state officials (chinovniki) take bribes, and still another admitted that his 
firm had been involved in otkat. 
Obtaining reliable information about the prevalence of otkat (or blat 
or barter) is understandably hampered by the several problems related 
to data and methods. One necessarily simplistic and limited way of 
approaching the subject is to examine the prevalence of these terms in 
the Russian media. Figure 4.2 is based on a scrutiny of selected Russian 
newspapers and magazines published in 1992–2007 and stored in the 
Integrum database. It shows how in the texts of central Russian newspa-
pers and magazines the term otkat has become more common during the 
2000s while the use of barter and blat has diminished (see Figure 4.2).10
Though the frequency of these terms in the media is not in direct 
correspondence with the occurrence of the phenomena in Russian 
society, it is noteworthy that the estimate of the peak of barter in 
Figure 4.1 is quite similar to the frequency of the term in printed media 
in Figure 4.2. 
The pervasiveness of corruption in Russia has also been addressed 
by Russian presidents – up to now without results. The latest data by 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index11 indicate 
a fall in Russia’s ranking from 121 in 2006 to 143 in 2007, and to 147 
in 2008, while in 2008 the US was eighteenth, the UK sixteenth and 
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Figure 4.2 The frequency of use of the terms blat, barter and otkat in selected 
Russian newspapers 1998–2007
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Figure 4.3 shows the deterioration of Russia’s ranking during the 
2000s despite the anticorruption speeches and campaigns. Russia’s clos-
est neighbors in the index in 1997 were Pakistan and Columbia and in 
2008 Indonesia and Togo.
The aim of this study is not the analysis of corruption in Russia. 
Therefore the processes and structures at the base of the corruption 
index rankings will not be investigated in detail (see, e.g. Lovell et al. 
2001). However, even without a detailed analysis one may draw the 
conclusion that Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev have not succeeded in 
weeding out wide-scale corruption, which seems to be a systemic char-
acteristic of the society and economy, from Russia.
The referrals to corruption and illegal or ambiguous practices in 
the interviews were mostly related to dealing with state structures. 
Understandably, most respondents did not clarify these things to the 
interviewer either because of unwillingness or because they were not 
responsible for communicating with these structures within their com-
panies. The following interview quote shows how a question not origi-
nally meant to refer only to state structures was interpreted as such by 
the respondent and how the native Russian interviewer read between 
the lines of the respondent’s reply:
Q: Have you sometime been in situations in business, where you 
could not solve the problem in a formal way and you had to lean on 
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Figure 4.3 Ranking of Russia in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index
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P20: Again here it is a question related to state structures. I do not 
know how this all goes, I do not deal with these things.
Q: Do you mean bribes? OK, it is not a secret to anyone, what 
there … Is this related to accounting?
P20: No, not to accounting. I will not answer this question. 
(technical director, p20) 
One of the few respondents who overtly told of illegal practices such 
as tax evasion was working in a small company employing only a few 
people and in a field representing a small fraction of the ICT sector.12 
In his field one did not, in the early 2000s, work on written contracts 
but on the basis of ‘gentlemen’s agreements’, because ‘practically all 
money goes over the taxman’s head’. According to the respondent prob-
ably one ruble out of 20 was reported to the taxman in falsified official 
contracts, the monitoring of which was based on social control and the 
reputations of actors within the small and specialized markets. Another 
respondent lent support to this view, stressing the similarity of the busi-
ness environment for all Russian companies:
[I]n general, companies work in a similar manner, which is defined 
by the legal environment. The legislation of the Russian federation 
contains directly both the juridical and financial aspects: taxes, 
banks and so forth. And I know that up to this day all firms work by 
and large according to the same model. There are very few firms that 
pay full taxes.
(general director, p4)
According to still another respondent (general director, p48) working in 
telecommunications it is not a secret that most of the telecommunica-
tions technology sold in St. Petersburg is ‘gray’, that is, not imported 
according to legal customs regulations.
Because of the particular nature of the software design sector (rela-
tively small turnover, large share of human and educational capital, 
orientation abroad), extortion and other forms of organized crime did 
not emerge as important issues in the interviews. A programming com-
pany is less vulnerable to extortion or takeover by criminal groups than, 
say, a distribution chain of food products. However, particularly in the 
1990s, keeping a low profile was considered to be a precaution against 
these practices, and probably also against the taxman: 
Until 1999 our company was not visible anywhere (…) But the 
level of criminality was at that time much higher than today – thank 
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God. And we did not want to be seen, to be known of or heard of 
here.
(general director, p1)
Things were different in the hardware business. Technical director 
Kirill (p38) remembered a meeting among Russian ICT companies at 
the beginning of the 2000s. A merry group of software designers was 
approached by an entrepreneur in the hardware business, who smiling 
sadly told the entrepreneurs ‘How well things are with you, nobody 
beats up or kills anyone’. (Nu, kak u vas khorosho, nikto nikogo ne izbivaet, 
nikto nikogo ne ubivaet.)
Other informal practices in the post-Soviet Russian 
economy
In her book How Russia Really Works. The Informal Practices That Shaped 
Post-Soviet Politics and Business (2006) Alena Ledeneva extends her 
studies of blat to other forms of informal practices in post-Soviet Russia 
which have gained ground parallel to blat losing its central role. She 
defines informal practices ‘as people’s regular strategies to manipulate 
or exploit formal rules by enforcing informal norms and personal obli-
gation in formal contexts. Such strategies involve bending both formal 
rules and informal norms, or navigating between these constraints, by 
following some and breaking others’ (Ledeneva 2008: 119, 2006).
The informal practices include, in addition to the barter dealt with 
earlier in this book, the use of ‘black PR’ and kompromat (gathering and 
fabricating blackmail files for political or business purposes), the prin-
ciple of krugovaia poruka (joint responsibility and mutual obligations 
of a closed social circle), double accountancy, financial scheming, and 
alternative law enforcement. As with blat, the nature of these practices 
is considered ambivalent, both reproducing and undermining the post-
Soviet society and economy:
I argue that informal practices were an integral part of the post-
socialist transformation. Informal practices adjusted to and were 
shaped by formal and informal constraints: they supported for-
mal rules and informal norms but also subverted them; they rap-
idly accommodated legal changes but also created an obstacle to 
further change; they were beneficial for certain individuals but also 
made them hostages of the system. These practices were not simply 
illegal but integrated the law into political, media, and business 
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technologies, often manipulatively. Similarly, they did not simply 
follow or contradict informal norms but relied on some of them and 
played one set of norms against the other.
(Ledeneva 2006: 190)
Ledeneva’s illuminative case studies describe, among other things, 
different types of sanctions as part of the informal practices:
The first area encompasses a set of administrative sanctions, that can 
be organized through well-placed links to official structures such as 
regional administrations, the tax inspectorate, tax police, the fire 
department, and the departments of sanitation and public health. 
It is possible to arrange for a firm’s access to water, gas, electricity, 
and sewers to be cut off by the regional authorities on the pretext of 
arrears. These techniques have been practiced widely and remain one 
of the most common ways of neutralizing opponents.
(Ledeneva 2006: 172–3)
Another example of informal practices presented by Ledeneva is the 
possibility of influencing official investigations and judicial proceedings 
in Russia. Law cases and investigations can be opened or closed by influ-
encing judges, prosecutors, or police, and if unfavorable judgments are 
passed, their enforcement can be prevented (Ledeneva 2006: 174).
Informal practices are conducted both in politics and business – and 
at the intersection of the two spheres. Ledeneva cites a case published 
in Kommersant in 2001 where as part of an anti-black PR action a 
St. Petersburg agency offered money for 21 press outlets to publish 
commercial disinformation (a nonexistent company opening a 
nonexistent shop at a nonexistent address) as an editorial form rather 
than as a paid advertisement. As a result, 13 outlets agreed to publish 
this information as an article for prepayment, three recommended to 
publish it as advertising, four wanted additional information and one 
published it for free (Ledeneva 2006: 35, citing Kadik and Pyanykh 
2001).
Ledeneva’s examples of kompromat contain, among others, cases of 
Russian businessmen’s and politicians’ suspicious political activities 
(abuse of office and power); shady and often illegal economic activi-
ties (e.g. misuse of budget funds, capital flight, giving or accepting of 
bribes); criminal activities (contract killings), and compromising details 
of private life (spending habits, sexual orientation) (Ledeneva 2006: 
58–90).
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Krugovaia poruka refers to ‘a pattern in behavior or relationship 
according to which a person is part of a bigger social unit (a group, net-
work, family, or clan) rather than an isolated human being driven by 
self-interest. Such a social unit is “tied up” by joint responsibility and 
mutual obligations’ (Ledeneva 2006: 90). The genealogy of krugovaia 
poruka has long roots in both prerevolutionary Russian and Soviet his-
tory and its forms have been continuously changing and adapting to 
the new circumstances. In post-Soviet Russia the principle of krugovaia 
poruka can be found both in politics and business, often connecting 
the two spheres as with the ‘Mabetex case’ against Pavel Borodin, the 
Kremlin property chief, whose bailing out of Swiss prison was consid-
ered to be due to his inside knowledge of Kremlin affairs reaching up to 
Yeltsin and his inner circle (Ledeneva 2006: 107).
Similar to blat, krugovaia poruka overlaps with the use of personal 
networks, but is not identical to it. It underlines that in Russian politi-
cal culture:
–The individual is viewed as a part of a bigger system (such as a circle 
of svoi liudi [one’s own people] or a network of interests) rather than 
isolated and working for oneself
– Individuals are encouraged to seek protection and to repay favors.
– Long-term relationships are kept and nurtured, thus creating 
mutual dependency rather than operating on the basis of short-term 
individual gain.
– Governance is by flexible ethical standards rather than by the strict 
rule of law.
(Ledeneva 2006: 113)
Ledeneva also offers a detailed account of a variety of financial schem-
ing related to double invoicing, capital flight, tax evasion, or tax 
avoidance which the participants see as necessary survival strategies 
for protecting themselves against turbulent and changing institutional 
environments, corrupted authorities, and the arbitrariness of the tax 
inspection. On the systemic level the financial schemes, however, create 
a vicious cycle, undermining formal institutions and decreasing their 
effectiveness (Ledeneva 2006: 161).
Prevalence of criminal practices in the Russian economy
Does the long list of informal practices referred to in this chapter 
imply that the Russian economy is completely dominated by illegal 
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practices or run by dubious, half-criminal groups? Due to its qualita-
tive nature, this study cannot answer the question of the prevalence 
of illegal and informal practices in the Russian economy. However, 
the interviews suggest that most prone to corruption, otkat and 
other informal practices are the IT firms dealing with the hardware 
trade and those doing business with state-owned or state-controlled 
sectors. 
These conclusions are supported by Chachin (2008), who cites a 
report by the Commission of Telecommunications and Information 
Technology of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. 
According to the Commission, the state has not been able to monitor 
the observation of customs and tax regulations. Therefore the majority 
of Russian IT imports are effectuated by ‘gray schemes’:
[A]voiding value-added taxes and customs (…) leads to the offering of 
‘gray’ IT products to markets 30–35 percent cheaper than is possible 
for entrepreneurs who pay full taxes and customs. As a consequence 
all Russian and foreign firms working in Russia are forced to play 
by the rules, with which many disagree, but which they have to 
follow.
(Chachin 2008)
Moreover, the commission notes how the equal level of social security 
payments in all fields of industry particularly hampers the competitive-
ness of the labor-intensive IT sector, forcing Russian IT firms to use 
‘gray’ schemes of payment. This distorts the accounting and makes 
Russian firms ‘untransparent’ to foreign investors. 
The role of illegal and criminal aspects of the Russian economy have 
been also analyzed by Vadim Volkov (2002) who has proposed an 
interpretation stressing the civilizing effect of capitalism on organized 
crime in post-Soviet Russia. Volkov does not deal with organized crime 
as a deviant phenomenon, but sees it instead from a neoinstitutionalist 
perspective as a response to the requirements of the emerging Russian 
markets. For him, organized Russian crime was not a rampage of blood-
thirsty killers, but the organization and commodification of violence 
by the ‘violent entrepreneurs’ – often called ‘Russian mafia’ by other 
writers. 
According to Volkov’s theory, the Russian state in the 1990s was 
fragmented and weak. It had lost both the fiscal monopoly and the 
monopoly of force, and could not secure the property rights or other 
needs of the emerging Russian economy. The splitting of the KGB into 
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five separate agencies by Yeltsin’s government in order to diminish the 
power of Soviet structures led unintentionally to the birth of protection 
markets in Russia. A great number of unemployed state security offic-
ers from the power structures (silovye struktury, e.g. security services, 
interior, and defense ministry) moved to the newly established private 
security agencies. 
These ‘violence-managing agencies’ such as criminal groups, private 
protection companies, and police and security forces acting as private 
entrepreneurs took over many of the functions of the unstable Russian 
state and, therefore, were an inherent part of post-Soviet Russian state-
building. For a beginner businessman, they were a more effective option 
for settling disputes than turning to the state.
The tightening of competition in the protection business created 
new informal rules in the turmoil. Some criminal groups were pushed 
out of the markets, but many were integrated into the local economies 
and politics. Former criminal leaders became managing directors, who 
employed public relations consultants to polish their public image. 
Stabilization of the environment made resorting to violence unprofit-
able and offered the Russian state a chance to regain the monopoly of 
force that it had lost under Yeltsin’s rule. Ultimately, the violent entre-
preneurs paved the way for Putin’s government and the strengthening 
of the Russian state in the 2000s.
In short, according to Volkov, organized crime did not capture the 
Russian state but participated – without being conscious of it – in the 
creation of an order within chaos. Thereby the violent entrepreneurs 
were actors in the state-building process of post-Soviet Russia, during 
which they were transformed from thugs into economic actors. 
All in all, while Volkov’s (2002) work stresses the civilizing effect 
of the markets, Ledeneva (2006) paints a darker picture of contempo-
rary Russian business life. According to her, ‘every legal firm or struc-
ture is forced (in order to preserve itself) to engage in underground 
financial scheming, usually having to do with its ownership struc-
ture, concealed profits, and multiple accounting systems’ (Ledeneva 
2006: 160). 
A mediating view between Volkov and Ledeneva, though closer to the 
latter, was offered by a St. Petersburg businessman from whom I asked 
at the end of 2006 if it is possible to conduct business strictly according 
to the laws and other official regulations. The reply was ‘it is complex, 
but possible’ (slozhno, no mozhno). 
Both Ledeneva’s (2006) and Volkov’s (2002) studies deal mainly with 
the 1990s, and the development during the Putin–Medvedev era requires 
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new empirical research. For the purposes of this book it is important to 
note that neither blat, nor barter, nor corruption debates are the whole 
truth about the role of social networks in the Soviet Union or today’s 
Russia. The various ways of networking find themselves rather on a 
continuum ranging from illegal or immoral to completely legal and 
moral ways of action. It is the latter that the remaining chapters of this 
book will discuss.
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5
Social Milieus and Personal 
Network Growth in the 
St. Petersburg IT Industry
Sociologist Michael Eve (1998) has remarked that personal networks 
do not extend haphazardly, but follow socially probable routes. New 
acquaintances are less likely to be made with previously unknown peo-
ple on the street, but rather by spending time with people in the same 
social milieus frequently or for longer periods.1 These social milieus 
include, among others, family and kin, neighborhood, school, univer-
sity, workplace, and hobbies and leisure. A common milieu allows not 
only for making acquaintances but also for monitoring the character of 
a new acquaintance, which in the long run may help to create trust and 
develop the relationship into a more intimate one.2 
Scott Feld (1981) refers to these milieus as ‘foci of interaction’, and 
defines a focus ‘as a social, psychological, legal, or physical entity 
around which joint activities are organized (e.g. workplaces, voluntary 
organizations, hangouts, families, etc.)’. According to him, without con-
textual information concerning foci, conclusions about networks tend 
to be misleading (Feld 1981: 1016; see also Castrén 2000).
Schools and universities
In addition to the workplace, two of the central milieus for forming 
networks for St. Petersburg IT professionals were schools and univer-
sities. The school system of the Soviet Union/Russia and Leningrad/
St. Petersburg contained special schools whose curriculum had a strong 
emphasis on mathematics or physics. These special schools which carry 
numbers (instead of names, for example, schools no. 30, 45, and 239) are 
commonly known and enjoy high reputations within the city. Among 
the graduates from these schools are internationally well-known math-
ematicians, such as Grigory Perelman, a graduate from school no. 239, 
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who won the gold medal in the International Mathematical Olympiad 
at the age of 16 in 1982. In 2006 Perelman was granted the Fields Medal, 
which is considered to be the Nobel Prize of mathematics.3 
At the special schools, the pupils were united not only because of 
their mathematical talents but also due to the feeling of belonging to 
a group of the selected and special. Moreover, the teacher–pupil rela-
tionships which even in a common Russian school have a tendency to 
become closer and stronger than in the West (Lonkila 1998) could be 
maintained even after graduation. One of the respondents remembered 
his own teacher at school no. 30:
Everyone loved very much our math teacher, who had worked at 
several math schools. A circle of former graduates gathered around 
him, went to congratulate him on his birthday, and got to know 
each other.
(technical director, p38)
The peer pressure of the mathematically talented pupils led to a com-
petitive study environment, where some of the pupils would voluntarily 
spend part of their summer holidays at a training camp studying math-
ematics while their counterparts in common schools were spending the 
summer at the beach or dacha. This kind of environment also nourished 
the formation of networks, which were later utilized in working life and 
maintained through annual meetings and/or through social network-
ing sites and Internet forums created for keeping in touch with one’s 
classmates.4
One of our respondents moved from a common school near her 
home to a special school which increased her daily commute to one-
and-a-half hours. However, in retrospect she does not regret this move, 
since it not only gave her a brilliant study environment with other tal-
ented pupils, but also extended her networks geographically.
If I had stayed studying at the local school (v raionnoi shkole), it would 
have been quite a small world (…). [Because of the studies in a special 
school] I know the whole city and I have friends all over the country. 
Many kinds of people gather in these elite schools.
(programmer, p36)
For the graduates from the special schools, the natural path of studies 
led to some of the technical universities in Leningrad/St. Petersburg. 
The abovementioned respondent – who due to having received the 
highest possible grade in all subjects was awarded the gold medal of 
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her school – describes the intertwining of the school and university 
networks in the following manner:
P36: On Saturday I will go to the meeting of the graduates to socialize 
(poobshchat’sia). We keep in touch very closely (my obshchaemsia ochen’ 
tesno). My classmate [from school] used to work with me in the firm 
but now she has left. (…) I keep in touch closely (ya ochen’ tesno obsh-
chaius’) with guys from other [university] faculties, some of them are 
my classmates [from school], some of them I know from common trips, 
some just appeared I don’t know where from. But there are four–five 
people from the University with whom I keep in touch continuously.
Q: Did many of your classmates enter the same university? Almost 
all of them?
P36: My classmates entered the university but in a different faculty. 
One of my classmates entered the same university faculty with me. 
But ten guys went to matmekh [mathematical-mechanical faculty]. Of 
my parallel class (…) only two went elsewhere, but the other twelve 
came to our faculty.
(programmer, p36)
As a Soviet legacy and because of the needs of the military-industrial 
complex, St. Petersburg hosts a great number of mathematical and 
technical universities which not only prepare employees for IT com-
panies but also serve as platforms for forming networks both among 
the students and between students and teachers.5 Several software 
programming firms originated from these milieus, and some were even 
established within the university infrastructure, keeping in close touch 
with their alma mater (e.g. company director, p31).
The special St. Petersburg mathematical schools, as similar elite 
schools in the West, created dense and lasting peer networks based on 
the sense of being chosen ones, in addition to giving a competitive 
education. One middle-aged IT manager told of having landed a job in 
several projects because the recruiting persons happened to be graduates 
of the same special school he had attended. 
The graduates of one of the most prestigious special schools in 
St. Petersburg, the physical-mathematical lyceum no. 30, for example, 
have organized websites, groups, and communities for keeping in touch 
with study mates through the Internet. In addition to several individual 
pages programmed and maintained by individuals, the graduates of the 
school have founded a group in the virtual community LiveJournal, 
and another group on one of the most popular Russian social network 
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sites, VKontakte (‘In Contact’) meant for ‘all who have studied, study 
or will study’ at this lyceum. The group had 2661 members in August 
2009, and in its news column it turned to a fund supported by graduates 
living abroad to organize, for the ninth time in a row, a collection of 
gifts for the lyceum teachers.6 The graduates of the year 2008 (and most 
likely of the other years) have similarly organized their own VKontakte 
group which is closed to outsiders. 
One respondent, speaking of the special role of the networks, referred 
to the Leningrad academic elite as a ‘caste’ (kasta). There were several 
researchers and professors among the parents, grandparents, and other 
relatives of this respondent, whose encouragement led the mathemati-
cally gifted son first to a well-known special school and then to the 
technical university. The networks of family and kin were of great ben-
efit in his university studies:
When the department of computer sciences [name of the department 
has been changed], where I wanted to get in, was opened, one of the 
employees was our family friend (…) These kinds of acquaintances 
certainly played a role in my entrance and made studies easier.
(director, p22)7
Likewise, Kirill (technical director, p38) commented that his career in 
the academic and research world was much easier because of the help 
from his kin, despite the fact that he had already shown special gifted-
ness in mathematics at school.
The importance of special schools and universities as the platforms of 
network growth and start-up companies is a well-known phenomenon in 
other countries. However, the case of Leningrad/St. Petersburg is different 
from similar kinds of network dynamics in, for example, the US, due to 
the specific Russian constraints on geographical mobility which are likely 
to result in the formation of more locally anchored networks. 
The historical background for the specificity of geographical mobility 
was the Soviet passport system, which tried to regulate internal migra-
tion in the country for the purposes of the planned economy. To settle 
in Leningrad a migrant needed a propiska, residence registration, with-
out which one could not get a permanent job. In Soviet times, both the 
vivid cultural milieu and the better availability of consumer goods in 
Leningrad were extremely appealing to those living in the countryside 
or smaller villages. For them, a Leningrad propiska was an attractive but 
hard-to-get document, and different legal and illegal ways to get it, such 
as false marriages, were used (cf. Lonkila and Salmi 2005). 
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Being a Leningrader was a sign of special status in Soviet times, and 
the  unique history and character of the city of Leningrad/St. Petersburg 
is also a classic theme in Russian and Soviet literature. Today, the appeal 
of St. Petersburg and Moscow is still likely to influence the migra-
tion decisions of Russians: whereas a Russian IT professional living in 
Moscow or St. Petersburg is unlikely to move to the provincial Russian 
towns, those from the smaller cities often head for the two Russian 
metropolises striving for employment as well as entertainment and 
cultural opportunities. One of the migrant respondents explained his 
decision to move to St. Petersburg from his provincial Siberian town 
with one million inhabitants:
To found a company there would have been much more difficult 
than here. In addition, there is a time difference of plus four hours 
which would have been a problem. (…) We [Russians] basically 
only have two important cities, Moscow and Piter [nickname for 
St. Petersburg]. Then there are of course smaller cities like Nizhny 
Novgorod, Novosibirsk, naturally, Omsk, well, centres with decent 
education. But the advantage of Piter is that in addition to educa-
tion, there are companies in which a programmer can become a 
professional. If in the city you’d have only one professional software 
developing firm, where would a programmer gain experience?
 (director, p35)
In his comparison of Moscow and St. Petersburg, another director of a 
small company in the telecommunications sector – himself a native of 
St. Petersburg – even invoked the tension and competition between the 
two cities that has long roots in Russian history and culture:
In relation to Moscow, there is less money [in St. Petersburg] and 
everything is simpler. But on the other hand, I cannot say that the 
Moscow companies that will come to our market will get the cream of 
the crop. This is not the case and it has to do with the Peterburgians’ 
dislike of Moscovians. If you have two [identical] offers on the table, 
one from a St. Petersburg company and another from Moscow, there 
is an inner negative attitude towards Moscovians. It exists and often 
you can use it, it works.
(company director, p47)
The relatively little willingness to leave St. Petersburg (except to go 
abroad or to Moscow) combined with the great mobility of employees 
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within the city led to the network formation where the central actors 
of the IT field, at least within the same specialized sector, are likely to 
know each other at least by reputation: 
Piter is a small city. IT specialists do not form that big of a stratum. 
If someone changes a job two–three times, he already knows about 
half of all the specialists by name.
(director, p39)
Many of the networks of the special schools and top university gradu-
ates have foreign extensions due to the ‘brain drain’ after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, an academic career in Russia was seen 
as a dead end. With the crash of the Soviet economy, a great number 
of research institutes formerly dependent on military orders fell apart. 
The academic world suffered from the crisis of the public sector, and the 
nominal salaries of teachers and researchers – if they were paid at all – 
did not provide a decent living. Consequently, emigration came to be a 
realistic and tempting option for the best graduates of the Russian top 
universities. Particularly appealing were the best US universities, which 
provided study grants for the selected students. One of our respondents 
(programmer, p40), a graduate of a highly esteemed technical university 
in Leningrad, recalls how 24 of his 25 classmates emigrated. According 
to him, an additional factor in the decision was to avoid serving two 
years in the Russian army, notorious for its practices of hazing and bul-
lying (see Lonkila 2008). 
These observations of the brain drain of the brightest Russian students 
are reinforced by investigation of a list of the graduates of the famed 
mathematical-physics school no. 239 in St. Petersburg published on the 
Internet. According to the list 44 percent of the reported graduates of 
1985–95 had given an address abroad, mostly in the US (26 percent), 
Israel (7 percent), or Germany (6 percent).8 Still, the new information 
and communication technologies also allow for the emigrated class-
mates of special schools to be in touch both with each other and their 
old teachers. 
The university networks were not equally important for everyone. 
One of the older generation CEOs who graduated from a prestigious 
technical university and started his firm in the turmoil of the early 
1990s stressed the generational difference: 
In my case those two cases [school and university milieus] are not 
important. Sad to say, but in my age group not many people made it 
to the level to be of professional interest to me. We all are ‘survivors 
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of perestroika.’ My school or University buddies are either drunkards 
or struggle to make it from salary to salary doing something very low 
level or – most of them – in the grave.
(general director, p1)
Internet milieus
For IT professionals, computer-mediated and mobile communication 
constitute one central channel for making acquaintances and main-
taining relations. Parallel to the explosion of the Russian mobile phone 
markets in the 2000s (Gladarev and Lonkila 2008), communicating 
through cell phone calls, SMS, e-mail, and social network sites has 
replaced fixed phones, letters, and fax:
Q: Are you often in touch with your friends [in the IT business]?
P18: Today the Internet gives a wide range of possibilities for com-
munication (dlia obshcheniia).
Q: You communicate with them through the Internet.
P18: Also in person. Practically every day on the Internet. And 
roughly once a month we also meet. They are of great help, particu-
larly in cases of technical problems.
(marketing manager, p18)
The Internet is an especially important medium for communication, 
and many respondents used its various applications (email, discussion 
forums, instant messaging, etc.) actively to search for clients, orders, 
technical information, or just for socializing.9 
Contradictory to the general idea of the Internet as a homogeneous 
global space where connections may be formed regardless of geographic 
or other limitations, the Russian language segment of the Internet is 
often referred to as ‘Runet’. This practice dates back to the birth of the 
Russian Internet which was born among the researchers at the insti-
tute for nuclear research in Moscow (see Cooper 2006; Lonkila 2008; 
Schmidt et al. 2006).
One of the particular features of the Runet is the popularity of the 
virtual community LiveJournal www.livejournal.ru, in Russian Zhivoi 
Zhurnal, often abbreviated ZhZh). LiveJournal was originally developed 
as a blog publishing channel for American teenagers, but the networking 
functions added to it, such as the possibility of creating links between 
personal blogs as well as between personal blogs and thematic discus-
sion groups or ‘communities’ led to the global spread of the system. 
9780230252394_06_cha05.indd   83 10/20/2010   1:55:20 PM
84 Networks in the Russian Market Economy
Quite unexpectedly, the well-educated Russian urban intelligentsia 
adopted Zhivoi Zhurnal in early 2000 as its avenue of socio-political 
expression to the extent that, until recently, Zhivoi Zhurnal was con-
sidered to be a general synonym for the word ‘weblog’ instead of one 
particular blogging platform. Though competitors have appeared (see 
below in this section), it is still a significant channel of expression for 
Russian urban professionals, as well as an arena for organizing protest 
actions. For example, the demonstrations of the opposition movement 
‘The Other Russia’ were partly organized through the discussion com-
munities of Zhivoi Zhurnal. 
The personal blogs and conversations in ZhZh deal with personal, 
political, social and professional matters, often mixing all of these. Our 
respondent Valentina (marketing manager, p15), for example, told of 
finding a valuable document from a competing company published by 
the Ministry of Economic Development (Ministerstvo Ekonomicheskogo 
Razvitiia, MERT) through a link published on Zhivoi Zhurnal: 
You could simply read it [the document] at the website of the Ministry. 
I remember that I found this link through ZhZh, LiveJournal, where 
there have now appeared many kinds of IT communities, in which 
people are communicating about IT. In general, ZhZh is such a virus, 
it is spreading quickly. (…) there are also people who are in high posi-
tions in IT and they are communicating quite informally (obshchaiut-
sia sovershenno neformalno). Somewhere I found this link o MERT.
(marketing manager, p15)
At the time of writing, Zhivoi Zhurnal is still a significant part of Russian 
virtual culture, but several new social network sites are challenging its 
position particularly among the younger generation of Russian ICT 
professionals. The two most popular ones are a Russian-made Facebook 
clone, VKontakte (‘In Contact’ – www.vkontakte.ru) and Odnoklassniki 
(‘Classmates’ – www.odnoklassniki.ru) whose origins are found in 
St. Petersburg and Moscow respectively, whereas the popularity of the 
original Facebook has been modest in Russia.
The opening page of VKontakte seems to be a close copy of Facebook 
design, and the counter on the page indicating registered users is 
growing continuously, exceeding 36 million users in June 2009 but 
already 86 million in July 2010. VKontakte was founded in 2006 by 
St. Petersburg brothers Pavel and Nikolai Durov, the former of whom 
graduated from St. Petersburg state university in spring 2006. While 
Pavel is the winner of the ‘Olympiad in linguistics, information science 
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(informatika) and design’, Nikolai was a school-time champion of the 
all-Russian Olympiad in mathematics and information science.10 
Odnoklassniki (‘Classmates’) was also founded in 2006 by the Moscow-
born Albert Popkov and claimed to have 37 million users on June 17, 
2009. The opening page of Odnoklassniki differs from VKontakte, since 
it is, as its name implies, designed to find one’s classmates. Thus the 
page contains a long list of Russian regions, asking the user to pick the 
region s/he went to school in, and further to find the specific school, 
in, say, St. Petersburg.
Because of great commercial interest, it is difficult to find reliable 
user statistics corroborating the claims made by the two competing 
sites. According to the ROMIR survey in summer 2008, for example, 
Odnoklassniki was the clear leader (see Table 5.1).
However, TNS Web Index estimated that VKontakte reaches 13.4 mil-
lion people monthly whereas the corresponding figure for Odnoklassniki 
was 12.9 million.11 The history of the two sites was still visible in the 
background of the users: 56 percent of the VKontakte users were from St. 
Petersburg while the same figure for Odnoklassniki was 24 percent.12
These virtual milieus and others such as Moi Mir (‘My World’)13 and 
more instrumental and business-oriented networks (US born LinkedIn, 
www.linkedin.com, and Russian Moi Krug – ‘My Circle’, www.moikrug.
ru) are important arenas for the network building of the new generation 
of Russian IT professionals. At the same time, characteristic of the distrust 
permeating Russian society, rumors spread among users of the monitor-
ing of these systems by Russian intelligence and security services.
For professional development, however, there seems to be a difference 
between LinkedIn and VKontakte. In the former, the professional and 
Table 5.1 Popularity of the Russian social 
network sites in summer 2008. Percentage of 
the respondents registered on the site
Odnoklassniki.ru 72
VKontakte.ru 44
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instrumental aspect of network use is considered to be the ‘default’ of 
the relationship – even though friends can also extend their networks 
through it – whereas the latter is more oriented toward socializing, 
relaxing, and having fun than building professionally useful contacts. 
Nevertheless, as will become evident, forming ties based on socializing 
also extends one’s network reach and may in the future provide bridges 
to economically relevant resources. 
Finally, for the younger generation, social milieus provided by various 
hobbies offer important opportunities to simultaneously have fun and 
expand one’s contact networks, as formulated by a younger generation 
IT specialist: 
Many IT professionals like mountain skiing, snowboarding, football, 
dancing (tango, latina), tennis, ping-pong, paintball. Sometimes we 
have tournaments organized by a company or several companies, with 
some customers and contractors invited. In more rare case we have 
tournaments like ‘IT football league against St. Petersburg government’, 
when IT guys are playing football with government officials. I believe 
that such tournaments or relationships started in fitness clubs/ski 
resorts can be a good start for new professional relationships.
Thus, St. Petersburg IT specialists have a wide variety of options for 
communicating both face-to-face and through the Internet. These 
options, particularly the increasingly popular social networking sites, 
build on the expansion of personal networks and may further contrib-
ute to the dissolving of boundaries between professional and personal 
spheres of life. 
The Russian Software Developers Association (RUSSOFT)
The association of Russian software development companies was estab-
lished in 1999 under the name Fort-Ross. In 2003 it joined the National 
Computer and IT Industry Association (APKIT), which was accepted 
the same year as a member of the international ‘World IT and Services 
Association’. In 2004 Fort-Ross merged with the Russian National 
Software Development Association. The interest and PR activities were 
continued under the name of RUSSOFT whereas direct marketing events 
were organized under the aegis of Fort-Ross. 
While the original idea of RUSSOFT was to promote Russian soft-
ware development skills to the Western markets, lobbying the Russian 
government for the interests of the domestic ICT companies and 
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recruiting new members to strengthen the voice of the association have 
recently grown more important.
The activities of Fort-Ross/RUSSOFT have thus included reporting 
and marketing the activities of the members, including organizing the 
Russian stand in international exhibitions, arranging the annual ‘Russian 
Outsourcing and Software Summit’, and lobbying the Russian government 
in the issues (e.g. legislation) central to the field. RUSSOFT also publishes 
an annual review of the evolution of the Russian software development 
field. The number of RUSSOFT members has grown from the original 10 
to over 80 companies from Russia, Belorussia, and Ukraine.
One of the important functions of the association is to lobby the 
interests of the field vis-à-vis the state apparatus. In this the relations of 
the president and one of the initiators of RUSSOFT, Valentin Makarov, 
come in handy. Makarov, born in Leningrad in 1955, worked as an elec-
tronics engineer in the defense industry from 1978 until 1985 when he 
started an administrative career, first as the manager of international 
relations at the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute, where he was then 
nominated the deputy-vice prorector. During 1996–2000 he worked as 
the deputy chairman of the foreign relations committee in the admin-
istration of St. Petersburg.14 
In addition Makarov’s career also includes business consulting and a 
diplomatic appointment in the Russian UNESCO delegation in France. 
This impressive career implies that the IT industry is connected to 
St. Petersburg and Russian power elites through Makarov, since he 
most likely also has close ties with the Russian intelligence services.15 
Among the benefits for software companies joining RUSSOFT, the 
association lists marketing opportunities (e.g. the possibility to place 
company information on the RUSSOFT website), discounts on buying 
licensed software, participating in conferences and other events, and 
access to nonpublic information of the Association. In addition, the 
Association has a networking function:
You will have a right to take part in the Board of Directors monthly 
meetings. At the meetings not only dealing with current issues is 
important but also informal relationships between colleagues. The 
meetings take place in the central office of RUSSOFT in St. Petersburg 
or in Moscow. The Association also organizes parties for its member 
on occasions of high-days and holidays.16
The Association thus also functions as a milieu for forming connections 
between the main players of the field. In its meetings and events the 
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representatives of member companies can exchange information about 
markets, new technologies, government plans, and other significant 
issues. 
These kinds of exchanges also took place outside of the association, 
since the managers of the most important software companies knew 
their competitors, and met once in a while to exchange opinions:
P3: once in a while we’ll meet, for example, with Boris Vladimirovich 
[a well-known St. Petersburg IT entrepreneur]. ‘Boris Vladimirovich, 
how are you? What do you think about this topic?’ (…) And then 
there are these events organized by FortRoss [RUSSOFT]. The leaders 
of NewComp [one of the biggest St. Petersburg software companies] 
were my study mates at the institute, and we meet at times over 
lunch or dinner to find common interests (…) To exchange some 
fresh gossip from the industry.
Q: What kinds of gossip?
P3: All kinds. Gossip about employees’ moving between firms, cli-
ents’ behavior, strategic plans on St. Petersburg markets of some 
well-known Moscow companies, about serious setbacks or problems 
of companies. Or whether it is time to start hunting for employees. 
Well, the kind of news that you don’t find in the internet media 
just because they have a dubious character, but which are good to 
know to understand the hidden meaning of many ongoing official 
events.
(general director, p3)
In addition to RUSSOFT activities, IT people participate in seminars, 
trading and training events, and other meetings organized by, say, 
foreign companies, trade associations, or chambers of commerce. One 
example is the gatherings of MobileMonday, a community of mobile 
professionals which fosters cooperation and cross-border business 
development through virtual and live networking events.
Birthdays as foci of interaction
In Russian business practices, as in Russian culture more generally, 
birthday congratulations and birthday parties have a particular role as 
‘foci of interaction’ (Feld 1981) anchored around a single individual. 
They are considered in this section as rituals indicative of the central 
role of personal networks in Russia. These rituals illustrate several 
central aspects of these networks such as the embeddedness of the 
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economically relevant ties in social and cultural contexts, mixing of 
personal and public spheres of life, and the importance of togetherness 
and communication (obshchenie) in coupling the networks of individual 
people (see also Chapter 7 on obshchenie). Therefore they deserve to be 
discussed here at more length.
One of our respondents, a 35-year-old IT consultant, referred in the 
interview to her recent birthday, when she had received 40 phone calls 
as well as the congratulating messages sent to her via other media, 
and another middle-aged Russian IT manager – probably exceptionally 
active in terms of social interaction – estimated himself to have received 
80–100 congratulations on his birthday. Still another respondent, a 
middle-aged general director and company owner, describes his birth-
day in the following way:
On November 22 [date changed] all kinds of people start phoning. 
Close ones, acquaintances. Young people trying to impress you. It 
is a pleasure (…) people that you never thought would remember 
or know you, start phoning. It is twice as pleasant that even distant 
people remember you. It is fantastic. 
(general director, p3)
Birthdays have a central place in Russian culture, in and outside the work-
place. They may be celebrated several times, both at work and home and 
with friends and other network members. Though birthday celebrations 
at work have likely become less prevalent compared to the Soviet era, 
one may encounter birthday congratulations for the bosses on the official 
websites of Russian organizations. The St. Petersburg weekly analytical 
newspaper Delo (Affair) had until the recent closure of the paper a special 
column devoted to ‘VIP birthdays’ of people in more or less important 
positions in the private or public sector. These columns were devoted to 
congratulations not only on round year birthdays (i.e. fiftieth birthday) 
however, but also contained subtly formulated congratulations by col-
leagues on, say, the sixty-fourth birthday of the person in question.17
Similarly, the well-known Russian daily Kommersant has a special col-
umn devoted to birthday congratulations for significant people in public 
office, culture, or business. An example is a congratulation by the president 
of the company ‘Komstar-OTS’ Sergey Pridantsev to Evgeny Yurchenko, 
the general director of Sviaz’invest, on his forty-second birthday:
Dear Evgeny Valer’evich, let me congratulate you from the bottom 
of my heart on your birthday! You are not just the most talented 
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manager I have ever known, but also a person who loves life and is 
able to light up the people around him with his energy. This quality 
enables you to succeed in any walk of life, and I hope that you will 
just go ahead and be a guiding star for all – for colleagues and for 
friends!
Pridantsev was joined in these wishes by Boris Belenky, the founder of 
the theater prize ‘Crystal Turandot’. His congratulation was written on a 
first-name basis, indicating a particularly close relationship with Evgeny 
Valer’evich:
Dear Evgeny Valer’evich! Forty two years ago the Creator sent you to 
the earth, and gave you a wise heart, a kind soul and a courageous 
intellect. During all these years, in spite of difficulties, you not only 
did not lose, but increased this richness. Precisely because of this you 
are a great manager. Thank you for tirelessly saving beauty rather 
than waiting for beauty to save the world.18
The ritualized importance of birthdays permeates the whole society up 
to the highest political and economic power elite. June 16, 1998, the 
day when a group of Russian oligarchs elected Anatoly Chubais as the 
representative of the country’s urgent loan negotiations with the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, happened to be Chubais’ 
forty-third birthday. It was celebrated with the oligarchs singing ‘Happy 
birthday to you’ for Chubais, with Mikhail Fridman, the main owner of 
Alpha Bank, on piano (Kolesnikov 2009: 168).
In one of the few existing studies in English of Russian birthdays, 
Anna-Maria Salmi (2000) depicts the role of birthdays in Russian cul-
ture. She draws from the teacher network data corpus described in 
previous chapters, but her results also extend beyond the particularities 
of the teaching profession. Salmi shows how aspects of sociability and 
mutual help get intertwined in Russian birthday celebrations, illumi-
nating the fit of the researcher’s notion of personal network with the 
Russian actors’ own views on their social life. 
Probably the most detailed study of Russian birthdays in the Soviet 
and post-Soviet period is, however, written by Olga Kalacheva, accord-
ing to whom the birthday is one of the most important and popular 
celebrations in Russian urban culture today (Kalacheva 2003: 9–10, 29). 
Kalacheva describes in detail the socio-historical roots of the Russian 
birthday, the organization of birthday practices, and their meaning 
for the formation of individual and collective identity. Especially 
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relevant to the current study and the argument for the significant role 
of personal networks in Russia are her observations about the practices 
of solidarity formation during birthday celebrations, such as the gather-
ing of guests around the common birthday table to share food, drink, 
and discussion. Kalacheva also cites the work by Lynn Visson, a transla-
tor well acquainted with Russian culture, which demonstrates well the 
significance of Russian birthday celebrations vis-à-vis their American 
counterparts: 
Adult Americans mostly pay much less attention to their birthdays 
than Russians. As a rule birthday parties are organized, guests invited 
and so forth only around round numbers of years. Other birthdays 
are noticed only by close friends. Besides, Americans do not have a 
need to use birthday as a good excuse to meet their kin and friends, 
to have a party.
(Visson 2003: 103, cited in Kalacheva 2003: 8)
The birthday celebrations render visible the significance of the role of 
the personal network but also the proximity of its members. With the 
closest ones face-to-face celebrations are a must – forgetting the birthday 
of one’s family member or close friend is likely to cause a breach in the 
relationship – but commemorating the birthdays of close acquaintances 
and business partners is also important. E-mail, mobile phone SMS, 
and social networking sites offer new technological possibilities both to 
maintain the connections and regulate the proximities: the inside circle 
must be encountered personally, for others one may phone and for still 
more distant acquaintances an SMS or an e-mail is sent. VKontakte pro-
vides, for example, a reminder of the birthday dates of one’s network 
members, though an online message may nevertheless be considered a 
less intimate way of congratulating than a phone call.
In all, birthday celebrations exemplify well the central role of per-
sonal networks in Russia. During these ritualized celebrations, personal 
network ties are maintained and formed, mixing both the public and 
personal spheres of life as well as economic and social aspects and 
motivations.
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6
The Types of Economic Resources 
Transmitted through the Networks 
of St. Petersburg IT Professionals
Practically everything where the price is not the only 
meaningful issue it is more effective to do through 
acquaintances.
(COO, director, p8)
This chapter describes what kinds of economically relevant resources 
are transmitted within the personal networks of St. Petersburg IT man-
agers. The resources can be both material (transmitting goods, loaning 
money) and immaterial (passing on various kinds of information, giv-
ing advice) or rendering services (fixing a computer problem, helping 
to write a legal document). 
The transmission of resources may be considered to comprise two 
successive phases or steps. In the first phase the problem is to find or 
locate the wanted resource, for example, an interesting job opening. 
In the next phase one has to secure the transmission of this resource, 
that is, get the job. Both steps can be conducted either through for-
mal mechanisms or institutions or informally through social ties, or 
combining both approaches. In the first phase a job seeker could, for 
example, formally register at an employment agency or search for a job 
through personal connections. Once a suitable job opening is found, 
the candidate may rely on formal processing (CV, tests) or try to get 
someone to recommend him informally to the employer to get the job 
(Akhlaq 2005; for a classic account on job searches, see Granovetter 
([1974] 1995).
This chapter focuses mostly on the first phase of locating the resources, 
while the second phase of securing the resources with the help of a third 
person is discussed in Chapter 7 in connection with brokerage.
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Unlike in many other fields of Russian industry, the beginning IT 
entrepreneur did not need a great amount of starting capital, employ-
ees, or a factory hall: the most important resources, that is, skill in 
problem-solving and the mathematical and programming abilities to go 
with it, were in his head. In the first phase of starting a company, these 
personal competences of the founder along with owning a personal 
computer and finding even one foreign customer could get the firm 
going: the projects implemented were small-scale or pilot projects and 
the founder’s home could serve as a temporary office. 
With the growth of the project or company, one also had to find a 
reliable business partner or partners and recruit more staff, for whom 
additional office space was needed. With increasing business activity, the 
self-taught entrepreneur had to obtain a wide variety of information and 
services concerning taxation, legislation, bookkeeping, financing, mar-
keting, and so forth. Personal network ties were used both in locating 
and securing the transmission of these resources.
Business ideas and partners
In the 1980s and early 1990s, Western research on entrepreneurship 
shifted its emphasis from the heroic, individual entrepreneur to one 
embedded in social networks and started to address the role played by 
personal and business networks in the start-up phases of firms (Elfring 
and Hulsink 2003: 409). 
Later research has confirmed the importance of network contacts 
during all stages of company formation starting from the initial idea of 
founding the firm (Hoang and Antoncic 2003). Researchers have inves-
tigated, for example, the optimal mix and functions of the ‘strong’ ties 
of family and friends on the one hand and ‘weak’ ties of acquaintances 
on the other (Uzzi 1996; Elfring and Hulsink 2003). 
For the new Russian entrepreneurs, personal ties played an even more 
important role than in Western countries, since several tasks, which in 
developed capitalism could be conducted through market institutions, 
required help from one’s personal network in the early 1990s in Russia. 
The picture emerging from our interviews concerning the start-up 
phase of the Russian IT field is in many ways similar to that reported by 
Ledeneva based on data from 1991–2 (1998: 184–5).1
As the launching of private businesses had not been attempted before, 
advice and help – for example, in presenting registration documents – 
was essential. Most ‘pioneers’ of Russian business acknowledged 
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that their registration documents were prepared by friends or con-
tacts. Even when a paid service for drawing up documents became 
available, informal channels were reported to be an essential factor 
in starting a business. The advice or information obtained through 
friends and acquaintances was the advice and information consid-
ered reliable. Business was bound to depend on informal contacts, for 
‘the contract system was not yet developed. There were no efficient 
mechanisms for managing conflict situations or inflicting sanctions 
on unreliable partners’.
(Ledeneva 1998: 184–5)
Ledeneva concludes that the informal relations of trust formed in blat 
networks were ‘the only guarantee one could rely on’. 
While blat was an important factor for many of our respondents at 
some point of their careers (see Chapter 4), mutual help not related to 
blat was also crucial, as will become evident below.
Besides Ledeneva’s, other studies lend credence to the importance of 
personal contacts for Russian start-up firms (e.g. Radaev 2003; Rogers 
2006; Batjargal 2006). The 1993 survey of 277 Moscow entrepre-
neurs conducted by Vadim Radaev’s group showed, for example, that 
42 percent of them started their companies with personal acquaint-
ances, 23 percent with friends and their kin, 17 percent with the 
entrepreneurs’ own kin, and only 11 percent with unknown people 
(Radaev 2003). 
Our data lend further credence to these findings. Many IT firms in 
St. Petersburg were born during the transition period when several 
institutions vital for a market economy, such as financial institutions, 
independent courts, effective law enforcement and so forth, were – and 
in many ways still are – either absent, functioning badly, or just about to 
emerge, and the whole society was penetrated by distrust. Thus, several 
of our respondents had turned to the help of their study mates, friends, 
relatives, or acquaintances to start their companies. 
Dmitry’s career (general director, p4), for example, began thanks to 
the suggestion of an emigrated friend of his parents who was running 
a firm abroad. The suggestion led Dmitry to establish a branch office 
of this firm with the spouse of his good acquaintance in St. Petersburg. 
The first employees were recruited from among his partner’s circle of 
acquaintances.
In like manner, Nikita (technical director, p20) started a firm in 2004 
together with his two friends and study mates from the university.2 
Nikita’s friends and acquaintances helped with registration of the firm 
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and obtaining the working space, as well as solving problems with 
tax officials. In the beginning all orders were received ‘either from 
acquaintances or friends’, who still continue to assist in finding orders 
in addition to the orders found through other, more formal channels. 
Acquaintances were called for help also in cases of technical problems 
that could not be solved by the staff. Bookkeeping – often considered 
the most central function of a Russian firm – had also been entrusted to 
acquaintances, to whom the company also turned when encountering 
juridical problems. 
Nikita’s case was not an anomaly. Kirill (technical director, p38) and 
Stanislav (general director, p48) had started their firms with their wives, 
and Oleg’s (project director, p26) wife worked for the same company as 
her husband. Andrey (general director, p1) established his firm together 
with his family members and Anton (p13) worked as a general director 
of the company founded by his study mate from the university. The 
central role of strong ties was similarly evident for Petr (PR-manager, 
p19), who had established a software company in the early 1990s on the 
basis of a circle of friends and acquaintances. In the beginning the staff 
was mainly recruited through connections who also helped to solve 
technical, juridical, and financial problems. 
This kind of developmental path led early on to the mixing of 
personal and professional spheres of life in the personal networks of 
St. Petersburg IT professionals – a theme to which we will return in the 
next chapter.
Clients
Finding clients and orders is the first and most crucial task for a fledg-
ling IT company, and for our respondents personal ties were one of the 
main channels to find them. In the 1990s foreign customers were par-
ticularly valuable, since only one foreign client would provide enough 
income to pay a couple of Russian programmers, rent office space and 
start working on the first project:
Again we run into social networks. A father of one of the founders of 
the company used to work in Germany [name of the country has been 
changed]. The son had an opportunity to work there, and he made 
the acquaintance of the first customer of the firm, a German, who 
ran his own company. The German found out that the son was a pro-
grammer, and asked if he could write him a specific type of program. 
(…) After having heard the price of programming in Russia he wanted 
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more. And the son was writing programs though the firm had not yet 
been founded. This was roughly the way the company was started.
(PR-manager, p2)
If the nascent company managed to assure the client of the quality of 
its work, another project followed, based on the relatively cheap and 
competent labor of the Russian programmers. After having established 
a successful business relationship, the company could get permis-
sion from the client to publish a reference on the company’s website, 
thereby attracting other customers. 
With the growth and professionalization of the company, personal 
relations continue to be important in finding clients, but are comple-
mented by all possible means such as participating in software fairs, 
exhibitions and seminars, opening offices in other Russian cities or 
abroad, searching for customers through the Internet, and contacting 
potential customers directly:
My partner has over ten years’ experience in the IT field, including 
quite big companies. On the one hand he has a collection of personal 
relations through which he can try to find potential clients (…) On 
the other hand he already has a certain reputation. In addition our 
company has customers who are very happy with our work and at 




After the first steps a growing business required more programmers, 
office space, computers, and other expenditures. Particularly for those 
interviewees who had started their commercial activity in the 1990s, 
finding starting capital to cover these costs was complicated because of 
the underdevelopment of the banking sector and the lack of alternative 
sources of financing.3 One of the interviewees who a started one-man 
small-scale programming business recalls:
At that time [early 1990s] the banking system functioned very badly. 
I do not mean the unreliability. Even under these uncertain circum-
stances people put money in the bank. I mean that everyone was pis-
sed off that banks simply did not know how to work with money (…) 
in those years there were cases when money was paid [to an IT firm] 
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but it was impossible to know by whom. One had to ask the client, 
‘have you by any chance sent me this sum?’ Some also charged from 
one client 200 roubles and 50 copecks and from another one 200 
roubles and 52 copecks in order to distinguish between the clients.
(programmer, p40).
Distrust of the banking system, the high level of interest rates, and the 
constant changes in the business environment made beginning entre-
preneurs turn to their kin, family, and friends to obtain starting capital. 
In the early 1990s this was one of the few legal ways to get financing, 
but the following description from early 2007 shows how turning to 
banks was till recently an expensive choice for a St. Petersburg entre-
preneur:
[A new IT company] can only get very small loans from banks. They 
are rarely tailored to the needs of companies, but rather for travel, 
leisure, health services or buying cars or apartments. The loans have 
extremely high interest rates, 18 percent is not unusual (…) It is dif-
ficult to start a business with a slightly over 10 000 dollar loan with a 
high interest rate. For bigger loans one has to have collateral such as 
a new car or better a luxury apartment. Not many people have them. 
A big part of the new IT companies nowadays is searching for money 
from kin or friends or knocking at the doors of existing firms.
(general director, p1)
The importance of social networks from the viewpoint of banks at the 
end of the 1990s has been described in the studies by Dinello (1999) 
and Guseva and Rona-Tas (2001, see also Uzzi 1999). Natalia Dinello 
interviewed Russian bankers during the banking boom of 1994 and at 
the onset of the crises in the summer of 1998. Her conclusion is that 
‘the F-connection’ – that is, the relationships among financial outlets, 
firms, friends, families, and favorites – ‘is pervasive and continuous and 
will likely outlast the market economy’ (Dinello 1999: 24). Her inter-
viewees rejected the possibility that Russian banking could be identity-
blind, only based on impersonal economic calculations, and supported 
the idea that it rather served primarily the inner circle of friends. 
Though Guseva’s and Rona-Tas’s (2001) comparative study of Russian 
and American credit card markets – based on fieldwork conducted in 
summer 1998 and fall 1999 in Moscow – did not draw quite as drastic 
conclusions, the authors also stress the central role of social networks 
in banking. According to them, due to the inability of Russian banks to 
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calculate risks, they relied on trust created by the social networks both 
of their own employees and their clients in issuing credit cards:
Reliance on existing networks of trust allows Russian banks to issue 
cards to families and friends of top bank executives (…) Here the bor-
rower–creditor relationship is intermingled with close social bonds 
that serve as an additional guarantee and a channel of information. 
For instance, one interviewee was granted an American Express card 
by his friend, a high-ranking employee of AmEx in Moscow. Relying 
exclusively on personal relations necessarily limits the number of 
potential cardholders, however. The credit card market turns into an 
elite membership club, hardly a desirable market for a product whose 
profitability (and calculability) resides in its numbers. 
(Guseva and Rona-Tas 2001: 638)
When assessing the studies of Dinello and Guseva and Rona-Tas, one 
must take into account the exceptional context of the 1990s and par-
ticularly the crisis of 1998. Presently, the Russian banking sector is 
extremely fragmented, consisting of a few large, Moscow-based and 
state-controlled banks, which form the backbone of the sector, and a 
great number of small banks.4 Though the total number of banks has 
decreased from 2084 in 2000 to 1243 in 2007, ‘the great majority of 
the banks are still tiny and can hardly be called banks’ (Fungáčová and 
Solanko 2008: 7–11).
The recovery of the banking sector after the 1998 crisis is due to many 
factors, among them the annual economic growth of more than 6 per-
cent during the 2000s and institutional reforms. These reforms include 
the laws on private credit bureau operations, mortgage lending, and the 
deposit insurance system, covering in full private deposits of up to RUB 
400,000 in March 2007 (Fungáčová and Solanko 2008: 7–11).
Despite the reforms, the distrust penetrating Russian society extends 
to banking. According to an interview in early 2007 with a Finnish 
banker with more than 20 years of experience in Russia, ‘the Russians 
still prefer to draw their salary all at once from the ATM and put it in a 
safer place.’ Though the ruble is the official currency, the amount of US 
dollars in cash in Russia is second only to that in the US (Kupila 2007). 
This distrust and the importance of connections in getting a loan were 
clearly expressed by one of our respondents: 
The credit is given to industrial enterprises. But we are in the IT busi-
ness. To get a loan, you need such an amount on paper … fuck them. 
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It is better to use your own money (…) It takes from two weeks to 
three months to get a loan, but you would need money tomorrow 
(…) The loans are given to acquaintances, on the basis of personal 
relations. This is how things are here.
(CEO, p12)
At the time of writing, the worldwide financial crisis had just hit Russia, 
and it was too early to assess its ultimate effects on either the world 
economy or Russia. Exceptional periods are, however, likely to increase 
the importance of personal contacts. 
Office space
In addition to clients, business partners, and starting capital, office 
space was another central resource necessary for business activities that 
was located and secured through networks in the early 1990s. Growing 
turnover necessitated recruitment of additional employees who in turn 
needed working space furnished with a reliable telecommunications 
infrastructure: 
We are sitting in this office because I know a person who knows the 
bankruptcy trustee of this factory. He phoned me and said, ‘do you 
need office space?’ I said ‘of course.’ When all others paid 12 dollars, 
I paid four. When all others pay 25, I pay 12.
(general director, p3)
Another respondent (COO, p8) similarly noted the role of his personal 
network ties in finding a new office for the company:
P8: One of our directors found out that her husband works in a hold-
ing company which was planning to open here a business center 
with another company. So we moved in here and this happened 
through acquaintances (po znakomstvu).
After the fall of the Soviet Union many Soviet organizations continued 
a ‘shadow life’ in their offices and buildings even though their Soviet 
functions had ceased to exist. It was possible to turn existing ties with 
the leaders of these organizations into important resources for a start-
up IT firm:
[During the Soviet era] my acquaintance knew the leader of the 
organization who administered this building. The leader was a 
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high-ranking state official who had several offices in the city and he 
worked in the regional committee of the Communist party. He was 
the kind of old man (diaden’ka) with whom it was in general impossi-
ble to get an appointment. (…) My acquaintance phoned him, based 
on this old connection, and said that my good acquaintances will 
come to see you, probably you could rent this office to them (…) At 
that time, as you remember, there was no business and nobody had 
money. And many state departments and institutes simply rented 
out offices.
(general director, p1)
Ledeneva (1998: 189) describes abuses and prosecutions that emerged in 
the Committee for the Management of City Property in St. Petersburg 
(Komitet po Upravleniiu Gorodskim Imushchestvom) after the appoint-
ment of a new director in 1991. With the economic growth in the 
2000s several business centers have been established in the city and 
office space is now freely available on the market. For a small start-up 
firm, however, social relations still come in handy in acquiring office 
space. 
Jobs
The significance of networks in obtaining a job is one of the basic find-
ings of social network research since the classic study Getting a Job by 
Mark Granovetter ([1974] 1995). The main point of Granovetter’s study 
was not only the observation that jobs were found through personal 
relations instead of through anonymous labor markets. Rather, his 
interesting and much disputed argument claimed that particularly the 
‘weak ties’ of acquaintances (vis-à-vis the ‘strong ties’ of family and 
friends) were especially valuable in finding jobs. 
Granovetter claims that a weak tie, such as a former classmate 
encountered by chance on the street, is more likely to provide new 
information from outside the job seeker’s habitual social milieu. Even 
though strong ties are more motivated to help the job seeker to get the 
job, the information they have is more likely to already be familiar to 
the job seeker and thus redundant. 
Our respondents’ descriptions of the development of their own 
careers confirmed the significance of personal networks, including 
both strong and weak ties, in locating and securing a job in the Soviet 
Union and Russia (cf. Yakubovich 2005; Clarke and Kabalina 2000). But 
more importantly, personal networks were still an important channel 
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for recruiting employees in St. Petersburg IT companies, a topic which 
emerged in several interviews. 
According to the respondents, finding qualified staff had become one 
of the main problems in the IT industry: economic growth along with 
a limited number of university graduates and the entrance of interna-
tional IT companies into the local labor markets had led to a shortage 
of labor and fierce competition for personnel.5
Under the conditions of the labor shortage, staff was recruited by all 
possible means, including ads, internet forums, recruiting agencies, and 
personal networks. Compared to anonymous recruiting, through ads 
for example, recruiting someone through personal relations was both 
quicker and cheaper. Especially in the beginning stages of start-up firms, 
recruiting through family, friends, or acquaintances could also guaran-
tee the reliability of the employee. 
On the other hand, several respondents brought up the disadvantage 
of using personal networks as a recruitment method: in the case of prob-
lems, friends and acquaintances are more difficult to fire. Similarly, with 
the growth and professionalization of the firm, the stakes, time, and 
costs related to recruiting grew, which made turning to a professional 
head-hunting firm a tempting option.
Many firms kept in touch with universities, whose graduates or 
advanced students were prime targets for recruiting. Since almost all 
respondents held a university degree, they already had previous ties to 
the university milieu. 
Some firms had combined formal and informal methods of recruiting: 
one company paid a bonus to its staff members for bringing in a new 
employee; another asked job applicants to name their possible acquaint-
ances among the company’s employees, who were then inquired about 
the qualifications of the applicant (see next chapter).
Advice and information
Due to rapid technological development and a constantly changing 
business environment, networks could transmit information crucial to 
a company’s competitiveness. A concrete example of this, in addition 
to getting orders or recruiting staff, was transmission of information 
concerning new technologies, markets, or legislation: 
My brother, for example, has a close friend, who works in an organi-
zation that supplies companies with juridical information. We had 
to decide from whom to buy this information (…). He helped us to 
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get an overall image and to understand, who, what and how, which 
organizations are offering what kind of services and how we could 
make a better choice. This, too, was done through acquaintances.
(general director, p1)
According to another respondent (development manager, p17), infor-
mation about employees’ salary level was also exchanged with compet-
ing firms, which helped to ‘keep an eye on things’ and ‘to understand 
if our salaries were lagging behind others’. 
Information is an especially precious resource in the IT field, which 
is mainly based on information processing and where the share of 
material production is minor. In some cases social networks are the 
only way to obtain important information, since sensitive and valuable 
information about, say, tenders or actual projects is usually not made 
public:
In our business nobody shares information about concrete projects, 
because our business is about information. And the key to success is 
the protection of this information.
(technical director, p11)
The role of networks in the transmission of information is further 
underlined by the fact that many types of information that are easily 
available and formally distributed in most modern industrialized coun-
tries, such as credit registries, may be hard to obtain or totally lacking 
in Russia:
When you are closing a big contract, for example, it is important 
for you to know how capable your client is of paying. You want to 
talk with the firms or people who have been dealing with the client. 
This information is not public. If you have good relations with these 
people, they are willing to reveal this information as much as they 
wish, and this is very important. To get to know something about 
this client or theme.
(CEO, p16)
The specific feature of offshore companies compared to firms operating 
only in Russian markets was that the former rarely had to compete for 
the same customers due to the size of the global markets. Consequently, 
monitoring the actions of competitors in this regard was often not 
considered to be of primary importance. Instead, the firms competed 
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fiercely on the local labor markets for employees, and the arrival of for-
eign competitors was important information for Russian firms:
Q: Do you often exchange useful advice or recommendations 
through acquaintances 
P11: Yes, of course. (…) Usually this is news about technologies or 
labor markets. For example, when Intel arrived and recruited all the 
programmers. One had to know about this beforehand, so that one 
would not start a new project at the same time as they start their staff 
recruiting campaign 
Q: But how can you know this beforehand?
P11: Usually some information exists (…) e.g. an office being set 
up. How would you get to know that Sun is opening a new office? 
Naturally only through some acquaintance.
(technical director, p11)
One respondent referred to the exchange of information as ‘gossip’, 
which took place among acquaintances over informal lunches or din-
ners. If gossip is defined as ‘the provision of information by one person 
(ego) to another person (alter) about an absent third person (tertius)’ 
(Wittek and Wielers 1998), our interviews contain several examples of 
interviewees gossiping to the interviewer about competitors, enemies, 
or well-known figures in the St. Petersburg IT industry. The relatively 
small field of St. Petersburg’s IT sector offered fertile ground for gossip-
ing about third persons:
There are different kinds of gossip. There is gossip that is related to 
the mobility of staff, the behavior of clients, the strategic plans of 
well-known Moscow firms in St. Petersburg markets, to the serious 
problems and failures of certain companies. Or if one has to start 
hunting for personnel. Well, some kind of new information about 
which they don’t write in the news (…) but which it pays to know in 
order to understand the context of many official events.
(general director, p3)
Services
Not only information is transmitted through networks, but also 
concrete services related to, for example, technical and legal prob-
lems. A universal ‘benefit’ for IT professionals is the requests for help 
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concerning the computing problems occurring in one’s personal net-
work of family, kin, and acquaintances. This feature was well known 
and several concrete examples of it were given in the interviews:
Here is a fresh example: Next to our office is hairdresser [field of the 
activity has been changed], where they continuously have problems 
with their computer. They stop by and I say, ‘guys, whoever has time, 
go lend a hand.’ And I myself regularly visit various friends precisely 
to fix computer problems. And my friends help me to solve some 
problems related to business administration. Someone works in state 
structures and I regularly turn to him for help in various problems. 
Q: What kind of problems? What was the latest case?
P4: I was interested in the credit system in the Russian Federation. 
I phoned my friends who work in a bank, consulted them and under-
stood that in Russia this is not favorable. (…) And then, when open-
ing an office I turned to my friend who works in fire protection. 
Q: Why?
P4: In order for an office to start working, it has to fulfill certain 
requirements concerning, among other things, fire protection. And if 
the landlord has not solved these problems, they fall upon the renter. 
I phoned, found out what I have to do in order not to have problems 
with fire inspection in the future.
(general director, p4)
Nothing in the quote above implies that the employees of the hair 
salon next to the IT company were charged money for the computer 
maintenance services. Similarly, it is plausible to assume that, in the 
case that one of the staff of the IT firm was in need of a haircut, this 
was done for free. 
The computing problems of the personal networks of an IT firm’s 
employees are thus dealt with in an informal manner:
[The service department] is constantly dealing with these things – 
installing computers. All my acquaintances go there all the time in 
a spirit of neighborliness, and someone helps. My home computer 
was also fixed this way.
 (marketing manager, p15)
The interviews contained several examples of these kinds of exchanges 
crisscrossing the personal and professional spheres of life. The father 
of the boss-friend of Valentina (marketing manager, p15), for example, 
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was a lawyer who took care of checking the contracts of Valentina’s 
company. In a similar manner, Anna (PR-manager, p2) asked the lawyer 
of her firm to help Anna’s friend in a law case:
A good example concerning the lawyers. Just a while ago my per-
sonal friends needed an attorney in a civil case. We have a lawyer 
in our firm who deals with contracts. I went to him and asked if 
he has some acquaintances at the [law] institute or in lawyer circles 
who have specialized in civil law. (…) Contacts were transmitted. Of 
course, this happens constantly. It is a constant practice.
(PR-manager, p2)
In the recently established company of Nikita (technical director, p20) 
‘many acquaintances from various fields’ had provided concrete help 
for the firm in terms of registration, finding an office, taxation, server 
installation, bookkeeping, juridical advice, and advertising. As a next 
step he was planning to use his acquaintances to establish a front-end 
office in the US to draw in American customers.
In sum, these examples illustrate the significance of personal 
networks in Russian managers’ business activities. The non-market 
exchanges effectuated through their personal ties provided them with a 
wide variety of both tangible and intangible resources. The next chapter 
will analyze the social mechanisms governing these transactions.
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Social Mechanisms Governing the 
Informal Transactions between 
Russian IT Managers
While the previous chapter dealt with the contents of Russian man-
agers’ informal transactions (e.g. information, advice, money), this 
chapter describes the social mechanisms regulating these transactions. 
Instead of trying to cover all such mechanisms, the chapter focuses 
on reciprocal obligations, brokerage, and mixing of professional and 
personal spheres of life, that is, mechanisms that are supposed to create 
continuity in relationships and enlarge personal networks by introduc-
ing new members.1
Reciprocal expectations in Russian managers’ transactions
The norm of reciprocity vs. the importance of socializing
It seems natural to think that a given favor evokes an expectation of 
a counter favor, thus contributing to the maintenance of the network 
tie. In his article The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement (1960), 
sociologist Alvin Gouldner explains this expectation by the existence of 
a universal, generalized norm of reciprocity.2 Gouldner considers reci-
procity to be as universal and important in cultures as the incest taboo, 
though he admits that its ‘concrete formulations’ may vary according 
to time and place.3 Moreover, the norm may also differ within one 
society according to the status of participants or certain other condi-
tions. Gouldner also mentions how the norm may function differently 
to some degree in different cultures, and also leaves room for the lack 
of reciprocal obligations:
Relations with little or no reciprocity may, for example, occur when 
power disparities allow one party to coerce the other. There may also 
be special mechanisms which compensate for or control the tensions 
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which arise in the event of a breakdown in reciprocity. Among such 
compensatory mechanisms there may be culturally shared prescrip-
tions of one-sided or unconditional generosity, such as the Christian 
notion of ‘turning the other cheek’ or ‘walking the second mile’, the 
feudal notion of ‘noblesse oblige’, or the Roman notion of ‘clemency’.
(Gouldner 1960: 164)
Edwina Uehara (1995) notes that the formulation of Gouldner’s norm 
is very general. In actual interaction situations, people have to make 
concrete decisions about, among other things, how much, when, and 
how to reciprocate
[O]ur expectations as to how and when we can ‘legitimately’ meet 
our reciprocity obligations are quite diverse, and some relationships 
afford more flexibility in this regard than others. For example, in 
relationships where indirect and/or delayed reciprocity is permitted, 
we are afforded a relatively wide degree of latitude in meeting reci-
procity obligations.
(Uehara 1995: 487)
We asked about the existence of reciprocal expectations and their 
actual realizations in concrete interaction situations among our Russian 
respondents with the help of two questions. The first question consid-
ered the possibility of a ‘free lunch’, and the other the possibility of an 
unreciprocated favor. The English expression ‘there’s no such thing as 
a free lunch’ was translated into the Russian saying ‘there is free cheese 
only in a mouse trap’ (besplatnyi syr tol’ko v myshelovke).4
In general the respondents admitted that doing a favor for someone 
created a need for a counter favor: 
Q: There is a saying ‘there is free cheese only in a mouse trap.’ To 
what extent do you agree with this? 
P4: Basically, of course, I agree. If someone does you a favor, you 
suppose as a silent agreement that you are ready to do some kind 
of a reciprocal favor. If not now, then in the future. In my opinion 
these are normal human relations (eto normal’nye chelovecheskie 
otnosheniia)
(general director, p4)
Some of the respondents, however, disputed the whole principle by 
criticizing the barter logic inherent in our question (and in Gouldner’s 
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norm). Instead, they related the giving of favors to a broader process of 
obshchenie – building and maintaining personal networks through com-
municating and socializing:
Q: Generally when you do someone a favor or someone does you a 
favor, do you expect something in return?
P6: No, I don’t. If I do a favor, I don’t do it on the basis of barter. 
But I have noticed that very often some contacts will overlap. They 
probably won’t bring concrete results right away, but perhaps later. 
But this is similar to human communication (srodni chelovecheskomu 
obshcheniiu). I am not giving you an interview because I expect some-
thing in return. Absolutely not. I give you an interview because it 
won’t take me much time. I can grant you half an hour. If this helps 
you, as I understand, why not?
(marketing director, p6)
This quote echoes the words of Luc Boltanski in a recent interview 
(Basaure 2008). Boltanski noted how expecting no reciprocity might 
seem like an unreachable ideal but ‘I think in daily life it happens very 
often, because it would become completely impossible, if anyone would 
constantly calculate what he is doing and what is being done for him, as 
equivalencies must permanently be evoked’ (Basaure 2008: 7, translated 
by M. L.). 
The quote may be interpreted as a criticism of the economic-rational 
perspective implied in the question, which considers the individual act 
of exchange as abstracted from its actual context. The reciprocal expec-
tations do not, for this respondent, figure as a motive for action or relate 
to individual actions but rather to the nature of the ongoing ‘human 
communication’ (cf. Gronow 2008). In a similar manner, another of 
our respondents (general director, p4) justified his helping others out 
without reciprocation as ‘normal human communication’ (normal’noe 
chelovecheskoe obshchenie). 
Alexey Yurchak (2006: 148–51) has paid attention to the importance 
of obshchenie, which has no adequate equivalent in English:
It refers to ‘communication’ and ‘conversation’, but in addition 
involves nonverbal interaction and spending time together or being 
together. It is different from just ‘hanging out’ with friends, as used in 
the United States, because it always involves an intense and intimate 
commonality and intersubjectivity, not just spending time in the 
company of others. The noun obshchenie has the same root as obshchii 
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(common) and obshchina (commune), stressing in the process of inter-
action not the exchange between individuals but the communal space 
where everyone’s personhood is dialogized to produce a common 
intersubjective sociality. Obshchenie, therefore, is both a process and a 
sociality that emerges in that process, and both an exchange of ideas 
and information as well as a space of affect and togetherness.
(Yurchak 2006: 148)
Quoting Vail and Genis (1988: 69), Yurchak (2006: 148) notes how 
obshchenie as a cultural practice intensified and evolved into a dominant 
pastime during late socialism. Though he remarks that in present day 
Russia people are regretting the diminishing chances for obshchenie, our 
interviews testify to its continuous existence and importance.
Indications of the importance of this practice were the frequent 
cases of obshchenie that took place not only among the Russian IT profes-
sionals, but also between our native Russian interviewer and the respond-
ents. The interviewer was advised to record her observations about the 
respondent and the interview situation on tape after each interview 
session. As a result, our ‘meta-level data’ of the interviewer–interviewee 
encounters contain several instances of the following type: 
[The respondent was a] very sociable (obshchitel’nyi) person. The con-
versation took place in the office. The respondent offered me coffee 
and introduced me to his partner. After the interview we still talked 
about some topics that were of interest t0o both of us. For example, 
the respondent has a very wide circle of sociality (krug obshcheniia).
(interviewer’s comment on the interview 
with general director, p3)
This quote illustrates not only an encounter between two individual 
persons, but a coupling of two personal networks (krug obshcheniia) 
through the commonly shared practice of socializing and communicat-
ing. Note that the interviewer uses the word ‘conversation’ (beseda) in 
addition to ‘interview’. The conversation ended with the respondent’s 
invitation to the interviewer to join his personal network on a social 
networking website. Despite the time constraints of our respondents, 
these kinds of instances of socializing took place frequently after the 
formal interview had ended:
During the conversation after the interview it became clear that 
the respondent is studying English and has been in English courses 
abroad. He regretted not being able to talk ‘kitchen English’ because 
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of the lack of occasions to practice. During the informal conversation 
after the interview we moved to a first-name basis (my pereshli na ty), 
and talked about the respondent’s relationship to the city.
(interviewer’s comment on the interview 
with development director, p5)
The importance of obshchenie was also key to understanding the inter-
views: our Western interview questions about the importance of recip-
rocating a given favor were often answered with examples emphasizing 
the importance of obshchenie. Metaphorically speaking, when asked if a 
person donating seeds to a gardener would expect a counter gift, many 
respondents suggested that it was more important to communicate and 
socialize with the gardener. The contact established might or might not 
bear fruit in the future:
I presume that if I help someone, I can also turn to this person with 
some questions. But I do not think at all that there is some kind of 
unavoidable principle of equality, some kind of calculation like ‘I 
helped you once, you will help me later’.
(development director, p17)
Many respondents agreed with the norm of reciprocity in principle but 
nevertheless told several examples of favors they had done without 
expecting something in return. First, some examples of unreciprocated 
favors considered cases where resources had been distributed so unevenly 
between the participants of the exchange that both understood that reci-
procity was not an option (cf. Ledeneva’s ‘regime of status’, 1998: 150–2):
Sometimes I can do a favor understanding that I will never get anything 
back. Because the person, for example, cannot give me anything.
(PR manager, p19)
Second, the respondents analyzed various factors related to situational 
contexts affecting reciprocal expectations:
I don’t know why you should necessarily do others a favor in order to 
be able to ask for one. If I ask you to bring me a cup of coffee, what 
reasons do you have to refuse? 
Q: None
P5: You can bring it. This is an example. If it is not difficult and does 
not require a lot of work. You just do it. Another variant is that you 
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have no reason to refuse but you feel lazy. And you will say that I do 
not feel like it. This will also be a variant of communication (eto tozhe 
budet variantom obshcheniia) (…) A wish is simply a wish and not a 
command. One cannot count on that what you want will be done. 
But one can hope for it.
(development director, p5)
Third, several respondents stressed the dependency of the reciprocal 
expectations on the nature of the relationship. According to them, 
friendship relations, for example, had different rules than business 
relations in terms of reciprocity (see the end of this chapter for a more 
detailed account on friendship):
Q: They say that there is free cheese only in a mouse trap. If you do 
someone a favor, you will expect something in exchange, some kind 
of help or favor. Do you agree with this saying? 
P13: No I don’t. It does not work in friendship relations (v druzheskikh 
otnosheniiakh). In them everything is different, otherwise they would 
not be friendship relations but something completely different.
(general director, p13)
In sum, although the majority of the respondents agreed with 
Gouldner’s norm of reciprocity in principle, many told examples of 
situations where they themselves had given help without expecting to 
be reciprocated; some denied it altogether; and others refined the norm 
in several respects, pointing to, among other things, the importance of 
obshchenie. Even a professional encounter between the interviewer and 
the interviewee could be transformed into a coupling of their personal 
networks through obshchenie. 
These denials and variations of the norm of reciprocity suggest that, 
in addition to reciprocal obligations, other social and moral mecha-
nisms were at work in the personal networks of our respondents. In 
the next section the denials of reciprocity are discussed based on Alena 
Ledeneva’s (1998) work on the ‘Russian economy of favours’ already 
addressed in the previous sections.
Denials of reciprocity as misrecognition
Ledeneva (1998: 141) analyzes reciprocal obligations in blat exchanges 
in a manner that is relevant to the current study.  According to her, the 
particular nature of blat favors has an impact on reciprocal expectations 
since it can be located between gift and commodity exchanges. On the 
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one hand, blat favors are different from commodity exchanges because 
they bear the personal stamp of the donor, but on the other hand blat 
favors may also be distinguished from gift exchanges because they hap-
pen upon request. Consequently, blat is protected from the ‘compulsion 
of the gift’ and imposed generosities. 
To find a way to deal with the complexity of reciprocal obligations in 
blat exchanges, Ledeneva (1998: 142–4) refers to Luc Boltanski’s distinc-
tion between the ‘affective regime’ and the ‘regime of justice’. To sum-
marize Ledeneva’s presentation, which draws on Luc Boltanski’s lecture at 
Princeton in 1992: in the ‘regime of justice’ parties search for equivalen-
cies – or a common point of reference – to manage disputes whereas in the 
‘affective regime’ people shove aside all calculations of equivalencies.5
Based on the theorizing of Boltanski and Thévenot, Ledeneva herself 
constructs three different ‘regimes of reciprocity’: the regime of equiva-
lence, the regime of affection, and the regime of status, between which 
the exchange partners may switch depending on the situation. In the 
regime of equivalence, the reciprocal expectations are most explicit since 
the focus is on the potential utility of the exchange partner. In the regime 
of affection participants stress the relationship itself rather than counter 
favors, and are bound by personal ties irrespective of their involvement 
in blat transactions. Finally, unlike the two other regimes, the regime 
of status is asymmetrical and can follow the pattern of patron–client 
relationships. This regime is affected by the status, power, and authority 
of the participants in blat exchanges and shows how reciprocal expecta-
tions may be irrelevant since some favors cannot be paid back even in 
principle (Ledeneva 1998: 142–52).
While Ledeneva’s trichotomy sheds light on various aspects of the 
reciprocity of blat exchanges, it also contains problems, since else-
where in her book she analyzes blat transactions with the help of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s notion of misrecognition (méconnaissance) in gift transactions. 
According to Bourdieu, the temporal delay between the gift and the 
counter-gift enables parties to create an illusion of the non-reciprocal 
nature of the gift. In reality, the reciprocal obligations do exist, and only 
the collective participation in the ‘misrecognition game’ makes it pos-
sible to conceal this objective fact.
In blat exchanges, however, the misrecognition game was incomplete, 
because people were able to recognize an exchange of favors as blat 
when it was conducted by others, but unable to do this when they were 
themselves involved in blat transactions: 
The complexity of the blat ‘misrecognition game’ cannot be fully 
grasped by Bourdieu’s concept of misrecognition, where even being 
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outside of the gift exchange transaction, a member of a community 
would admit that it is a gift that has been given. As not all individu-
als accept the internal rhetoric of blat and recognise it indicates that 
this did not endanger the foundation of community – that is, there 
was no universally shared sense of ‘honour’ involved in blat.
(Ledeneva 1998: 59–60; see also Ledeneva 2008: 129–30)
The disclosing of the objective truth underneath the respondents’ dis-
course in the misrecognition game seems to be at odds with the theory 
of Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), according to which ‘[t]he regime in 
which one makes calculations is no more true, no more real, than the 
regime in which people inhibit their calculation abilities’. However, 
according to Ledeneva – who illustrates this regime mainly with 
examples of friendship ties – in the regime of affection ‘the feelings of 
affection disguise blat relations’ and ‘the rhetoric of friendship tends to 
conceal mutual obligations’ (Ledeneva 1998: 148–9). If these mutual 
obligations are not obeyed, the real state of affairs is revealed:
But in fact, if the balance in the relationship is broken, if one takes 
offence and feels that the code of friendship has been violated, the 
relationships are likely to slip into the regime of equivalence.
(Ledeneva 1998: 149)
In other words, it looks as if in Ledeneva’s trichotomy the regime of 
affection would be a somewhat unstable discursive layer, under which 
the ‘objective reality’ of reciprocal obligations is to be found – as in 
Bourdieu’s misrecognition game. 
Denials of reciprocity as references to shared moral principles
Instead of applying the notion of misrecognition to denials of reciproc-
ity, this section follows the lead opened by Luc Boltanski and Laurent 
Thévenot (2006) in their book On Justification. Economies of Worth 
([1991], 2006).6 From this perspective, the respondents’ reflections on 
reciprocity may be considered ways of justifying their actions by refer-
ring to shared moral principles. 
Our respondents’ appeal to moral principles in the interviews con-
cerning their professional activities suggests that economic relations 
are far from being emptied of moral considerations. Moreover, it shows 
how economically relevant actions may be justified by referring to 
moral principles unrelated to the market logic of competition. Finally, 
respondents’ replies reveal how reciprocal obligations may also be 
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shoved aside completely in the name of non-instrumental friendship 
(Boltanski 1990; Kharkhordin 2005, 2009). 
In the remaining text of this section, justification theory is first 
described in short and then, in the next section, applied to the Russian 
managers’ interview data.
The basic idea of justification theory is that the normal, conventional 
course of action – for example, running a business – tends from time to 
time to drift into a dead end. Justification theory focuses on these ‘criti-
cal moments’ – crises, conflicts, and disputes – which force the disagree-
ing parties to argue and justify their actions by referring to ‘a common 
good’ recognized and accepted by both parties.7 
In order to settle the dispute, the parties have to establish a principle of 
equivalence, against which the arguments presented in the dispute can be 
evaluated, and the ‘worth’ (grandeur) of the disputants can be measured. 
Boltanski and Thévenot describe six different orders of worth, each 
of them referring to a different principle defining the ‘worth’, ‘size’, or 
‘greatness’ (grandeur) of the disputing parties. They distinguish six com-
mon worlds based on these principles and on the beings (persons or 
things) that inhabit these worlds.8
First, in the market world, the greatness (grandeur) of an actor is 
defined by wealth and ultimately measured by markets. The greatness of 
a physician in this world, for example, could be measured by her com-
mercial success in medical business. Second, in the industrial world, to 
continue the example, the same physician may be valued – irrespective 
of her commercial success – by her efficiency and measured in concrete 
terms, for example, by the number of patients handled per day. Third, 
in the domestic world, the greatness of the physician is evaluated by her 
position in the system of mutual dependency. Valued or ‘worthy’ in 
this world is one’s trusted family doctor who has been treating all the 
members of the family for years and with whom one can always jump 
the queue to get an appointment. Fourth, in the civic world, a doctor 
is evaluated by her willingness to treat all patients equally as citizens. 
Fifth, in the world of fame, a great person would be a well-known media 
figure (such as Dr. Phil), whereas in the inspired world such a figure 
would be a genius surgeon who is the only one able to conduct certain 
operations because of her unique, God-given artistic capabilities.9
In this book the focus is mostly on the domestic and market orders 
of worth and the tensions between them. It is important to note that 
economic relations are not to be identified with market worth since a 
firm, for example, may be analyzed as a ‘compromising device’ between 
the market and industrial worth (Thévenot 2001). 
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The originality of justification theory is that none of these moral 
orders are tied to particular social groups or superior to the others. 
The argumentation which is valid in one world may be out of place 
in another. Moreover, justification depends on the situation. The same 
person may, in the course of one day (or one hour), refer to different 
orders of worth to justify his actions.10 
Since the orders of worth are equal, there is no privileged position for 
a critical sociologist à la Bourdieu – or any other outside observer. From 
this perspective the misrecognition game turns out to be part of the 
project that tries to reveal a deeper truth lurking behind the backs of the 
actors. Justification theory, on the contrary, analyzes the interviews as 
examples of the competence of actors to justify their actions. 
In the next section we turn to the analysis of the empirical data, try-
ing to follow the methodological principle of justification theory as 
summarized by Nicholas Dodier (1993: 567):
[L]et us take peoples’ justifications seriously and study them in their 
plurality; let us observe how explanations are displayed, and accu-
mulate the accounts people give of their actions; and let us examine 
the sense of justice they thereby express.
Reciprocity and the domestic ethics of helping others out
Though it is plausible to think of reciprocal obligation as a universal 
phenomenon in line with Alvin Gouldner, it is similarly likely that the 
actual expectations and forms of reciprocity are likely to vary between 
cultures. Edwina Uehara’s review of the North American studies of reci-
procity helps to place the observations of the previous section into a 
comparative context.11 Uehara’s goal was to find out to what extent:
(1) [people] feel obliged to return support or assistance received from 
others and to act on this obligation; and (2) tend to resolve/give 
meaning to the reciprocity ‘balance’ in their relationships in a man-
ner that avoids the interpretation that they are ‘overbenefiting’.
(Uehara 1995: 488)
Uehara concludes that the studies reviewed support the idea of the 
existence of an obligation of reciprocity. But unlike it is postulated by 
the equity and utilitarian theories, in Western countries people seem in 
their reciprocal behavior rather to try to overbenefit a favor received –
 that is, to pay their debts with interest – than to strive for balance or to 
take advantage of their exchange partner. Uehara’s results are indicative 
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of a context where the principles of market worth such as self-reliance 
and competitiveness are particularly valued:
All in all, the normative ‘deck’ [in Western countries] appears to be 
heavily stacked against the individual in need of assistance from 
others.
(Uehara 1995: 499)
Justification theory does not, however, confine various orders of worth 
to specific cultures, but sees them rather as universal points of refer-
ence whose weight may nevertheless differ depending both on cultural 
context and situation. 
In Russian society, for example, reciprocal expectations exist in a con-
text where – due to the Soviet heritage and probably the much longer 
domestic tradition of the Russian village community – people are bound 
to each other within a system of mutual dependency and thus accustomed 
to turning to each other for help in various daily life problems. Though 
this ‘domestic’ idea of helping others out is now being challenged by the 
introduction of market-based principles in post-Soviet Russia, it has not 
disappeared. More importantly, it can be referred to even in the context 
of an interview concerning business-related favors, as the following quote 
from a Russian owner of a successful IT company shows: 
T: How and why does this [system of mutual favors] work? 
P1: Because mother was reading us fairy tales in childhood. In the fairy 
tale Mashen’ka is running on a field, where there stands an oven. ‘Take 
the pie out, it is burning,’ the oven says. Mashen’ka takes the pie out 
of the oven. Then an apple tree asks: ‘Shake me.’ Mashen’ka shakes the 
tree. But the bad girl just runs ahead and does not help anyone. And 
she will end up badly. This is what we were taught in childhood, to 
share things with everyone, to cooperate, to help.
(general director, p1)
The respondent is referring to a Russian fairy tale where the good girl 
Mashen’ka is helpful and gets rewarded at the end while things end 
up badly for the girl who does not help out other creatures. Many of 
Ledeneva’s (1998) respondents recognized the same ‘obligation to help’. 
Like our respondent quoted above Ledeneva herself describes this phe-
nomenon, referring to another Russian fairy tale with similar contents:
As in the fairy tale about Ivan-the-Fool who, despite his grand mis-
sion to liberate Helen-the-Beauty, helped different creatures on his 
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way, sharing food with them and saving their homes or lives. He 
would have had no chance in his fight with the Deathless (in Russian 
folklore a bony, emaciated old man, rich and wicked, who knows the 
secret of eternal life), but because every creature returned his favour, 
in their small ways in particular moments, in the end with their 
assistance he managed to kill the Deathless and marry the girl.
(Ledeneva 1998: 164–5, footnote 9)
Though these quotes may be read as examples of the reciprocal return-
ing of favors, as Ledeneva remarks, here they will be interpreted as 
referrals to the importance of helping out others within a system of mutual 
dependency. Without this principle things will turn ugly for everyone: 
the pie will get burned and Mashen’ka will suffer. It is because of this 
systemic importance of mutual dependence that the one helping others 
out will finally be rewarded. 
One of Ledeneva’s respondents describes this domestic principle from 
a comparative perspective, contrasting it to the ‘Western’ world plagued 
by competition and self-reliance.
Western people, in contrast to us, are very independent. They rely 
on themselves and do not fancy helping out or accepting help 
from others. Russians assume that they can always ask for help and 
will help themselves. I am sure that if I ask I will be helped. And 
the other way around. If I am asked, I drop everything and help the 
other person, because I can imagine myself in his place. Indifference 
or refusal is a psychological trauma. I try not to refuse, giving out 
everything I can.
(Ledeneva 1998: 163)
This interview quote could be read as a stereotypical Russian self-
identification vis-à-vis a mythical and idealized Western business life. 
However, instead of this kind of interpretation or trying to find out 
whether the respondent above in actual fact helped others, in this 
text these kinds of expressions will be considered moral justifications of 
action.
In line with the evidence on the importance of mutual help drawn 
from our interviews, Vadim Radaev (1998: 15) describes ‘the ethics 
of implicit contracts’ based on the surveys conducted among Russian 
managers and entrepreneurs at the end of the 1990s. When asked if 
the entrepreneurs were willing to loan a considerable sum of money 
to a firm of their regular partner who was confronting financial 
9780230252394_08_cha07.indd   117 10/20/2010   1:56:22 PM
118 Networks in the Russian Market Economy
difficulties, only one out five entrepreneurs responded negatively. Of 
the respondents, 27 percent would not require any interest, 25 percent 
would loan money on low interest, and only 3 percent on market interest 
(25 percent chose the option ‘difficult to say’).
Though the willingness to give discounts to trusted partners was 
probably partly related to the exceptional circumstances of the 1990s, 
by referring to the ethics of helping out some of our respondents still 
recognized the mutual dependence of people – and particularly the 
dependence between the members of one’s own personal network. 
Recognizing and sharing this moral principle means, first, that in Russia 
it is easier to ask for help and favors than in a context emphasizing 
competition and self-reliance. Second, it means that a request for help 
is more difficult to turn down in Russia by saying that ‘it is not my 
business’.
At the risk of exaggeration, one may claim that while asking for help 
is interpreted in ‘Western’ culture as a sign of weakness, in Russia turn-
ing down a request for help from one’s network member is a sign of rude, 
uncivilized behavior. One of our respondents (development director, 
p5), for example, having criticized at length the barter logic implied in 
our question on reciprocity, summarized that the topic of discussion 
was related, rather than to the professional sphere, ‘to the worldview’ 
(eto skoree vsego otnositsia k mirovospriiatiiu).
If this hypothesis is valid, we can better understand the replies of our 
respondents about the variations and denials of reciprocity as indicative 
of a context in which ‘owing favors’ is common and allowed. Where 
problems are often solved ‘with a little help from my friends,’ the pres-
sure to reciprocate may be less stringent than in a context stressing the 
individual’s capacity to do it ‘my way’. 
If we think of the reciprocal expectations as a cohesive force in 
networks (as a kind of ‘social glue’), the pressure on self-reliance and 
immediate reciprocating in fact tries to dissolve this glue by a quick 
and full return of favor.12 The weaker pressure on reciprocation goes 
hand in hand with the tendency to help others out, the importance of 
obshchenie, and the maintenance of network ties.
Nevertheless, referring to the ethics of helping out does not mean 
that it is applied in practice automatically in all circumstances. Instead, 
its application is likely to depend on the specific situation and person. 
Rather then describing Russian IT professionals as altruistic actors 
always ready to sacrifice their own interest, the analysis of this section 
has tried to illustrate the tensions between the new market-based logic 
emphasizing independence, competitiveness, and self-reliance, and the 
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traditional domestic logic of helping out others in a system of mutual 
dependency.
Brokerage
Q: Have you sometimes exchanged useful contacts through your 
acquaintances? For example, have you recommended your acquaint-
ance who can help you with a question you cannot?  
P6: Of course. It is an element of everyday communication (eto kak 
element povsednevnogo obshcheniia). It happens very often beginning 
with small details. It is difficult to tell examples, because it is so 
self-evident.
(marketing director, p6)
This section considers middlemen or brokers as another important 
social mechanism regulating transactions in personal networks. Brokers 
may, among other things, create trust between network members, 
transmit and evaluate resources circulating in networks, and enlarge 
the networks through the introduction of new members. In addition to 
these connective and collaborative functions, brokers may also try to 
use their position as middlemen between unconnected network mem-
bers to their own advantage.
According to our respondents, the inclination to use third persons in 
transmission or evaluation of resources is a conventional and routinized 
way of acting in the Russian business environment:13
According to my personal experience I can here [in Russia] freely 
phone a quite distant acquaintance, that is, someone whom I know 
well enough to phone, and ask him a favor or propose something. In 
Germany [where the respondent had worked] this is not as usual.
(general director, p4)
Recent research has emphasized that brokers do not only pass on 
resources but also participate actively in the process by adapting and 
refining them (Mustikkamäki 2008; Sverrisson 2001; Obstfeld 2005; 
Obstfeld and Borgatti 2008; see also Gould and Fernandez 1989).14 This 
active involvement is particularly important in the field of information 
technology where the transmission of information is often accompa-
nied by its sorting, filtering, and analysis. 
The first part of this section discusses the dividing and connecting 
aspects of brokerage on the basis of Ronald Burt’s and David Obstfeld’s 
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theorizing. The remaining part focuses on the connecting and col-
laborative aspects of brokerage, illustrating them on the basis of our 
empirical data. 
The broker as divider and as connector
One of the central ideas concerning brokerage is the theory of structural 
holes by Ronald Burt (1992). According to David Obstfeld (2005) Burt’s 
theory is based on a variant of Georg Simmel’s idea of the tertius gaudens 
broker (third who gains), where the third person in a triad takes advan-
tage of the missing contact between the two other actors:
He [Burt] argued that social networks rich in structural holes present 
opportunities for using a tertius gaudens strategy, by which an actor 
positioned between two disconnected parties can manipulate or 
exploit those parties to the actor’s benefit.
(Obstfeld 2005: 103)
Though Obstfeld notes that Burt has also addressed a broader varia-
tion of triadic behaviors, structural hole theory concentrates on the 
separation of actors suggested in Simmel’s original usage. Burt’s theory 
is marked by competition, control, and conflicts, and his tertius gaudens 
broker attempts to profit from his position by keeping the triad’s other 
parts separate.
Unlike Burt’s, Obstfeld’s approach to brokerage builds on the tertius 
iungens (third who joins)15 – a non-competitive and non-adversarial 
‘behavioral orientation toward connecting people by either introducing 
disconnected individuals or facilitating new coordination between con-
nected individuals’ (Obstfeld 2005: 102; see also Obstfeld and Borgatti 
2008).16 
Obstfeld (2005) distinguishes four types of brokerage. The first type 
(conduit) refers to coordination of action or information between 
parties who have no immediate prospects for direct introduction or 
connection. The second type (tertius gaudens) contains Burt’s theory 
of structural holes. The third type (brief tertius iungens) introduces or 
facilitates ties between parties where a continuing coordinative role 
is unnecessary, diminishes in importance, or simply is not offered. 
The fourth type (sustained tertius iungens) introduces or facilitates 
interaction between parties while maintaining an essential coordina-
tive role. 
Obstfeld’s idea of tertius iungens does not, however, exclude the 
presence of structural holes – which would lead to completely closed 
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networks – because the introduction of new members to the network 
by a cooperative broker may, together with closing old structural holes, 
also create new holes. 
In brief, the viewpoints of Burt and Obstfeld shed light on the two 
sides of brokerage, competition and collaboration, both of which merit 
attention. In this section the focus is, in line with the main emphasis of 
this book, on the latter, particularly on the role of brokers in connect-
ing, transmitting, and evaluating resources circulating in the personal 
networks. 
The remaining two sections do not aim at a fine-grained conceptual 
analysis of different brokerage types or functions but rather try to illus-
trate the significance of middlemen in the Russian IT business through 
the examination of our empirical data. Particular focus is placed on the 
brokers’ role in recruiting employees, since competent staff was the 
most valuable and scarce resource in the St. Petersburg IT industry at 
the time of our interviews. 
Brokers as connectors
I simply have a huge database [of connections] in my head. Probably 
not in details, but I know how to connect people who can help each 
other.
(project leader, p26)
According to our respondents, brokerage chains and triads were com-
mon in IT business. The inclination to turn to middlemen for help 
was illustrated in the expressions used by our respondents, where the 
instances of brokerage were described as, for example, ‘self-evident’ 
or were considered part of ‘human communication’ (chelovecheskoe 
obshchenie), and contact information was actively transmitted within 
one’s personal network:
In my circle of communication (v kruge moego obshcheniia) we usually 
let each other know about useful contacts. All colleagues in this circle 
think like this: ‘I got to know an interesting person and for you it 
would be useful to talk with him’.
(general director, p7)
Through brokers the network ties transferred information about a wide 
variety of resources such as technologies, markets, and competition. 
Though contacts with customers were a heavily contested resource, 
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even they were at times transmitted from one firm to another provided 
that the firms were not active in the same markets: 
Q: Have you sometimes exchanged useful contacts through 
acquaintances?
P10: Of course. This is banal: two weeks ago I got a phone call from 
my acquaintance who is also working in the IT industry. His firm 
has a slightly different specialization. He was contacted concerning 
a project which is our specialty but not theirs. So he transmitted a 
contact with a potential customer.
(director, p10)
In the basic ‘brokerage triad’ between the donor, broker, and receiver, 
three different but interrelated ties will be born, in which the broker 
may function either as the third person introducing the donor and 
the receiver, or the guarantor of their interrelation, or both. In some 
cases these brokerage chains could grow long and complex. One of the 
respondents (director, p39) told about a phone call he got on a Sunday 
from his colleague ‘from a friendly company’. This colleague needed to 
find a programmer for his project that same day. Our respondent asked 
the colleague to describe the requirements of the job and turned then 
to his personal contact notebook which contained almost 200 names. 
The second broker in this transmission chain was our respondent’s 
acquaintance working in another firm, whom our respondent phoned 
explaining the problem:
He [the respondent’s acquaintance] said: ‘This is not my field. Phone 
N. N’. I phoned N. N. who said: ‘Yes this person exists but he is now 
devil knows where. You cannot reach him by phone, but he can be 
found through a third person’. (…) Finally, the person was found on 
Sunday, after three hours of searching.
(director, p39)
This quote is illustrative both of the dense networks between the 
managers of the St. Petersburg IT companies and of the speed and effi-
cacy of personal networks, but most importantly, of the inclination 
and willingness of all links in the search chain – including at least 
four professionals – to work as middlemen. This inclination is related 
to the ethics of helping out described in the previous sections and 
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forms an important aspect of the functioning of personal networks 
in Russia.
Brokers as evaluators
Brokers were central not only in transmitting and connecting, but also 
in evaluating various resources circulating in the networks. Among the 
most valuable and scarce resources were competent employees, whose 
assessment through networks will be at the center of this section. 
The particular significance of personal evaluations and recommenda-
tions in Russia may be understood against the lack or distrust of formal 
means and institutions of evaluation. Overcoming this distrust with the 
help of personal network ties was underlined by a 40-year-old company 
director who had conducted a survey about how customers had found 
their company. He illustrates the significance of trusted third persons 
with the following example:
If a person tells his friend that I’ve bought a TV set at this specific 
firm, his friend will go there automatically, without thinking, just 
trusting his friend. Even though this person may have bought his TV 
set there by chance, his friend will anyhow automatically also buy 
his TV set there. Provided, of course, that everything was OK with 
this firm. His friend will go there and the friend of his friend, and 
this chain will work on and on. [According to our customer survey] 
a significant percentage of our clients come here because of recom-
mendation from somebody. Moreover, when there is a personnel 
change in a [customer] company, the new employee will first see 
with whom the company has worked before. And if they’ve been 
happy, they will continue to work with us.
(director, p22)
The need for recommendations from a third person was even more 
acute in the field of IT services, where defining the quality of the 
services, products, or labor was a much more complex process than 
evaluating the quality of TV sets. Though international certification 
standards such as ISO9000 and CMM were referred to by some of our 
respondents,17 only a minority of small- or medium-sized firms have 
been granted these certifications.
The remaining text of this section focuses on the use of brokers in 
recruiting personnel which, at the time when our interviews were 
conducted, was the main problem for St. Petersburg IT firms. Despite 
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high-level theoretical knowledge, the graduates from the local universi-
ties lacked practical experience of, say, project management or language 
skills necessary for a successful career in the IT business, and the evalu-
ation of their de facto capacities was crucial for the employers.
When assessing the potential candidates for recruitment all informa-
tion available was used, including formal applications and written testi-
monials from previous workplaces. However, written testimonials could 
have strings attached. A good testimonial, for example, could turn out 
to be an attempt to save the face of an incompetent employee and avoid 
problems which would have resulted from his firing:
[Y]ou have to fire a person. He says OK, gets up, leaves his resignation 
of his own free will and saves his face. You will save his face. He could 
say that I won’t resign, fire me according to the laws. He takes the 
issue to court after which the real show begins. He will say that you 
are paying salaries under the counter. And you will say that I will send 
13-year-old hooligans to your home to explain to him where to look 
for his salary (…) who needs this? You will write him a letter of recom-
mendation (…) and he continues on the markets, shows the letter.
(general director, p3)
Moreover, in a formal testimonial the image given of the evaluation 
target is positive and flawless. The possible failures, conflicts, and other 
shortcomings at work have been excluded, whereas in an informal rec-
ommendation both pros and cons of the target can be dealt with.
Because a testimonial as a rule is written to an anonymous reader, it 
implies a different kind of responsibility than an informal recommenda-
tion given in a brokerage chain to an old acquaintance or friend: 
If for example one of my former employees is looking for job in some 
firm and asks for a recommendation (…) if he does not ask anything 
supernatural, I’ll write a recommendation regardless of how our work 
relationship ended. And I don’t feel any responsibility for it to other 
people (…) If I recommend to a friend, good acquaintance or my part-
ner a person whom I know personally, then I will bear a certain respon-
sibility for it. And therefore I think ten times, I weigh everything before 
I will give a recommendation. These are completely obvious things.
(general director, p4)
Therefore, when possible, an attempt was made to check the infor-
mation of the formal testimonial against the evidence obtained from 
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trusted third persons. In a typical case, the new employer would contact 
the former employer of the applicant to inquire about the background, 
trustworthiness, and competence of the employee:
If I see from the application that the applicant has worked, e.g., with 
Volkov [a well-known St. Petersburg IT entrepreneur – name has been 
changed], and I am not hiring a cleaner but a programmer, I will 
certainly phone Volkov and ask: Gennady Viktorovich, you had so-
and-so working for you. What can you tell me about him? ‘Nutcase’ 
(pridurok). Thanks a lot, Gennady Viktorovich.
(general director, p3)
In this example the written testimonial was bypassed in favor of a 
personal recommendation which was not made public: unlike formal 
evaluations, informal ones are often made orally and the persons evalu-
ated do not necessarily know about the contents of these assessments 
or even about their existence. 
Checking the background of the applicant over the phone was a com-
mon way of inquiring about the applicant’s character and competences. 
During one such conversation concerning an applicant, the advice 
given was ‘to chase him out with a broom’ (project leader, p24). 
However, informal recommendations were also evaluated critically 
and were cross-checked with different sources:
If I see from the applicant’s CV that he worked in a particular firm, 
it is very important for me to be able to phone some acquaintance 
in this firm and ask how things are with this person. Why did he 
leave the firm, what he was unhappy with, what are his weak and 
strong points? It is of course very important to talk directly with 
the employee because the information received from a third party is 
not always objective. Thus one shouldn’t blindly trust some recom-
mendations but always communicate directly with the person in 
question.
(technical director, p11)
Moreover, neither good informal recommendations nor testimonials 
will secure a job if the candidate does not pass the formal tests required, 
for example, to land a programming job.
In one company the applicants had to fill in a form where they 
were asked if they had acquaintances in the company. In the case of a 
positive reply, the recruiters turned to this acquaintance for additional 
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information ranging from the applicant’s professional competence to a 
detailed description of his personality: ‘This person is psychologically 
unstable. I studied with him at school and he used to throw paper balls 
at the teacher’ (PR-manager, p2).
In another company recruiting through networks was formalized in 
the form of a bonus paid to employees for bringing in a new worker. In 
this case the company’s employee functioned as a broker responsible for 
the new candidate:
If I recruit staff through my own employees the one who brings in 
a new person is personally responsible for him to me. The employee 
is still my subordinate and thereby bound to me ‘by blood’ (po krovi 
poviazan). If I recruit an employee through acquaintances and am 
unsatisfied with him, I am forced either to cut my relations with this 
acquaintance or carry that burden (derzhat’ kamen’ za pazuhoi) for 
the rest of my life.
(general director, p7)
While employers tried to evaluate the competences of the potential 
employees, the employees themselves were simultaneously turning to 
third persons to evaluate the quality of the employers. Because of the 
mobility of the workforce and the relatively small size of St. Petersburg 
markets, the reputation of both employers and employees spread 
quickly through networks:
Q: How important are social networks to the formation of a person’s 
reputation?
P11. Extremely important. Particularly important is the lack of nega-
tive information. Negative information about the company or the 
director may stain the project right away. It will be more difficult to 
find staff if it is commonly known that the company does not treat 
employees fairly. This information will quite soon become common 
knowledge.
Q: And will be particularly damaging for recruiting?
P11: Of course. Such negative information is spread primarily 
through acquaintances. It is not usually published and therefore you 
can find negative information only through acquaintances.
(technical director, p11)
In sum, the role of brokers was central both in introducing new mem-
bers to personal networks and evaluating the resources circulating in 
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them. Inclination to turn to brokers and willingness to act as one were 
marked features of the Russian managers’ activities. The role of brokers 
was further emphasized by the lack and distrust of formal systems of 
evaluation and was facilitated by the relatively small circles within the 
industry. 
The mixing of personal and professional spheres of life
This section describes how the personal and professional spheres of life 
get intertwined in Russian managers’ networks. This mixing was due to 
both the historical development of the Russian IT field discussed in pre-
vious chapters and more general cultural factors related to the Russian 
workplace. Once established, this intertwining affected the ways trans-
actions were conducted. 
The main focus of this section is on strong ties, particularly the ties 
of friendship, and their mixing with the economic activities of our 
respondents. The remaining text analyzes both the advantages and the 
problems and tensions caused by the efforts to combine friendship and 
business.
The role of strong ties in the Russian ICT business
As described in the previous chapter, for a Russian entrepreneur just 
starting out it was a natural choice to turn to personal network members 
such as kin, family, or friends in order to start up a firm, arrange start-
ing capital, and recruit personnel (cf. Oleinik 2004: 88). Several of our 
respondents had indeed built their companies upon this kind of ‘strong 
ties’ (Granovetter 1973) which in itself had contributed to the dissolving 
of the boundary between personal and professional spheres of life. 
The roots of this mixing can be traced back to the cultural aspects 
of the Soviet workplace, which regulated most aspects of the citizens’ 
daily life, including those which in Western countries were considered 
‘private’. It is not coincidental that the Soviet workplace was sometimes 
dubbed ‘second home’ (vtoroi dom) by workers and the relations within 
the ‘labor collective’ (trudovoi kollektiv) in many ways mixed with other 
aspects of life. 
Though in many ways different from the Soviet era, some of the 
cultural meanings and practices have been carried over to post-Soviet 
workplaces, and studies of the workplace as the nexus of social life in 
post-Soviet Russia have found a strong overlap between the personal 
and public spheres (Lonkila 1998, 2010; Lonkila and Salmi 2005). 
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Similar to these studies, our data illustrates how having people at 
work who were not only colleagues but also kin, friends, or good 
acquaintances extended work-connected favors to other areas of life.18 
In the company of one of our respondents, which belonged to the 
group of the most central software firms in St. Petersburg it was, for 
example, a customary practice to borrow discount cards for shopping 
from one’s colleagues:
I guess that every person has some kind of discount cards for vari-
ous shops, furniture, home appliances and so on. There are a lot of 
these cards but everyone does not have a card for every shop. Before 
we had a quite common practice that an employee planning to buy 
a bed, for example, would turn to the management asking informa-
tion about who in our firm would have a discount card for Maksidom. 
And often it happened that there was such a person: ‘Yes, Boris, go 
to the office 402, your card is waiting for you’. At some point of time 
we understood that we had to organize this information because 
there were so many letters coming in. Thus we published informa-
tion in our company intranet about all cards owned by the firm 
employees, naturally hoping that no single person would be too 
much bothered.
Another respondent (project leader, p26) whose girlfriend worked for 
the same company turned to his boss in order to find a loan to buy 
an apartment. Other examples of mutual help crossing the borders of 
the professional and personal spheres of life, such as borrowing a col-
league’s car or loaning money, abounded in the interviews and were 
likely to affect the nature of our respondents’ economic activities.
The importance of friendship
In addition to showing up in the respondents’ life stories recorded 
in the interviews, the mixing of close relationships, particularly 
friendship, with business ties also emerged in the online survey data (see 
section on data collection). Quite surprisingly, given the instrumental 
formulation of the survey questions,19 the characterizations by Russian 
respondents contained a lot of morally and emotionally loaded descrip-
tions, for example, ‘friend and colleague, consults me on work matters’, 
‘boss and a good friend’, ‘we are good family friends, we spend spare 
time together, play football’, ‘my boss and simply a good person’, ‘good 
and understanding friend, we are working on some projects together’, 
and so forth. Particularly interesting was the share of characterizations 
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describing the emotional closeness between the respondent and his 
network members or the moral qualities of the latter. 
These characterizations suggest that friendship ties were strongly 
present also in the professional life of the Russian IT managers. This 
observation was supported by the fact that, of all social ties useful for 
business or career reported by the respondents, 22 percent were friend-
ship relations. Moreover, 62 percent of all respondents recorded at least 
one friend in their personal network.20 
In themselves, these figures seem to testify to the importance of 
friendship relations – and thus also to the mixing of professional and 
personal spheres of life. But we also conducted an analysis of all rela-
tionship descriptions that implied a crisscrossing of the borders of per-
sonal and public spheres of life. Because the survey question inquired 
about the help received in the context of professional activities, each 
instance of friendship or kin (‘pleasant acquaintances’ – priiateli and 
acquaintances were not included) was counted as an instance of this 
blurring of boundaries by definition. To them were added other kinds 
of descriptions in which boundary crossing was clearly indicated, such 
as ‘work and personal relationship’, ‘more than just a director’, ‘we play 
football together’, and so forth. Altogether 108 such descriptions (31 
percent of all ties) were found, lending further credence to the mixing 
of the spheres.
Finally, when 40 network structures reported by the respondents were 
selected for closer inspection, the role of friendship in the support 
networks of the Russian managers turned out to be even more vital.21 
When the number of ties involving at least one friend at the other end 
(or both ends) was calculated relative to all ties in the network, the 
average indication of the structural importance of friends in the networks 
was on average around 60 percent, reaching 100 percent for nine net-
works. 
This is not to say that all St. Petersburg firms are populated by kin 
and friends or that friendship ties in business are necessarily only a 
Russian particularity. On the contrary, several studies (e.g. Dulsrud and 
Grønhaug 2007; Halpern 1994; Ingram and Roberts 2000; Kadushin 
1995) point to the importance of the role of friendship also in Western 
economic life.22 The mere number of the relations, however, is not 
enough to make conclusions about the significance of these ties, 
since the meaning of friendship varies between cultures (Fischer 1982; 
Castrén and Lonkila 2004; Kharkhordin 2005). In other words, Russian 
friends may expect different kinds of behavior from each other than 
American or Finnish friends. For instance, helping out a friend seems to 
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be constitutive of the Russian friendship relation to a different degree 
than in Finland.23 
Having friends as colleagues, bosses, business partners, principals, or 
clients may be both a blessing and a curse. The remaining text of this 
chapter analyzes the pros and cons of combining business and friendship.
Combining friendship with business
When we asked about possible conflicts between friendship and busi-
ness, managers’ replies revealed the complex relation between these two 
kinds of social tie.24 
First, some respondents distinguished strictly between friendship and 
business (‘the best way to get rid of a friend is to lend him money’). In 
this case the worlds of friendship and business were clearly separated 
(Dulsrud and Grønhaug 2007). 
Second, respondents emphasized the positive aspects of friendship 
for business. The trust inherent in friendship can, for example, help in 
work tasks which otherwise might require complicated arrangements. 
In cases of possible conflict, finding a compromise with a good friend 
might be easier because of a common past and shared worldview. 
Third, respondents questioned – similar to the replies to the question 
on reciprocity – the generalization implied by the question. In this case 
respondents started reflecting upon the combination of friendship and 
business in relation to the situation and person in question. Thus, the 
reply to the question of whether it is possible to combine friendship 
and business would be ‘that depends on the friend and the situation’. 
A good friend might be, because of his disorganized character or other 
features, completely unsuitable for business: 
P5: I find it is stereotypical to think that friendship and work fit 
poorly together. There are many practical considerations related to 
this. On the other hand we have live examples of how good friends 
run businesses together very successfully. I think this depends a lot 
on the people.
Q: In which way?
P5. Punctuality, organized character. A person could be your friend 
but not necessarily a well-organized and good business partner.
(development director, p5)
Fourth, the success of the ‘marriage’ between business and friendship 
was considered to depend on the sequential order in which they were 
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born. As described above, in many cases firms were established on the 
basis of an existing friendship relation or network:
Q: Do you know if the owners of your firm are friends?
P6: Yes.
Q: Were they friends already before starting business?
P6: Yes. This is not an individual example. For instance the firm of 
my husband was established originally by a small group of enthusi-
asts (…) they all know each other and are friends. 
(marketing director, p6)
Since friendship contains elements, such as trust, which are beneficial 
in running a company, building a firm upon a circle of friends, kin, and 
acquaintances was not an uncommon way to establish an IT business 
in St. Petersburg during the 1990s. But sometimes these two ties may 
come into conflict, as in a case where friends disagree upon an impor-
tant decision:
Q: How in your opinion do business and friendship fit together? 
Have you been in situations where there was a conflict between 
friendship and business? 
P1: I have been lucky not to be in such a situation. Though the present 
managing director and partner is our good friend. But I know several 
cases where friendship and business disturb each other.
Q: Why?
P1. Because often it is a question about a decision made by one per-
son. (…) In business there are situations when one person has to be 
leader and sometimes this causes conflicts. In friendship it is difficult 
to be a leader.
(general director, p1)
In the worst possible cases, the emerging disagreement may end with 
the destruction of the friendship tie or business, or both. It may, to take 
a concrete example, be a rational decision to fire an incompetent busi-
ness partner-friend. 
Generally I think that one should not work with friends. If you, for 
example, get into a situation, and these situations occur often, when 
you will have to fire your best friend (…) I got into exactly such a 
situation.
(technical director, p11)
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One of our respondents referred to business as an ongoing ‘test’ (ispy-
tanie) for friendship. In his opinion, friends doing business together 
have to be on guard all the time, because of the fragility of this com-
bination:
Q: How in general do friendship and business relate to each other? 
Have you been in a situation where they got into conflict? 
P10: (…) business is quite a test for friendship (ispytanie dlia druzhby). 
Many passed the test but many did not, and either friendship or 
business crashed. (…) it is a difficult test (tiazheloe ispytanie). I have 
at the moment no conflicts between friendship and business, but if 
you are conducting business with friends you have to be constantly 
ready that it will lead to conflict. The same with family relations. 
Some think that it is a bad idea to conduct business with your wife. 
But there are situations where it works well. 
(director, p10)
The respondent does not detail the nature of the test. But this could 
mean, for example, giving a customer-friend credit without guarantees, 
or not demanding written, formal contracts which could be interpreted 
as a lack of trust between friends.
Unlike in previous examples, friendships could also be built upon 
already existing business relationships. Some respondents considered this 
variation easier than the preceding one: 
In my opinion if a good business exists, a friendship will be born. 
The other way around is rarer and that’s why I try to avoid building 
business with friends.
(general director, p7)
Another respondent supported this reflection by warning against start-
ing a business with someone only because he is a friend. It may be pleas-
ant to drink beer with a friend, but besides this, he may turn out to be 
a useless business partner:
But the other way around [turning business into friendship] – as 
much as you like. You can have a great time working together and in 
addition you may also spend free time together.
(director, p39)
This difference may be due to asymmetric dynamics of transforma-
tion of the ties. Trying to turn a business relationship into friendship, 
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the first type of tie is more or less conditioned by calculative rational-
ity. Dissolving these conditions may happen by giving up the formal 
practices step by step (‘I trust you as an old buddy so I won’t ask for 
guarantees for this loan’). In this case a limited tie will be gradually 
transformed into a more diffuse one. 
The reverse transformation will impose limits on the diffuse friend-
ship tie (for example, the friends will be forced to formalize their rela-
tionship in a written contract). Sometimes this may lead to complete 
revaluation of the relationship and breaking up of the friendship.
Combining friendship and business ties may thus strengthen a rela-
tionship but may also create tensions. For our online survey respond-
ents, these tensions are all the more serious considering both the long 
duration of the reported friendship ties in the web survey data – 19 years 
on average – and the particular role of friendship in Russian culture.25 
In all, this chapter analyzed the functioning of social mechanisms 
and practices governing network exchanges in the Russian software 
industry. It showed how economically relevant resources are not only 
channeled and evaluated through middlemen, but that transactions 
also include a moral domestic element alternative to market-based 
logic. Combining this domestic logic, ties of friendship, and the new 
world of market competition is a potential source of conflicts between 
the two sometimes-contradictory worlds.
The chapter also illustrated the complex interplay of the Soviet past 
and the post-Soviet present addressed in previous chapters. The role of 
strong ties, for example, cannot be only conceived of as a Soviet legacy 
since it was also a solution to the problem of trust in the turbulent con-
ditions in the 1990s in Russia.
In sum, the present-day Russian market economy seems to lean in 
many ways on the functioning of personal networks and the domestic 
logic of action. The next chapter will analyze if this could be a basis for 
generalizing the value of particular and trusted links to any potential 
new relationship as suggested by Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello in 
their account of the ‘new spirit of capitalism’.
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The Spirit of Russian IT Capitalism
This chapter connects the analysis of the actors and their micro-level 
networks to the macro-level question of the nature of emerging Russian 
capitalism by asking what makes individuals commit themselves to 
working in the new Russian economy. The chapter will investigate the 
Russian IT business by comparing its moral aspects with the ‘new spirit’ 
of Western contemporary capitalism found by Luc Boltanski and Ève 
Chiapello ([1999], 2005) in their study of modern French business life.1
The main idea of this chapter is to see to what extent this new 
spirit, based on continuous networking and searching for new contacts 
and projects, are detectable in the most modern part of the Russian 
economy. The chapter presents first the basic ideas of Boltanski and 
Chiapello concerning this new spirit and then analyzes our Russian 
online survey data in order to find out if those data contain traces 
of it.
The connexionist spirit of Western capitalism
Boltanski’s and Thévenot’s justification theory presented in the previ-
ous chapter was criticized for, among other things, its allegedly ahis-
toric nature. In their book The New Spirit of Capitalism, Boltanski and 
Chiapello (2005, 2001) try to address the issue by examining capitalism 
from a historical perspective as a system that is not only constantly 
transforming itself, but also needs to get employees committed to par-
ticipating in the system.
Boltanski and Chiapello focus on the dynamic relationship between 
capitalism and its critique, showing how capitalism has historically 
been able transform itself by adapting to the critique addressed to it. 
For example, while during the 1960s employees were lamenting loss of 
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autonomy and increasing control, in the 1990s employees were required 
to be autonomous, and the control of employees was transferred to the 
customers (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005: 81).
To get employees committed to capitalism, something more than 
mere profit motive is needed. Capitalism has to stimulate participants 
through generating enthusiasm, offer security for them and their fami-
lies, and be coherent with people’s sense of justice by explaining how 
it contributes to the common good. By ‘the spirit of capitalism’ the 
authors refer precisely to the ideology justifying this commitment and 
making it attractive. 
Boltanski and Chiapello distinguish three different spirits of capital-
ism, each of which corresponded with a particular form of the capital 
accumulation process. The first spirit depended mainly on domestic and 
market orders of worth. It corresponded with the traditional bourgeois 
capitalism which blossomed until the end of nineteenth century and 
was characterized mainly by small firms. The second spirit leaned more 
on the industrial and civic orders of worth and corresponded with the 
mode of capitalism which reigned from 1940–70 and was marked by 
managerial firms, big industrial companies, mass production and state 
economic policy. The third form has been emerging since 1980 and is 
characterized by network firms, Internet and biotech, global finance 
and varying and differentiated production (Chiapello and Fairclough 
2002: 186–8, 191). Chiapello and Fairclough summarize this ‘new spirit’ 
in the following manner:
Life is conceived as a series of projects, the more they differ from one 
another, the more valuable they are. What is relevant is to be always 
pursuing some sort of activity, never to be without a project, without 
ideas, to be always looking forward to, and preparing for, something 
along with other persons, who are brought together by the drive for 
activity. When starting on a new project, all participants know that 
it will be short-lived. The perspective of an unavoidable and desirable 
end is built in the nature of the involvement, without curtailing the 
enthusiasm of the participants. Projects are well adapted to network-
ing for the very reason that they are transitory forms: the succession 
of projects, by multiplying connections and increasing the number 
of ties, results in an expansion of networks.
(Chiapello and Fairclough 2002: 193)
This new ‘connexionist’ order of worth (cité) – as the six original orders 
of worth described in On Justification – is ‘a model of justice, not an 
The Spirit of Russian IT Capitalism 135
9780230252394_09_cha08.indd   135 10/21/2010   11:31:16 AM
136 Networks in the Russian Market Economy
empirical description of the state of the world’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 
2005: 356). As other orders of worth, it consists of conventions that 
enable the establishing of equivalences that transcend the particulari-
ties of persons and things. On the basis of a common axiom, each order 
of worth proposes an architecture which specifies the qualities of the 
things that it contains, whether human beings or objects, and thus 
defines the contours of a corresponding ‘world’ (monde) (Boltanski and 
Chiapello 2005: 527). This model (cité connextionniste) is translated into 
English in The New Spirit of Capitalism as a ‘projective city’ and the cor-
responding world as a ‘connexionist’ or ‘network’ world.2
Unlike their counterparts in the 1960s, the workers of the new con-
nexionist world are expected to put everything they have into their 
work, including emotions, personal relations and creativity. Worthiness 
or ‘greatness’ in this world means avoiding life-long projects. An ideal 
employee has distaste for stability, rootedness, and commitments to 
people, things or institutions:
[A]ccess to the condition of great man presupposes sacrificing any-
thing that might impede availability – that is to say, the ability to 
engage in a new project. The great man renounces having a single 
project that lasts a lifetime (a vocation, a profession, a marriage, etc.). 
He is mobile. Nothing must hamper his movements. He is a ‘nomad’.
(Boltanski and Chiapello 2005: 122)
These visionary leaders, coaches and experts are thus ‘light’ and mobile, 
renouncing stability and rootedness. They are capable of establishing 
and maintaining numerous diverse and enriching connections, and of 
extending networks. A truly great man (network extender) cannot, how-
ever, only serve his own selfish interest as a mere networker would do 
but has to think of the common good by being willing to help share his 
contacts and extend the networks:
The relations between great men and little people is just when, in 
exchange for the trust that the little people place in them and their 
zeal for engaging in projects, great men enhance the value of the 
more humble, in order to increase their employability – that is to say, 
their capacity, once one project is finished, to integrate themselves 
into another. Terminating a project without worrying about what 
becomes of those who have participated in it is unworthy of a great 
man.
(Boltanski and Chiapello 2005: 121)
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The crucial tests of greatness and network extending capabilities are the 
moments at the end of the project ‘when people are in search of a new 
engagement, their ability to integrate themselves into a new project 
constituting one of the palpable signs of status. They have potential, 
know how to engage others, they are employable and also capable of 
employing others’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005: 106, 112).
The exploitation in a network world is related to mobility differential: 
the great men are mobile, and exploit the local and stable nature of the 
small. At the same time, it is because of the local connections of the 
small that the great men can have success. The small men live in con-
stant worry of being disconnected or abandoned by those who move 
around (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005: 364). 
In the next section we turn to empirical analysis of our online survey 
data in search of the light and mobile network extenders in Russian IT 
business.
The domestic spirit of Russian IT capitalism
At first sight the IT industry would seem to be a perfect arena for the 
emerging new ‘connexionist’ spirit of Russian capitalism, since it is 
typically based on successive projects conducted by ambitious, well-
educated managers and employees. Moreover, as has become clear in 
previous chapters, leaning on networks is an essential component of the 
new Russian economy. Could we thus find traces of the new network 
spirit in the Russian IT industry? 
We searched for the answer through detailed examination of our 
online survey data on St. Petersburg IT professionals’ personal net-
works.3 These data contain information on 72 respondents and their 
343 network members. In the survey, the respondents were asked to 
name a maximum of six network members, three of whom had helped 
them to accomplish a successful project in 2003, and three others who 
had supported their career in IT (for a more detailed description, see 
Chapter 2).
For each supportive network member (e.g. colleague, boss, subordi-
nate, client), the respondents were encouraged to record different kinds 
of information in our online survey questionnaire, such as a free-form 
qualitative description of the nature of the tie between the respondent 
and the network members (e.g. ‘partner and a good friend’, ‘client and 
good acquaintance’), and the content of the help received from the 
network member (e.g. ‘helped in leading the negotiations’, ‘invited me 
to work in big and interesting projects’). 
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Because our data comes directly from IT professionals and not from 
business management guides as for Boltanski and Chiapello (2005), our 
results are not directly comparable. The nature of our data has to be 
distinguished from the texts of ‘how to behave’ management guides. 
However, studying Russian management guides probably would not 
have been a reliable method since many Russian IT managers do not 
have formal training in business management and were forced to learn 
everything by themselves or through imitating their more experienced 
colleagues. In all, our online survey produces interesting information 
about the possibly emerging new order among Russian managers in their 
own words in one of the most modern sectors of the Russian economy. 
Since the survey was not originally planned to map the emerging 
moral orders of worth, it had some limitations. For example, the replies 
were often either too laconic or too general to give a precise idea of the 
order of worth in question. Despite this limitation, it seems reasonable 
to argue that if a new, connexionist spirit is about to be born in Russia, 
traces of it should be found in the Russian IT managers’ reports of their 
networking activities connected to their ongoing projects or in their 
characterizations of the persons having supported these activities or 
their professional careers in general. These data seemed a good test case 
to see if a world populated by flexible Russian network extenders con-
tinuously in search of new connections and with a distaste for stability 
and rootedness was to emerge.
We analyzed both the qualitative descriptions concerning the con-
tents of help received from network members and the nature of the 
network ties to find indications of an emerging connexionist order of 
worth based on projects and visionary team leaders, coaches, or project 
heads (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005: 79). 
We thus examined all the qualitative descriptions reported by our 
Russian respondents concerning the contents of the help received to 
see if the help was related to searching out and extending network 
connections. However, most descriptions (43 percent) concerned the 
organizing and implementing of various work tasks (e.g. ‘help in pro-
gramming’, ‘helped to solve several difficult problems’). Sometimes 
these descriptions also contained moral evaluations explicitly valuing 
hard work and efficiency, thereby referring to the industrial order of 
worth (‘Worked 16 hours without a break. Showed exceptional organi-
zational capabilities’, ‘energetic approach to work, professionalism, 
capability to solve problems’). 
In only 17 cases (5 percent) of 343 instances of help or support was 
explicit reference made to a ‘connexionist’ type of activity (e.g. ‘he 
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found the first indispensable contact for the project’, ‘he introduced 
me to several people in the beginning of my career’). But under closer 
examination six cases out of these 17 concerned contact with ‘useful 
people’ (nuzhnye liudi) – a Russian expression for the closed circles of 
personal acquaintances needed to get things done. These instances 
of the data (‘he recommended that I turn to a “useful person”’ 
[porekomendoval obratit’sia k nuzhnomu cheloveku]) were thus rather part 
of the domestic world of personal dependencies than of the emerging 
new connexionist world.
Neither did the image of a charismatic and visionary team leader 
emerge in the descriptions of the contents of help. Though the per-
sonal networks clearly had a training and education function for the 
new Russian entrepreneurs, this happened rather through the moral 
category of mentoring. In the language of justification theory, mentoring 
is a ‘domestic’ category since it mostly implies a position in a system of 
mutual dependence. Mentoring was referred to, for example, through 
the forms of direct teaching or learning through following the example 
of a mentor. Thus, descriptions such as ‘collaboration with him was my 
first “school” of working in IT’, ‘I learned from him’, ‘he taught me’ and 
so forth, were noted in the data. 
Mentors were sometimes described as generating enthusiasm and 
new ideas (‘together we came up with many creative ideas which were 
implemented in the project’) and as open-minded people who helped 
to find new ways of looking at things (‘He taught me a non-standard 
approach to solving problems’). These descriptions were written with 
the vocabulary of curiosity, openness, and creativity, referring rather to 
the inspired than to the connexionist world. 
More often, however, mentoring relationships implied a type of 
social tie similar to the relationship between master and apprentice 
(e.g. between the employer and employee, professor and student, or 
a newcomer in the field of IT and a more experienced colleague). The 
descriptions of mentors were often characterized as ‘help’ and expressed 
respect and filial liking extending far beyond the professional sphere of 
life. 
The impression of the importance of moral evaluations in economic 
activities was further supported by the analysis of the nature of the rela-
tionships between our respondents and their network members. First, 
the respondents used a colorful, refined, and emotionally loaded vocab-
ulary when assessing their professionally relevant ties. In addition to 
drug (friend), network members were also characterized as priiatel (pleas-
ant acquaintance), tovarishch (buddy) or znakomyi (acquaintance), often 
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preceded by an attribute detailing the emotional closeness between ego 
and alter (Lonkila 2006).
Second, though 41 percent of all network members were character-
ized solely in terms of their professional role (‘colleague’, ‘client’, ‘sub-
ordinate’), 35 percent of the descriptions contained a mixture of the 
role-based and relation-based aspects of the tie, often combined with 
a moral assessment of the network member (‘client and good friend’, 
‘trustworthy subordinate, an open and frank workmate’). Moreover, 24 
percent of the depictions characterized the tie only in terms of ‘infor-
mal’ aspects of the relationship, without any reference to the formal 
role (‘good friend’, ‘good acquaintance’, ‘pleasant acquaintance’).
Finally, strong ties, mainly friendship, accounted for 24 percent of all 
tie descriptions. This proportion of friendship relations, along with the 
long average duration of these ties, also lend credence to the conclusion 
that the ‘distaste for stability and rootedness’ of the connexionist world 
was very alien to our Russian respondents.
In general these results reinforce the image of the importance of 
moral evaluations in economic activities. Moreover, concluding from 
the analysis of the content and nature of the ties it is fair to suggest that 
the world populated by light and mobile nomads and governed by the 
new, connexionist spirit was not visible in our Russian data. Rather than 
placing general value on linking to others per se, Russian IT managers 
appreciated trusted links with specific individuals they knew personally 
or through someone. 
More than anything, our results suggest that Russian IT capitalism 
seems rather to be animated by a ‘domestic’ spirit valuing the tradi-
tional and trusted ties of one’s personal network. In the turmoil of the 
Russian transition, these ties create stability and a fixed reference point 
in an otherwise constantly changing society.




This book began with a reference to Anders Åslund’s (1995) claim that 
‘Russia has become a market economy’. With the wisdom of hindsight, 
it can be said that this was a hasty statement considering the share of 
barter in the Russian economy in the 1990s. Later Åslund specified 
his claim by noting that Russia fulfils the five criteria of a functioning 
market economy: economic actors are independent from the state and 
are able to act freely, private ownership of enterprises is prevalent and 
property rights reasonably secured, prices and trade are predominantly 
free, state subsidies are limited and transactions are largely monetized 
(Åslund 2007: 2–3).
These criteria implicitly assume that economically relevant transac-
tions take place through market exchange where the price mechanism 
is the sole or main criterion regulating these transactions. This book has 
contested these assumptions and argued that an understanding of the 
functioning of the Russian markets requires a micro-level examination 
of the cultural, political, and moral foundations of the actual transac-
tions.
Åslund’s statement implies that the problems and peculiarities 
observed during transition were due to the Soviet legacy and would dis-
appear in due time. However, the anthropological students of transfor-
mation were quick to point out how the lack of knowledge of the actual 
economic processes on a grassroots level led to interpretation of even 
the problems which were actually created by the reformers themselves 
as Soviet legacies. The spread of barter, for example, followed from the 
monetization of the economy as an unintended result of the reforms 
and differed qualitatively from its Soviet-era counterpart. It was thus 
‘a product of shock therapy rather than the legacy of a paternalistic 
Soviet state’ (Burawoy and Verdery 1999b: 9; Woodruff 1999, 2000). 
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This book has similarly proposed that the formation and significance 
of personal networks in post-Soviet Russia is not only a legacy of con-
nections dating from the Soviet era but also an unintended result of the 
very process of transformation of the Russian society and economy: the 
turmoil of the post-Soviet transition forced the newly emerging Russian 
entrepreneurs to turn to their trusted social ties such as family, kin, 
friends, and acquaintances. 
The tendency of turning to one’s own personal network members 
went hand in hand with the mixing of the personal and public spheres 
of life, the overlap of instrumental and sociability aspects of mutual 
favors – such as the importance of obshchenie – and the use of the domes-
tic principle in justifying transactions. At the same time, this principle 
is constantly being challenged by the newly introduced logic of market 
competition, resulting in frictions and tensions in the networks. 
Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman (2005) raised recently a heated 
debate on the nature of the Russian economy and politics by claiming 
that Russia was a ‘normal’ case when compared to the countries in the 
same middle-income range. They sought to prove, among other things, 
that the scale of the collapse of the Russian economy and the decline 
in output in the 1990s have been exaggerated. In their opinion, when 
compared to other eastern European nations and the former Soviet 
Union, Russia’s economy performed by and large as might have been 
expected (see Shleifer and Treisman 2005).
Nevertheless, it is somewhat unfruitful to argue whether Russia is a 
‘normal’, ‘real’ or ‘distorted’ market economy. All market economies are 
different and a more urgent and interesting research task is to investi-
gate the specificity of the Russian case (Rautava and Sutela 2000: 242; 
Sutela 2003). 
This specificity is in many ways rooted in the developmental path of 
the Russian transition. Introducing a capitalist system in Russia was a 
conscious, foreign-led modernizing project whose critics were identi-
fied with the old Communist regime and thereby sidelined. Post-Soviet 
Russian capitalism was constructed with the help of foreign advisors 
in an extremely short time in the hope that market competition and 
capitalist relations would dissolve the old Soviet patterns and networks. 
In fact, the opposite seems to have happened: the combined result of 
the imported capitalism and the existing networks produced a socioeco-
nomic and political system very different from the original intentions 
of the reformers. 
In Western countries, on the contrary, capitalism developed during a 
long period of time, in which it was constantly exposed to various forms 
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of criticism. Probably partly because of this differing evolutionary path, 
this study found no support for the existence of a ‘new spirit’ of Russian 
network capitalism similar to the one proposed by Luc Boltanski and 
Ève Chiapello (2005) in the French context. This kind of spirit would 
stress the importance of continuous networking and constant mobility 
and would have an aversion to stable and strong ties. As has become 
apparent in this book the Russian IT industry seems, on the contrary, to 
lean in many ways on trusted and established personal ties.
As noted in the introduction to this book, the development of infor-
mation and communications technology has also, in addition to its 
functions in the economy, an important political role in the post-Soviet 
Russia. President Medvedev himself brought up the link between tech-
nological progress and political freedoms in his ‘Go, Russia!’ – speech 
in 2009: 
The growth of modern information technologies, something we will 
do our best to facilitate, gives us unprecedented opportunities for 
the realization of fundamental political freedoms, such as freedom of 
speech and assembly. It allows us to identify and eliminate hotbeds 
of corruption. It gives us direct access to the site of almost any event. 
It facilitates the direct exchange of views and knowledge between 
people all around the world. Society is becoming more open and 
transparent than ever – even if the ruling class does not necessarily 
like this.
(Medvedev 2009b)
The president’s faith in the democratizing effects of technological 
development contrasts starkly with the avalanche of worrying news 
about the state of the Russian democracy. These include, among others, 
harassment of opposition demonstrations, killings of journalists, biased 
broadcasting by the main national TV channels, selective punishment 
of citizens or democratic institutions under various pretexts, and arbi-
trary practices of the Russian police. The president also neglects the 
possibility that new technology may be used to monitor, control, and 
repress citizens. Moreover, his statement is internally inconsistent since 
‘the Russian ruling class’ is simultaneously supposed to facilitate democ-
ratization through the means of modern information technologies and 
not to like this development. 
The president returned to the modernization theme and the rela-
tion between information technology and politics in his speech at 
the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum plenary session in 
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June 2010, citing several recent policy reforms aimed at building ‘a 
modern, strong and prosperous Russia’. This new Russia would, accord-
ing to him, be among the co-founders of the new global economic order 
and political leadership (Medvedev 2010). 
The new Russian economy would not be built ‘from above’, but 
through the efforts of private business in a competitive environment 
where the job of the state is ‘to ensure a good business climate for 
Russian and foreign entrepreneurs, and a fair and honest competitive 
environment’. The most ambitious of the new reforms are the plans to 
make Moscow a global financial center and to create a Russian version 
of the Silicon Valley near the capital. The reforms also include, among 
other things, incentives to innovation companies, a law limiting pos-
sibilities of arresting businesspeople in connection with investigations 
into economic crimes, simplifying immigration rules for highly quali-
fied foreign specialists, and cutting the list of strategic enterprises. 
This kind of new Russian economy would go hand in hand with the 
development of democracy in a process where information technology 
has a specific role:
Information technology is one of the key elements in developing 
democracy in general. The speed and quality of feedback between the 
authorities and society, greater technological possibilities for guaran-
teeing freedom of speech, and internet technology in operation of 
political and electoral systems are all important for developing our 
political structures and institutions.
(Medvedev 2010)
Even though both the intrinsic connection between capitalism and 
democracy in general and the blessings of information technology in 
particular may well be questioned, the emergence of a more diversi-
fied economic structure in Russia with a great number of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises is more likely to be conducive to democrati-
zation than an economy dominated by a few big companies owned or 
controlled by the state. Similarly, the role of the Internet and new tech-
nology for political and opposition activism in Russia is likely to grow 
in importance in parallel with the decrease of the Russian traditional 
media’s ability to fulfill its watchdog function (cf. Lonkila 2008).
However, as with the efforts to weed out corruption from the Russian 
economy and society, the question is, who is going to implement these 
macro-level reforms and how? The answer has to do with the func-
tioning of personal networks, which has been the focus of this book. 
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Because of its qualitative nature, this book has not attempted to answer 
the question of whether or not the Russian economy and networks are 
dominated by immoral and illegal practices. Rather, it suggests, along 
the lines proposed by Oleg Kharkhordin (2005, 2009), that personal 
networks may be one of the main resources that the Russian society and 
economy have at their disposal and therefore merit special attention.
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Appendix: List of Respondents
Respondent Pseudonym Year Sex Age Position
1 Andrey 2005 male 55–60 general director
2 Anna 2005 female 25–30 PR-manager
3 Boris 2005 male 35–40 general director
4 Dmitry 2005 male 30–35 general director
5 Vladislav 2005 male 30–35 development director
6 Svetlana 2005 female 25–30 marketing director
7 Nikolay 2005 male 44–50 general director
8 Mikhail 2005 male 35–40 COO, director
9 Evgeny 2005 male 25–30 director 
10 Leonid 2005 male 20–25 director
11 Sergey 2005 male 25–30 technical director
12 Vasily 2005 male 25–30 CEO
13 Anton 2005 male 25–30 general director
14 Denis 2005 male 44–50 business development 
manager
15 Valentina 2005 female 20–25 marketing manager
16 Konstantin 2005 male 44–50 CEO
17 Viktor 2005 male 30–35 development manager
18 Galina 2005 female 20–25 marketing manager
19 Petr 2006 male 35–40 PR-manager
20 Nikita 2006 male 20–25 technical director
21 Vadim 2003 male 20–25 programmer
22 Pavel 2004 male 35–40 director
23 Jury 2004 male 35–40 project leader
24 Anatoly 2002 male 25–30 project leader
25 Grigory 2004 male 25–30 journalist
26 Oleg 2004 male 25–30 project leader
27 Fedor 2004 male 25–30 team leader
28 Eduard 2004 male 40–45 director
29 Filipp 2004 male 35–40 director
30 Taras 2004 male 30–35 programmer
31 Roman 2004 male 30–35 company director
32 Ivan 2004 male 20–25 system administrator
33 Aleksandr 2004 male 30–35 department head
34 Artem 2004 male 20–25 IT service expert
35 Valery 2004 male 30–35 director
36 Larisa 2004 female 25–30 programmer
37 Nina 2004 female 35–40 team leader
(continued)
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38 Kirill 2004 male 45–50 technical director
39 Lev 2004 male 30–35 director
40 German 2004 male 35–40 programmer
41 Alina 2004 female 45–50 director
42 Egor 2004 male 30–35 company director
43 Gleb 2004 male 25–30 director
44 Maksim 2004 male 25–30 journalist
45 Ruslan 2004 male 40–45 company director
46 Vyacheslav 2004 male missing company director
47 Matvey 2004 male 25–30 company director
48 Stanislav 2004 male 30–35 general director
49 Vladimir 2004 male 35–40 technical director
50 Vera 2004 female 25–30 operator
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1. The software industry or software sector comprises businesses involved in 
the development, maintenance and publication of computer software and 
software services such as training, documentation and consulting (Software 
Industry, Wikipedia 2010). Together with the hardware industry it makes 
up the IT (information technology) sector and IT and telecommunications 
together make up the ICT (information and communications technology) 
sector. Giving exact definitions of ICT or drawing strict boundaries between 
its subsectors is problematic because of the dynamic nature of the field. 
Official statistical categories, for example, often lag behind the development 
of technology and cannot grasp its rapid evolution. The main focus of the 
analysis of this book is on the software sector, but it will be contextualized 
by a review of the Russian ICT sector. Later in this book the terms IT and ICT 
will often be used interchangeably.
2. Their realizing the necessity of diversification is likely to have been affected 
by the worldwide financial crisis in 2008. Anders Åslund considered Russia 
‘as one of the countries likely to be worst hit by the international financial 
crisis, although it entered the crisis with huge budget and current accounts 
surpluses since 2000 and the third-largest currency reserves in the world’ 
(Åslund 2008). Until the crisis Russia’s annual growth in the 2000s had been 
among the world’s fastest and in the beginning of 2008 Russia rose to join 
the world’s top ten largest economies (Sutela 2008a; Gaddy and Ickes 2009). 
3. In Anders Åslund’s (2008) opinion, except for the fiscal policy, almost eve-
rything else in Russia’s economic policy has gone wrong after the arrest of 
Khodorkovsky in 2003. Among other errors (such as failure to develop the 
banking sector and a nationalistic energy policy after 2003) Putin’s main 
project to develop ‘huge state-owned mastodons’ financed by foreign loans 
rather than equity has stalemated large parts of the economy because of 
their inertia and corruption and has also prevented diversification of the 
economy.
4. See also: Lomnitz (1988); Srubar (1991).
5. While accepting the general conclusion on the significance of networks 
in the Soviet Union, Anna-Maria Salmi (2006, 2009) presents three critical 
notes on the discussion of Soviet-era networks. First, focusing solely on con-
nections may run the risk of overemphasizing their role and underestimat-
ing that of money which, despite the significance of networks, still had an 
important role in Soviet society. Second, there is a lack of reliable empirical 
data on the actual use of connections in Soviet society since conducting field 
research on the topic in the Soviet Union was impossible. Finally, the dis-
cussion of Soviet era networks has not addressed the inequality of citizens’ 
access to these networks in terms of, say, gender, place of residence and class 
position.
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Salmi suggests that the debate on networks should not get stuck on the 
irresolvable question of whether or not the networks are more important 
than they used to be. Rather, more empirical research is needed to examine 
the use of networks in various, specific contexts: to whom and in which ways 
do the networks matter in present-day Russia? Finally, she notes how a 
surprisingly small percentage of the claims about networks is based on the 
application of conceptual tools and methods developed in the social net-
work analysis tradition (Salmi 2006, 2009).
6. See, for example, Castrén (2000); Castrén and Lonkila (2004); Lonkila 
(1999a, b, 2010); Lonkila and Salmi (2005); Rose (1998); Ledeneva (1998, 
2006).
7. Sotsial’noe neravenstvo v sotsiologicheskom izmerenii, 2006.
8. Though Simon Clarke’s (2002) study of the subsistence of Russian house-
holds in the 1990s warns against overestimating the role of networks at the 
expense of formal monetary sources of income such as salaries and pensions, 
he also found that social networks were an important resource for Russians. 
Nevertheless the most significant exchange of help took place between close 
kin, and there was no evidence of private transfers constituting an important 
component of a household’s survival strategy (Clarke 2002: 206). 
9. See also: Radaev (2003); Dolgopyatova (2000); Kosonen (2002); Lonkila 
(2006); Ledeneva (2006); MacMylor et al. (2000); Salmi and Bäckman (1999); 
Salmi (1995).
10. In Western sociology of economic life, the role of social networks in the 
economy has been at the center of attention since Mark Granovetter’s semi-
nal article Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness 
(1985). In the article Granovetter emphasizes how economic action is 
not carried out by atomized actors and cannot be explained only by indi-
vidual motives, but is embedded in ongoing networks of personal relations 
(Granovetter 1985, 1992, 2002; Swedberg and Granovetter 2001; Swedberg 
2004: 318). 
Granovetter borrowed the notion of embeddedness from Karl Polanyi – 
though the notion actually derives from the book Die menschliche Gesellschaft 
published in 1932 by the German anthropologist Richard Thurnwald 
(Beckert 2006: 37) – who used it to refer to the intertwining of the economy 
and other fields of life in premodern societies. According to Granovetter, 
Polanyi not only overestimated the embeddedness of the premodern socie-
ties, but also underestimated it in modern societies where economic action 
is also ‘embedded’ in social life through networks of actors.
There is neither the possibility nor the need to summarize here the find-
ings of the vast literature about networks in economic life inspired by 
Granovetter and other students of social networks. This literature covers a 
wide variety of themes, from job seeking, leadership, organizational power, 
information diffusion, board interlocks, joint ventures and inter-firm alli-
ances to knowledge management, innovation and entrepreneurship. Many 
of these studies employ the notion of embeddedness though Granovetter 
himself has later considered the term rather as a general approach than 
a variable to be measured empirically (Rahman 1998: 88, 92–3; see also 
Krippner et al. 2004; for critical views, see Swedberg 2004; Krippner 2001; 
Krippner and Alvarez 2007; Beckert 2006). For a general review of the 
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network research in economic life, see Smith-Doerr and Powell (2005), for a 
review of network research in organizational research, see Borgatti and Foster 
(2003) and in entrepreneurship, see Hoang and Antoncic (2003).
11. Examples of this lack of confidence in most institutions of the Russian 
economy and society abound both in surveys and research literature, on 
Russian Internet forums and in discussions with Russians. Prior to sending 
their children to a kindergarten or school, going to the hospital, seeing an 
unknown doctor or dentist or turning to a travel agency or a car mechanic, 
Russian citizens are first likely to consult their personal network members. 
The Russian traffic police are particularly notorious for their bad reputa-
tion of arbitrarily fining car drivers and driving schools for refusing driv-
ing licenses to the candidates not giving bribes (Lonkila forthcoming). 
Moreover, because of the hazing and bullying that takes place in the Russian 
army, educated young Russian men try to avoid obligatory military service 
either through bribing, using social relations or through other informal 
means (Lonkila 2008). 
The lack of trust also has concrete implications for economic activities. 
One of the IT professionals whom we interviewed, for instance, expressed a 
fear that an application filed at the patent registration office would be sold 
to outsiders. 
12. The quotation marks around ‘Western countries’ indicate the problem-
atic nature of this expression, often used in constructing the ‘otherness’ 
of Russian society. It is clear that ‘Western’ countries do not constitute a 
homogeneous category. Nor are they, if used to refer to modern industrial-
ized countries, located westwards from Russia. On the other hand, as will be 
evident from the next note, the Russians themselves are keen to use ‘West’ in 
their own identity construction, which has long roots in Russian history. 
13. One of the Russian IT directors we interviewed described his experience and 
difficulties in conducting business in Russia vis-à-vis Western countries ‘as 
having to walk five meters under water’. An example of this ‘inertia of daily 
life’ is the fact that up to and at the present time, there has been no phone 
directory published in St. Petersburg, and getting a lost number through a 
number inquiry service is extremely difficult. Therefore losing one’s phone 
book – a database and an embodiment of one’s personal network – is a small-
scale social and economic catastrophe.
14. The functioning of these favors overlaps with the notion of informal econ-
omy: as in the informal economy, favors are neither regulated by states nor 
by market forces, but governed by social and cultural conventions. However, 
grasping the use of networks in terms of the ‘informal’ (Portes and Haller 
2005), ‘shadow’ or ‘underground’ economy or even ‘non-market economic 
practices’ (Smith and Stenning 2006) is difficult since the term ‘economy’ 
tends to miss the intertwining sociability aspect of the favors. Rather, we 
are dealing not only with strictly speaking economic but also economically 
relevant social practices, which are often impossible to conceptualize in 
terms of livelihood or income formation. It is also important to note that 
the sites of the use of networks ‘engage the full range of social and economic 
sites of everyday life – homes, workplaces, schools, hospitals, shops, bars, res-
taurants and local government offices, among others’ (Smith and Stenning 
2006: 202).
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2 Using Networks to Find Out about Networks
1. Social network studies should be distinguished from the Actor-Network 
Theory, by Bruno Latour and his colleagues (see, e.g. Latour 1996, 2005), 
which extends the nodes of the network to non-human actors. 
2. In this text, when there is no danger of confusion, I will use both the terms 
‘network’ and ‘social network’ when referring to personal networks. 
3. In addition to the direct relations between the respondent and his network 
members (‘first order star’), a researcher may also study the relations between 
the network members themselves (‘first order zone’), or widen the reach of 
the network, also considering the relations mediated by the network mem-
bers themselves (‘second order star’). This book deals mostly with the first 
order star, with some consideration to the first order zone and the second 
order star. 
4. These notions are in quotation marks to warn against uncritical application 
of binary dichotomies to Russian society. Rather, network research helps 
to deconstruct such dichotomies as official/unofficial or public/private in 
Russia (Yurchak 2006). As the text below will show, network research in 
Russia shows a continuous overlapping of ‘personal’ and ‘professional’ ties 
as well as the crisscrossing of traditional social cleavages. 
5. These terms are more neutral than instrumental expressions referring to 
strategic use of personal relations, such as svoi liudi, poleznye/nuzhnye liudi 
(useful people). The Russian language also makes fine-grained distinctions 
concerning the proximity of personal network members that are difficult 
to grasp in many other languages. For instance, there is an intermediate 
category of priiatel’/priiatel’nitsa (meaning literally ‘a pleasant acquaintance’) 
located between friend (drug/podruga) and acquaintance (znakomyi), which 
does not have an exact English translation (though it could be translated as 
‘buddy’ or ‘mate’ depending on the context, see Kharkhordin 2002, 2005).
6. The approach utilizing the notion of personal networks as a consciously cho-
sen theoretical and methodological tool has been used in a series of compar-
ative studies based on the structured daily diaries that Russian and Finnish 
secondary school teachers kept of their social relations. These studies, led 
by Professor Risto Alapuro at the University of Helsinki, have supported the 
hypotheses of the centrality of personal networks in Russian culture and the 
mixing of professional and personal spheres of life in these networks.
Lonkila (1998), for example, in his comparative study of the ‘social mean-
ing of work’ for the Russian and Finnish teachers found that, contrary to 
expectations, Russian networks contained clearly more social ties related 
to the workplace than the networks of the supposedly more work-centered 
Finns. 
An explanation for this puzzling discovery was only found through a 
detailed micro-level study of the formation of the teachers’ personal net-
works. This examination revealed how the difficulty of getting an apartment 
but ease of finding work in the Soviet era led many teachers to change their 
workplace in order to teach at a school next to their home. This not only 
saved time in commuting to work in the crowded public transportation of 
the city, but also allowed teachers to put their own children in the same 
school and thereby to ensure the quality of their education. 
9780230252394_12_notes.indd   151 10/20/2010   1:59:14 PM
152 Notes
Ultimately this led to a geographically dense formation of teachers’ 
personal networks around the school, and the mixing of professional and 
personal spheres of life. The colleague of a Russian teacher could, for exam-
ple, simultaneously also be her child’s teacher, living in the vicinity, and 
be engaged in the informal exchanges effectuated through the workplace 
(Lonkila 1998).
7. Multiplexity refers to a social tie combining two or more different kinds 
of relations. One may, for instance, be a friend or a neighbor of one’s col-
league.
8. Noteworthy also are the numerous studies conducted by Simon Clarke’s 
group, see: http://www.warwick.ac.uk/russia/, accessed September 4, 2010.
9. The qualitative analysis of the interview data on the Russian directors and 
managers is a dialogue on at least three levels. First, the respondents are 
often arguing with themselves: it is not uncommon to note that at the 
end of the interview the respondent is contradicting his earlier statements. 
Second, the respondents often detail, contradict, or confirm information 
obtained from other respondents. Third, respondents engage in discussion 
with the interviewer by answering the questions and, in the best cases, 
reinterpreting, denouncing, and criticizing the researcher’s formulations, as 
will become evident later in this book.
This polyphonic and polymorphic network of interrelations cannot be 
represented ‘as is’. The researcher has to construct the most reliable and 
plausible image of the study topic from varied and sometimes contradictory 
material. In doing this, one has to make selections, emphasize some con-
nections and cut others and, finally, present one’s own interpretation. We 
have, however, tried to give voices to multiple opinions as much as possible, 
including those deviating from the majority of the respondents. 
10. The growing popularity of qualitative and mixed method studies has been 
visible in, for example, the panels on qualitative network analysis at the 
yearly conferences of the International Network of Social Network Analysis 
(INSNA). See also Hollstein and Straus (2006), Dominguez and Hollstein 
(forthcoming). 
11. Later in this book the interviewees are referred to as ‘respondents’ or ‘man-
agers’ and each interviewee is identified by work assignment and code (e.g. 
technical director, p20) and at times also by an invented first name. The 
first 20 codes (p1–p20) refer to the interviews of the second round and the 
next 30 (p21–p50) to the interviews of the first round. A complete list of 
all respondents is found in the appendix. The data were collected in the 
research project ‘Russia, Finland and globalization from a micro perspective’, 
led by Markku Lonkila. The Russian interviews were conducted by Tatyana 
Kozlova.
12. Because of the prevalence of male respondents both in the interviews and 
the industry, this book uses ‘he’ instead of ‘she’ where gender-neutral lan-
guage use is not possible.
13. The Russian licentiate degree (kandidat) corresponds roughly to the US doc-
toral degree.
14. In the first round of interviews (30 respondents) the task was to inquire 
more generally as to the structure, evolution, and practices of the IT sector 
in St. Petersburg. In order to get a diverse image of the field, the firms were 
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selected from different areas of the IT industry, such as software design, tele-
communications, hardware, computer magazines, consulting companies, 
and so forth, and the respondents from different positions in the company 
hierarchy, including programmers. In the second round of interviews (20 
respondents) the focus was on software developers’ networks, and the 
respondents were selected from among the top- and mid-level directors, 
managers, and company owners. 
The book is mainly built on the systematic analysis of the second round of 
interviews, but the first round of interviews is also utilized to complement 
and contextualize the analysis. Combined, the data corpus of 50 interviews 
gives a rich and versatile view of the different parts of the St. Petersburg IT 
industry, with the detailed and systematic analysis of the software sector 
during the second round of interviews.
15. According to one of the respondents (general director, p3), this modest 
lifestyle was, however, dictated by the relatively small profits made in the 
software development sector in St. Petersburg: ‘They [the company direc-
tors] drive used cars, nobody wears an expensive Swiss watch. All wear suits 
made in St. Petersburg and shoes that cost less than 400 USD (…) there is no 
money’.
16. The interviews were recorded and transcribed in Russian with MS Word and 
coded with ATLAS/ti text analysis software. In actual fact this meant that the 
interviews were first read through once. After the first reading, my native 
Russian research assistant coded the interviews according to the themes 
appearing in the interview protocol and the new ones which had emerged 
during the first reading. The coded parts of the text were then printed out 
and read through while starting to write the manuscript.
During the process of writing, new themes, which were similarly coded 
in ATLAS/ti, emerged. In like manner, some old themes were observed to be 
futile and were abandoned. During the last round of research, the data were 
still read through once to test the interpretations from previous rounds.
17. The first results of the research are published in Lonkila (2006). This volume 
re-analyzes the web survey data for the purposes of this study. 
18. These data were stored in a MS Access database located in a Finnish server. 
The free-form descriptions concerning the nature of the ego–alter relation-
ship and the content of the support that ego had received from alter were 
coded by the author for analysis. Finally the personal network graphs were 
drawn with the help of UCINET 6 (Borgatti et al. 2002) and used in the 
analysis of the friendship ties (see Chapter 7). 
19. This is not to say that networks would automatically be less important for 
big companies but that their contents and functions may differ: a big com-
pany may, for example, have crucial networks connected to other major 
economic or political actors or both. 
3 The Evolution of Russia’s IT Sector
1. I am obliged to Gordon Cook for his kind permission to use the interview. 
The interview quotes from the Cook report are indicated in parentheses after 
the quotes; all others are from the author’s interviews.
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2. The first L in the abbreviation refers to the small city of Lomonosov, 
located 40 km west of Leningrad on the Baltic Sea. The whole name of the 
firm was Lomonosovskoe spetsializirovannoe montazhno-naladochnoe upravlenie 
‘Spetsavtomatika’, which can be roughly translated as ‘The Lomonosov city 
agency “Specialautomation”’.
3. The rise and fall of the joint venture Dialogue would merit a separate study 
not attempted here.
4. ‘A Bulletin Board System, or BBS, is a computer system running software 
that allows users to connect and log in to the system using a terminal 
program. Once logged in, a user can perform functions such as upload-
ing and downloading software and data, reading news and bulletins, and 
exchanging messages with other users, either through electronic mail or 
in public message boards. (…) Bulletin Board Systems were in many ways a 
precursor to the modern form of the World Wide Web and other aspects of 
the Internet’ (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulletin_board_system, accessed 
November 17, 2009). The Moscow BBS built by Dialogue was the second 
and the St. Petersburg BBS the ninth Russian node in FidoNet, a global 
network named after its developer’s dog Fido. FidoNet enabled communica-
tion between the bulletin board systems and was most popular in the early 
1990s, before easy and cheap access to the Internet became available (http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FidoNet, accessed November 17, 2009).
5. For other founding fathers of Soviet computing, see Trogemann et al. (2001a: 
1). For a more detailed account of Soviet computing, see, for example, 
Trogemann et al. (2001b).
6. See also: Khetagurov (2001: 189); Fitzpatrick et al. (2006).
7. Strela was developed in the special design bureau SDB-245 in Moscow. This 
bureau created the Scientific Research Center for Computer Technology in 
1969, which was to become known as the leading center for copying the 
IBM 360 models (Klimenko 1999: 19). For a recent detailed account of the 
development of Strela, see Ichikawa (2006).
8. The naming of M-20 referred to its capacity of conducting 20,000 operations 
per second (vis-à-vis the 50 of the first BESM).
9. Lebedev was also supervising the construction of BESM-6, the first 
Soviet supercomputer. The great number of different kinds of mainframe 
computers at the beginning of the 1970s complicated the development of 
the Soviet computer industry. To solve this problem, a series of ‘Unified 
System of Computers’ (ES-riad), computers with a modular structure cor-
responding to the architecture of the IBM 360/370 families, was designed to 
enable a large volume of production (Prokhorov 1999: 8–10). 
10. Opinions on this point seem to differ to some extent. According to 
Crowe and Goodman (1994), for example, the first models of IBM 709 
delivered in early 1958 were faster than the M-20, the most advanced 
Soviet computer at the time. Because of this failure, the makers of M-20 
failed to be awarded the Lenin prize. Similarly, Klimenko (1999: 25) claims 
that by the early 1980s, the Soviet computer industry was lagging 20–25 
years behind the Western one in comparison with five years in 1967 and 
one year in 1959. According to Igor Apokin on the other hand (2001: 79), 
‘By the end of the 1950s, when one of the best pioneer computers M-20 was 
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already in operation, Soviet computers had already reached, and in some 
sense even surpassed, the level of American computers’. See also Susiluoto 
(2006: 144). 
11. For more detail, see Nitussov and Malinovskiy (2001: 163–7). 
12. The report was written during the last years of the existence of the Soviet 
Union leaning on both Western and Russian sources as well as on unidenti-
fied ‘knowledgeable Soviets’. The part of the report concerning the Soviet 
Union and CMEA countries is clearly worried about the possibility of 
Gorbachev reviving Soviet economic and military might with the help of 
technology transfer from the West.
13. Though Academician Dorodnitsyn, the long-time director of the center, 
related to the first PCs ‘indifferently’, considering them as toys, he allowed 
the establishment of a group focusing on PC use already around 1982. The 
group worked with IBM XTs writing Russian applications (such as the word 
processing software LEKSIKON) for it and publishing Russian-language 
literature on the PCs. Due to the fall of the Soviet Union the center lost its 
financing and custom base and had to give up the project of installing a 
supercomputer built on Russian technology. (Evtushenko et al. 2001) 
14. This section follows mainly Castells’ interpretation. For other views on the 
development of Soviet computing, see Adirim 1991; Crowe and Goodman 
1994; Klimenko 1999; Prokhorov 1999; Trogemann et al. (2001b). 
15. According to Castells, statism is a system in which the surplus value is appro-
priated by the powerholders of the state apparatus, whereas in capitalism the 
surplus is appropriated by those in control of the economic system. Castells 
defines industrialism as a mode of development in which productivity is 
based on the quantitative growth of factors of production (work, capital, 
and natural resources), whereas in informationalism ‘the main source of pro-
ductivity is the qualitative capacity to optimize the combination and use of 
factors of production on the basis of knowledge and information’. A social 
structure that would correspond to an informationalist mode of develop-
ment is dubbed a ‘network society’ by Castells. In his theory the economy’s 
shift from industrialism to informationalism went hand in hand with the 
shift from an industrial to a network society (Castells 2000: 8).
16. This section describes Russian IT as a part of the ICT sector. 
17. Elektronnaia Rossiia website (http://www.e-rus.ru/site.shtml?id=11&n_
id=4677, accessed December 15, 2006). See also RUSSOFT’s annual report 
from 2008, in which the ICT sector’s share of the GDP was estimated at 4.8 
percent in 2007 (RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008). 
18. The data concerning the ICT sector should be read with care since acquir-
ing exact and reliable figures of its current size is problematic. The area’s 
young and dynamic nature complicate its description with the help of tradi-
tional statistics. Also, publicly available accounts are often based on market 
research conducted by private companies or industry associations, which 
have marked financial interests. The telecommunications sector is also one 
of the Russian state’s strategic lines of business, in which the activities of 
foreign companies are subject to license (Vahtra 2007). 
19. Lanit-Tercom merged with Artezio software company in 2008 to form AT 
software.
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20. Levada Center (2010). The data is based on representative surveys of 
the Russian population over 16 years of age. The questions asked about 
cellphones and personal computers were: ’Do you personally have a cell-
phone?’ and ’Is there a computer at home in your family?’ The question 
asked about Internet use was: ‘Do you personally use Internet (except e-mail) 
at home, at work, or at any other place? If yes, how often?’ The answering 
options were ‘daily’, ‘a few times a week’, ‘about once a week’, ‘2–3 times a 
month’, ‘about once a month’, ‘less than once a month’, and ‘never’. The 
Figure 3.1 summarizes the first five options. These figures are clearly smaller 
than those concerning the six months audience (see FOM estimate below).
21. In 2007 Vladimir Putin decreed the formation of the Rosokhrankul’tura, 
an organization supervising media and culture, with the federal body 
Rossviaz’nadzor controlling telecommunications and IT, thereby creating 
fears about tightening Internet control in Russia. These fears were also 
increased by the arrest and conviction of a Russian blogger, who wrote in his 
LiveJournal blog that the Russian police were ‘scum’ and called for officers 
to be tossed on a bonfire (‘Putin decrees creation of a media and Internet 
regulator’, New York Times, March 15, 2007).
22. No attempt is made here to deal with either all possible relations between 
the Russian state and the ICT industry or the amount of control the Russian 
state has over the economy. Suffice it to say that in general Vladimir Putin’s 
term as president has been marked by an increase in state involvement in 
the economy, especially in strategically important sectors. According to 
Yakovlev (2006), state–business interaction under Putin swung from the 
control of the federal and regional authorities by the ‘oligarchic capital’ – 
also called ‘state capture’ – in 1998–99 to the dominance of the state over 
big business by 2003–4. The state managed to gain control over the economy 
and dissenters, such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, were removed from power. 
However, the notion of the state’s control of the economy is a compli-
cated matter. Though the privatization of the Russian economy had cut the 
number of state-owned firms to 9 percent in 2007 (in addition 2 percent had 
mixed ownership according to the estimates from Troika Dialog 2008, cited 
in Sprenger 2008: 2), federal and regional authorities controlled about 40 
percent of the market capitalization of the Russian stock market at the end 
of 2007, compared to 24 percent in 2004. The largest companies controlled 
by the state in 2008 were in the energy, banking, and communications sec-
tors (Sprenger 2008: 2, 13). 
In terms of ICT, the Russian state also has both financial and strategic 
interests, which are particularly visible in the telecommunications sec-
tor, consisting of the state-owned Sviaz’invest and three major mobile 
operators. As described in previous sections, telecommunications has 
been the locomotive of the Russian ICT industry with the lion’s share of 
the turnover. An intensive struggle for the ownership of Megafon, one 
of the biggest Russian operators, has been ongoing for years along with 
the debate regarding the allegedly close ties between the Russian politi-
cal elite and mobile teleoperators. According to the decision of a Swiss 
court in 2006, Leonid Reiman secretly owned a large part of the country’s 
telecom industry through an offshore fund (Amsterdam 2007). Reiman 
denied the allegation.
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23. See also interview with Economy Minister German Gref (Part 1), RIA 
Novosti, May 1, 2007, available at: https://www.usrbc.org/goverment/russian_
government/executivebranchrus/event/170, accessed August 7, 2009.
24. Of the companies that participated in the poll, 66 percent considered 
the situation not to have changed, and 2 percent considered it to have 
worsened.
25. See ACM-ICPC Programming contest, 2009. However, one of our respondents 
(development director, p5) considered the idea of Russian education being 
better than Western to be a ‘stereotype’, and another (department head, p33) 
regarded the level of Russian IT education as ‘insufficient’.
26. International Intellectual Property Alliance placed Russia on its ‘priority 
watchlist’ with Argentina, Chile, India, Israel, Pakistan, People’s Republic of 
China, and Thailand in 2006–7, when estimating trade losses due to business 
software copyright piracy. See www.iipa.com.
27. For a recent comparative account of Russian ICT, see Dutta and Mia (2010). 
See also Bardhan and Kroll (2006).
28. At the time of writing, the first signs of the worldwide recession, which 
began from the US, could also be seen in the growth of supply in the job 
market. 
4  The Soviet Legacy and Its Transformation in the 
Russian IT Field
1. It also pays to remember the role of material legacy – probably the most vis-
ible form of Soviet legacy for Western visitors of Russia. Buildings, roads, 
communication infrastructure, trains, airplanes, tramways, trolleybuses, and 
cars and many other material objects from daily life still remind one of the 
Soviet era and will continue to do so for many years to come.
2. Michael Burawoy and Katherine Verdery (1999b) suggest that the emphasis 
laid on the legacy aspect of post-Soviet transformation is a combination of 
the development path advocated (revolution vs. evolution) and one’s point 
of orientation (past vs. present). Institutional economists, for example, 
orient to the future and consider the transformation in evolutional terms 
whereas the similarly future-oriented neoliberalists stress the revolution-
ary nature of the change and try to get rid of the reminders of the past as 
quickly as possible in order to give life to the new market order. The defend-
ers of totalitarian theories likewise stress the revolutionary changes but are 
more interested in the extinction of Communism than genesis of the new 
system. Finally, sociologists have suggested various notions to grasp the 
legacy aspect of the systemic transformation, such as path dependency, 
cultural persistence, circulation of elites, or recombinant forms of property 
(Stark 1996).
3. Oksana Shmulyar Grèen (2009: 270–84) considers Komsomol entrepreneurs 
as a part of a ‘co-operative movement’. She also distinguishes an additional 
three economic areas in which entrepreneurial activities were developed in 
the Soviet Union: the Soviet second economy, state-run institutions and 
ministries, and the independent private business sector. The last category, 
which in her mind is ‘probably one of the least studied groups’ among 
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Russian entrepreneurs, can be further divided into groups of young entrepre-
neurs with credentials in education who started as junior managers in small 
private firms or Western companies; ‘mass entrepreneurs’ such as commuter 
traders; and members of the younger generation of the Soviet intelligentsia 
coming from academic backgrounds. 
4. Presently AT Software.
5. Though navigating in the interstices of the Soviet system is likely to have 
taught entrepreneurial skills to part of the population, one also has to 
keep in mind that private entrepreneurial activity was illegal in the Soviet 
Union until the end of the 1980s, and some of this official hostility was 
carried over to the transition period (Aidis et al. 2008: 658). In addition, 
during transition the emergence of entrepreneurs involved in criminal 
or semi-legal activities created considerable amount of envy, annoyance, 
and fear among the population. This hindered the formation of a positive 
image and social status for the new social strata of Russian entrepreneurs. 
On the other hand, the collapse of the publicly funded research institutes 
(military research among others) freed up an educated workforce, which 
supplied the pioneering builders of the ICT sector, for the work market 
(see Yurchak 2002; Rogers 2006; and Shmulyar Gréen 2009 for closer 
accounts of the evolution of entrepreneurship and the related legislation 
in Russia). 
6. Analyzing the transformation of Soviet blat networks requires many caveats 
already referred to in the Introduction. First, the lack of systematic data 
on blat practices in the Soviet Union makes comparisons difficult. Second, 
discussing Soviet networks solely in terms of blat runs the risk of neglecting 
the role of non-instrumental ties. Finally, as remarked by Michael Burawoy 
and Katherine Verdery (1999b), phenomena which at first glance appear to 
be remnants from the Soviet era may have not only taken on new and dif-
ferent meanings and functions in post-Soviet society, but may also have new 
causes.
7. I am obliged to Tiina Saajasto from the Bank of Finland Institute for 
Economies in Transition for compiling Figure 4.1.
8. Belchenko (2008) also quotes the annual survey conducted by the Institute 
of Transition Economics (Institut ekonomiki perekhodnogo perioda, IEPP) in 
October 2008, according to which the payments in arrears had doubled in a 
short time: in October 22 percent of the survey respondents had had experi-
ence of arrears, whereas the same figure in a spring/summer survey in 2008 
had been 10–12 percent.
9. Kosals and Ryvkina (2001) define the notion in the following way: 
‘Otkat – a “kick-back” – is the charge demanded by an official for granting 
an order (usually, a state order), credit (often with interest below market 
rates), subsidy, or grant. It is measured as a percentage of the amount 
provided and it can reach more than half the total sum. Otkat is thus a 
specific form of corruption. Basically, otkat operates within the state sector 
or between the state and private sectors of the economy, but it is sometimes 
even found in relations between private companies. It reflects the privatiza-
tion by an official (or a manager of a private company) of his or her posi-
tion, which is used as a resource for carrying out private entrepreneurship. 
Often, otkat appears as a stable partnership between officials of different 
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ranks (in the case of misuse of budgetary funds), or between officials and 
businesspeople. Otkat became the norm for the system of state allocations 
and state orders’.
10. Integrum is the largest collection of Russian and CIS databases, contain-
ing roughly 400 million documents, among them a great number of 
Russian national and regional newspapers. The search was conducted in 
December 2008 among the issues of 1992–2007 of the following newspapers: 
Izvestiia, Kommersant, Kuranty, Literaturnaia gazeta, Moskovskii komsomolets, 
Nezavisimaia gazeta, Pravda, Rossiiskaia gazeta, Sem’ia, Sovetskaia Rossiia. The 
search takes into account also the conjugation of the search words. I am 
obliged to Sylvi Nikitenkov for conducting the search.
11. http://www.transparency.org/, accessed September 5, 2010.
12. Another respondent told about tax evasion practices and a third one 
admitted to having bribed officials.
5  Social Milieus and Personal Network Growth in the 
St. Petersburg IT Industry
1. Another mechanism for network growth is through a third person introduc-
ing separate parties. In Chapter 7 the central role of brokers is described in 
detail.
2. The relative importance of various milieus and types of brokers varies 
depending on context and culture. Anna-Maija Castrén (2000) showed how 
the role of spouses in Helsinki teachers’ networks was more important than 
in St. Petersburg teachers’ networks; Lonkila (1998; see also Lonkila and 
Salmi 2005) suggests that the work milieu was more central in transmitting 
ties in St. Petersburg than in Helsinki.
3. Perelman refused both the Fields Medal and the monetary prize attached. He 
left his academic career in a top US university and is currently living near 
St. Petersburg with his mother.
4. Certainly not all or even the majority of the IT managers in St. Petersburg 
have studied in the specialized schools, nor did all the graduates of these 
schools go into the IT business. The tradition of keeping in touch with one’s 
old classmates is common to all kinds of schools in Russia, though probably 
more so in schools with a special reputation.
5. According to RUSSOFT, software companies particularly value gradu-
ates from St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg State University 
of Information Technologies, Mechanics and Optics, St. Petersburg State 
Polytechnical University, St. Petersburg State Electrotechnical University, 
Bonch-Bruevich Telecom University, Transport University, and Aerospace 
Instrument Engineering University (RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008: 33).
6. See http://vkontakte.ru/club336, accessed August 12, 2009.
7. It is considered common knowledge that during both the Soviet and 
post-Soviet eras, a study place at a university could be either bought or 
obtained through relations. Though in mathematic-technical fields the 
share of these practices is probably smaller, since the studies require cer-
tain competences, one of our respondents (IT service expert, p34) told 
of having entered a technical university ‘through recommendation’. In 
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practice this meant an agreement where the candidate prepared for the 
entrance examination under the guidance of a specified teacher accepted 
by the university, which was enough to guarantee passing the entrance 
exams. In the case of the interview quote mentioned above one has to 
remember that the student in question had already shown special math-
ematic talent.
 8. Source: http://www.sergey.com/cgi-bin/list-239.cgi, accessed August 19, 
2009. The period 1985–95 was chosen because of the relatively large number 
of graduates reported yearly (on average 69 graduates). The list is based on 
the voluntary reports by the graduates and thus certainly only forms a small 
and possibly biased sample. Though the list was updated in January 2008, 
the last reported graduate is from 2005, and the yearly number of graduates 
in the 2000s is negligible. 
The overall number of highly skilled migrants is, however, much smaller 
than the total migration flow. Moreover, Russians accounted for only 1.4 
percent of the high-tech professionals working with special visas in the US 
in the early 2000s whereas Indians accounted for one third (Gapova 2006). 
For a closer account of the brain drain of the early 1990s from the former 
Soviet Union, see Moody (1996). Moody examines the issue mainly from 
the viewpoint of international security. He considers that the most serious 
brain drain has taken place internally in terms of scientists, engineers, and 
technicians leaving science and defense-related fields for other professions 
such as business. 
 9. The Russian Internet also contains specific forums for job searches, such as 
www.job.ru, www.rentacoder.com, and www.freelancer.ru. 
10. www.vkontakte.ru, accessed May 24, 2009.
11. These figures are overlapping since many people are registered on both 
sites.
12. http://www.tns-global.ru/rus/projects/media/asmi/inet/descrip/, accessed 
May 24, 2009.
13. http://my.mail.ru/cgi-bin/login?page=http%3A%2F%2Fmy.mail.ru%2F, 
accessed May 24, 2009. Specific cases are discussion forums and user 
groups on technical matters such as Java or database programming or 
Russian Linux users, which occasionally also offer meetings in pubs in 
St. Petersburg. 
14. http://www.russoft.org/russoft/?makarov, accessed May 22, 2009.
15. When discussing Makarov, one of our respondents remarked that ‘He is now 
in civil duty, but the [officer] stars shine through’.
16. http://www.russoft.org/russoft/?benefits, accessed May 22, 2009.
17. Mikhail Piotrovsky, the director of the Hermitage museum, was con-
gratulated on his sixty-fourth birthday on December 9, 2008 by Valentin 
Rodionov, the director of Tretyakov Gallery with the following words: 
‘Deeply honored Mikhail Borisovich! Allow me to congratulate you on 
your birthday. For many museum directors you are a model for museum 
professionals. Under your leadership the Hermitage was transformed into 
a museum which maintains its traditions and is simultaneously developing 
according to international standards. We thank you for many years of coop-
eration with Tretyakov gallery and for your work for our common effort’ 
(http://www.idelo.ru/535/17.html, accessed June 15, 2009). 
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18. Kommersant, May 14, 2010. Available at: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.
aspx?DocsID=1368383, accessed June 16, 2010.
6  The Types of Economic Resources Transmitted through 
the Networks of St. Petersburg IT Professionals
1. Ledeneva relies on 40 interviews provided for her by Nonna Barkhatova. 
The data was collected in Novosibirsk regarding small enterprises (coopera-
tives) including service, production of consumer goods, and educational and 
organizational services (Ledeneva 1996: 184, footnote 4).
2. Many US success stories in the field of IT were originally based on study 
mates’ circles. However, as will become evident, the institutional environ-
ment of post-Soviet transformation makes the cases very different. 
3. As with the banking sector, venture investment activity is still in a rudimen-
tary state in Russia. Polynskaya et al. (2008) remark on the establishment of 
the Russian foundation for venture investment (Rossiiskii fond venchurnykh 
investitsii) in 2007 in the IT field. We do not, however, have information on 
its functioning.
4. This evaluation is supported by Anders Åslund’s critical estimate of Russia’s 
financial markets dominated by inept state banks (2008).
5. The interviews were conducted prior to the worldwide economic crisis of 
2008.
7  Social Mechanisms Governing the Informal 
Transactions between Russian IT Managers
1. There is thus no intention of developing a general theory of network cohe-
sion. The social milieus discussed in Chapter 5, for example, also support the 
maintenance of the networks.  
2. Gouldner divides the norm into two parts, of which only the first will be 
dealt with in the text below: ‘(1) people should help those who have helped 
them, and (2) people should not injure those who have helped them’ 
(Gouldner 1960: 171).
Reciprocity is naturally also the subject of a vast anthropological litera-
ture starting from the classic work by Marcel Mauss (2000), the review of 
which is beyond the purposes of this study (see, e.g. Boltanski 1990). In the 
sociological debates on reciprocity, balanced and generalized reciprocity are 
generally distinguished from each other. Balanced reciprocity refers to a ‘tit 
for tat’ kind of exchange between A and B, where A gives an object to B who 
returns another object corresponding to the original one in a short time. In 
generalized reciprocity – one variant of which is often discussed as ‘social 
capital’ – A gives a gift or favor to B and gets it back from a third, unknown 
person.
3. See Parry (1986) about criticism concerning the universalism of reciprocity. 
4. The exact formulations were: (1) There is a saying ‘there is free cheese only 
in a mouse trap’, meaning that if you do someone a favor, you expect the 
favor to be returned. Do you agree with this saying? (2) Have you yourself 
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ever given or received favors in business without any wish or chance that the 
favor would be returned? Examples?
5. It is evident that Ledeneva’s discussion of the ‘affective regime’ is based 
on Luc Boltanski’s (1990) work, whereas the ‘regime of justice’ draws from 
Boltanski’s and Thévenot’s work on justification (1991, see the next section) – 
even though the latter is not among the list of references mentioned: 
Boltanski (1992) suggested the distinction of ‘affective regime’ and ‘regime 
of justice’ which the same relationship may undergo. In the regime of jus-
tice the stress is laid on the equivalencies, explicated to manage disputes. 
On the contrary, in the ordinary course of common actions equivalen-
cies are not subjected to deliberate reflection. In the affective regime, 
persons actively cooperate in the process of shoving the equivalencies 
aside in order to make the cumulation and calculation operations which 
are required to blame and criticise difficult. This regime is described with 
the stress on the present moment, and on a form of forgiveness which 
borders on forgetting. The person who goes on shifting from one regime 
to another looks back over past events in a disillusioned way: ‘how was it 
possible to be such a fool; so naive of me. For the last twenty years I have 
been doing [all these favours] … Now, I realize’. But this experience of the 
moment of truth is not more real than the other. The regime in which 
one makes calculations is no more true, no more real, than the regime 
in which people inhibit their calculation abilities, he argues. It is the 
[change] in the perception of the world stemming from a quick shift from 
one regime to another which gives the illusion of a glaring truth.
(Boltanski 1992, cited in Ledeneva 1998: 143–4)
6. The book was published in French already in 1991 under the name De la 
justification. Les économies de la grandeur (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991). It is 
considered to be a cornerstone work both for the French ‘pragmatic sociol-
ogy’ as well as for the ‘Convention School’ of French economic sociology. 
For English introductions and reviews, see Dodier (1993), Boltanski and 
Thévenot (1999), Wagner (1999), Eulriet (2008), Naccache and Leca (2008). 
For critical views, see Amable and Palonbarini (2005). Justification theory 
has also been applied to comparative studies (e.g. Lamont and Thévenot 
2000, Luhtakallio 2010). The main ideas of justification theory will be pre-
sented here on the basis of the authors’ summarizing article (Boltanski and 
Thévenot 1999). 
7. See Buck (2006) for the application of justification theory to postsocialist 
forms of patronage and Stark (1996) for an early application of justification 
theory to eastern European forms of recombinant property.
8. The number of the orders is not fixed. Boltanski and Chiapello (2005), for 
example, have proposed a hypothesis of the emergence of an order of worth 
based on networks (cité connexionniste) related to the ‘third spirit of capital-
ism’ (see also Chapter 8), and Michèle Lamont and Laurent Thévenot (2000) 
have investigated the emergence of ‘green worth’.   
9. Justification theory is built upon an unorthodox connection between the 
contemporary how-to-behave management guides and the classical texts of 
political philosophy including City of God (St. Augustine – the inspired order 
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of worth); La politique tirée des propres paroles de l’Écriture sainte (Bossuet – the 
domestic order); Leviathan (Hobbes – the order of renown); Contrat social 
(Rousseau – the civic order); Wealth of Nations (Adam Smith – the market 
order); Le Système Industriel (Saint Simon – the industrial order). These orders 
define the worth of the persons present in the dispute. Though the princi-
ples of equivalence differ, all orders share the same common structure or 
model (modèle de la cité), which explains how actors may easily switch from 
one order to another depending on the situation.
To solve an emerging dispute, the parties have to agree upon a test 
(épreuve) which, if successful, will bring the dispute to an end. The other 
party may disagree on two grounds. In internal criticism he may argue that 
the test itself is ‘impure’, and contains beings from another world. A more 
radical, external criticism does not aim to improve the test to be fairer, but 
instead wants to replace the test altogether with another one relevant in 
another world. 
Finally, it is also possible to end the dispute by constructing a compromise 
between two orders of worth where ‘people maintain an intentional procliv-
ity towards the common good by cooperating to keep present beings rel-
evant in different worlds, without trying to clarify the principle upon which 
their agreement is grounded’ (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999: 374). These 
compromises tend to be fragile because they maintain the inherent tension 
and, instead of solving it, temporarily ‘sweep it under the rug’.
10. In addition to the regimes of justification in which the participants look for 
a common principle of equivalence to settle the dispute, there are other pos-
sibilities for ending a dispute. One of them is giving up arguing altogether 
and shoving aside all calculations of reciprocity in a regime of affection 
(regime d’agapè). More generally the settling of disputes contains two dimen-
sions: the presence or absence of dispute on the one hand, and the presence 
or absence of a principle of equivalence on the other. These two dimensions 
produce a four by four matrix where the regime of justification combines 
dispute with the search for the equivalence principle, whereas the regime 
of affection combines the peaceful solution (absence of dispute) with the 
absence (or bracketing) of the equivalence principle (for the remaining vari-
ants, see Boltanski 1990; Basaure 2008).
11. Uehara (1995: 492) is conscious of the limits of his mainly North-American 
data and warns against generalization to the US ethnic groups or other 
cultures.
12. According to Sahlins (1969: 178), balanced exchange is not an effective glue 
in social ties, because it will dissolve the motive to maintain the relation-
ship. Contrary to Sahlins, Leithart (2006) has proposed that one’s interest in 
maintaining a relationship with one’s trusted car mechanic does not disap-
pear even though one pays for his services.  
13. Ledeneva (1998) also describes the Soviet practice of referring to a third per-
son in arranging blat services (ia ot Ivana Ivanovicha).
14. Obstfeld and Borgatti (2008) suggest that brokerage should be defined as 
a process which has a structural condition (three or more network nodes). 
Separating the analysis of the brokerage process from the social network 
structure would help to uncover processes which are otherwise easily 
neglected. 
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15. Iungens is based on the Latin verb iungo meaning to join, unite, or connect. 
According to Obstfeld, this view is related to a variant of Simmel’s think-
ing where the tertius serves as a means to the ends of the group. However, 
Obstfeld remarks that the examples by Simmel refer mostly to the adversial 
tensions within a group.
16. According to Obstfeld, Burt’s structural holes create new ideas but contain 
an ‘action problem’, for the weakly or not at all connected people that make 
up the ‘holey’ network are difficult to mobilize. People connected by dense 
networks are for their part easy to mobilize, but they have the ‘idea problem’ 
already noted by Granovetter (1973): the information circulating in the net-
work is known to all and thus redundant.  
17. See Thévenot (2009) and Feakins (2007) for the role of standards as govern-
ing mechanisms.
18. At least six of our respondents worked in the same firm with their family 
members.
19. The survey questions asked the respondents to name people who had helped 
them to accomplish a successful project or supported them in their profes-
sional career.
20. The respondents were encouraged to describe both the character of the 
relationship between themselves and their network members and the type 
of help received in their own words. Analyzing the qualitative descriptions 
revealed a fine-grained and complex image of the relations in business life in 
general, and friendship in business in particular. Of all characterizations of 
the network members in the web-survey, 41 percent were role-based descrip-
tions (‘colleague’, ‘client’, ‘subordinate’), 24 percent relationship based 
(‘friend’, ‘pleasant acquaintance’ (priiatel’)) and 35 percent were mixing role 
and relationship based characterizations (‘partner and good friend’) (Lonkila 
2006). Sometimes respondents themselves wanted to clarify the nature of 
ties by calling them formal (formal’nye), matter-of-fact (delovye), or work 
relationships (rabochie otnosheniia). 
21. Only the networks containing five or six network members were included 
in the analysis. The network graphs were drawn with the help of UCINET 6 
software for network analysis (see Borgatti et al. 2002).
22. An online survey among Finnish ICT professionals also yielded an important 
number of friendship ties. Due to the small number of replies, however, the 
results are only indicative. Various aspects of friendship have been addressed 
by a great number of studies (e.g. Shlapentokh 1984; Paine 1969; Silver 1990; 
Pahl 2000; Eve 2002; Doyle and Smith 2002).
23. In a comparative case study of the personal networks of female secondary 
school teachers in St. Petersburg and Helsinki during the 1990s, Castrén and 
Lonkila (2004) noted, among other things, differences between the friend-
ship ties and practices of the Russian and Finnish teachers. Though trust, 
common values, and sharing were important in both cities, for Russian 
teachers, unlike for Finns, all kinds of helping were an indistinguishable part 
of their friendship relations. The Russian teachers exchanged more favors of 
a more varied nature than the Finns.
24. The interview questions were: ‘How do business and friendship fit together? 
Have you been in a situation where you felt that business and friendship 
were in conflict?’
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25. In their work on the ‘third spirit of capitalism’, Luc Boltanski and Ève 
Chiapello (2005) have also analyzed the tension between friendship and 
business relations in the emerging new world based on continuous network-
ing and searching for new projects and connections. In this kind of new 
capitalism, there is an anxiety about the instrumentalization and commodi-
fication of friendship relations.
The anxiety of French businessmen about the possible instrumental moti-
vations behind a dinner invitation by a friend seems to be, however, very 
different from the cases from the Russian data we have described above. 
Probably because helping out friends in any possible way is a constitutive 
part of the Russian friendship, our respondents were not afraid of corruption 
of friendship by business but rather of either the incompatibility of these 
worlds or of practical questions of how to organize this connection. 
8 The Spirit of Russian IT Capitalism
1. For English reviews of the study, see, for example, Budgen 2000. For accounts 
in German, see Boltanski and Chiapello 2001; Potthast 2001. Later in this text 
references are made to the English translation.
2. English translations of the French original differ depending on the source 
used. The French term cité (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991) was translated as 
‘order of worth’ in On Justification (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) but as ‘city’ 
in the New Spirit of Capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). In order not 
to confuse the reader, the former translation is used in the remaining text of 
this section. It is illustrative of the difficulties of translation that in German 
cité is translated as polis (Basaure 2008).
3. This section is partly based on Lonkila (2006), but contains reanalysis of those 
data for the purposes of this book.
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